

Joint Publication 3-57.1



Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs



14 April 2003



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides planning guidance and considerations for the use of designated civil affairs (CA) and the conduct of CA activities in support of the joint force commander (JFC) across the range of military operations. It identifies and describes civil affairs forces and organizations, the type of civil affairs activities they perform, and their employment in support of military operations and Department of Defense programs. Additionally, the publication addresses appropriate legal and regulatory civil affairs policy guidance. Joint Publication (JP) 3-57.1 also builds on the foundation of JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other JFCs and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States.

For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | PAGE |
|---|-------|
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | vii |
| | |
| CHAPTER I | |
| OVERVIEW | |
| • Authority for Conducting Civil Affairs Activities | I-1 |
| • Civil-Military Operations, Civil Affairs, and Civil Affairs Activities | I-2 |
| • Relationship Between Civil-Military Operations, Civil Affairs, and Civil Affairs Activities | I-4 |
| • US Policy Regarding Civil Affairs | I-8 |
| • Principles for Planning | I-9 |
| • Operational Parameters | I-10 |
| | |
| CHAPTER II | |
| CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO MILITARY OPERATIONS | |
| • General | II-1 |
| • Command and Staff Civil Affairs-Relevant Functions | II-2 |
| • Conventional Operations | II-4 |
| • Special Operations | II-5 |
| • Civil Administration | II-10 |
| • Multinational Operations | II-11 |
| • Domestic Support Operations | II-13 |
| • Information Operations | II-14 |
| • Public Affairs | II-16 |
| | |
| CHAPTER III | |
| RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES | |
| • General | III-1 |
| • Responsibilities | III-1 |
| | |
| CHAPTER IV | |
| ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS | |
| • Organization for Civil-Military Operations | IV-1 |
| • Command Relationships | IV-2 |
| • Humanitarian Operations Center, Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, Executive Steering Group, Civil-Military Coordination Board, Civil-Military Operations Center, and Civil-Military Cooperation Center | IV-3 |
| • Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force | IV-11 |

CHAPTER V

CIVIL AFFAIRS FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTIES

- General V-1
- Functional Areas V-1

CHAPTER VI

SERVICES' CIVIL AFFAIRS

- US Army VI-1
- US Marine Corps VI-2
- Additional Support to Civil Affairs VI-4
- Summary VI-5

CHAPTER VII

CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING AND COORDINATION

- Planning Process Considerations VII-1
- Theater Security Cooperation Plan and/or Peacetime Engagement VII-1
- Planning Considerations VII-4
- Coordination with Other Government Agencies VII-28
- Coordination with International Organizations VII-30
- Coordination with Nongovernmental Organizations VII-31
- Additional Recommendations in Working with International Organizations and
Nongovernmental Organizations VII-32

APPENDIX

- A References A-1
- B Administrative Instructions B-1

GLOSSARY

- Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms GL-1
- Part II Terms and Definitions GL-4

FIGURE

- I-1 Utilization of Civil Affairs I-3
- I-2 Activities Conducted by Civil Affairs I-4
- I-3 Civil-Military Operations Relationships I-7
- I-4 Planning Principles I-10
- II-1 Civil Affairs Support to Special Operations II-6
- IV-1 Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center IV-7
- IV-2 Civil-Military Operations Center Functions IV-9

| | | |
|-------|---|--------|
| IV-3 | Possible Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Responsibilities | IV-13 |
| IV-4 | Notional Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force | IV-14 |
| V-1 | Civil Affairs Functional Specialties | V-2 |
| VII-1 | Civil Affairs General Planning Considerations | VII-5 |
| VII-2 | Civil Affairs Planning Considerations for Military Operations Other Than War | VII-6 |
| VII-3 | Sample Checklist for Termination Planning | VII-13 |
| VII-4 | Sample Checklist for Transition Planning | VII-15 |

Intentionally Blank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Provides an Overview of Civil Affairs**
- **Discusses Civil Affairs Support to Military Operations**
- **Provides an Overview of the Responsibilities for Civil Affairs Activities**
- **Discusses Organization and Command Relationships**
- **Explains Civil Affairs Functional Specialties**
- **Highlights Services' Civil Affairs**
- **Defines Civil Affairs Planning and Coordination**

Overview

Civil affairs (CA) activities and civil-military operations (CMO) shall be executed consistent with guidance provided in Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs.

Civil affairs (CA) activities and civil-military operations (CMO) shall be executed consistent with applicable treaties to which the US Government (USG) is a party, international and US law, Presidential Directives, Executive Orders, and other pertinent Department of Defense (DOD) Directives and policies.

Commanders plan and conduct CA activities to support CMO.

CA activities are planned and conducted by CA due to the complexities and demands for specialized capabilities involved in working within areas normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments or authorities. While all CA activities support CMO, they also are a distinct element of CMO.

Factors such as mission, policy, and the relationship of the government of the country concerned with the United States have an influence on CMO and CA activities.

CMO and CA activities contribute to shaping the battlespace.

CMO and CA activities contribute to shaping the battlespace by focusing on the civil dimension affecting US objectives.

The purpose of CMO is to facilitate military operations, and to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives.

CMO are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area.

CA refer to designated Active and Reserve Component forces.

CA are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct CA activities and to support CMO.

CA activities refer to activities performed or supported by CA forces.

CA activities (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve the application of CA functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of CMO.

Civil Affairs Support to Military Operations

CA contribution to an operation.

The CA contribution to an operation is a function of the ability to rapidly analyze key civil aspects of the operational area, develop an implementing concept, and assess its impact through the operation.

Liaison

CA are specially trained and suited to perform CMO liaison with the varied civil agencies and multinational partners in the operational area.

Multinational Operations

CA bridge the gap between the US military and the HN military and civilian authorities in support of military objectives of the operation. CA also can provide support to non-US units in multinational operations.

Domestic Support Operations

When responding to domestic emergencies, the US military normally supports other Federal agencies.

The expertise of CA (e.g., conducting assessments, transition planning, skills in functions that normally are civil in nature) in working crisis situations and their ability to operate with civilian organizations, makes CA units/personnel ideal for domestic support operations. CA should never be considered as a substitute for other military forces.

Information Operations

Information provided by friendly, adversary, and neutral parties has a significant effect on CMO planners' ability to establish and maintain relations between joint forces and the civil authorities and general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas.

Depending on the nature and mission of specific joint operations, other joint force capabilities and activities used to conduct information operations may complement or support CMO efforts. Working through the combatant command or subordinate joint force commander (JFC) information operations cell staff, CMO planners seek to ensure that other capabilities and activities related to information operations are consistent with and supportive of CMO objectives. Concurrently, the information operations cell can deconflict CMO with information operations-related activities.

Responsibilities for Civil Affairs Activities

President and/or Secretary of Defense

Because of the politico-military nature and sensitivity of CA activities undertaken by US commanders, whether in a joint or multinational context, CA activities shall be governed by deliberate policy developed and promulgated by the President and/or Secretary of Defense.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, provides advice on the employment of CA and the conduct of CA activities.

Geographic Combatant Commanders

Geographic combatant commanders plan, support, and conduct CA activities.

Geographic combatant commanders designate a staff element within the headquarters with responsibility for coordinating CA activities.

Commander, United States Special Operations Command

Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) provides combatant commanders with CA from assigned forces that are organized, trained, and equipped to plan and conduct CA activities in support of combatant commanders' missions.

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command

Coordinates with the US Marine Corps for CA units from assigned forces that are organized, trained, equipped to plan and conduct CA activities.

Effects integration of CA into joint doctrine, training, and exercises, as warranted.

Ensures CA activities are properly represented in joint training exercise scenarios.

Secretaries of the Military Departments

Develop and maintain programs necessary to support CA activities to meet their Service and combatant command requirements.

Subordinate Joint Force Commanders

Plan, integrate, and monitor the employment of available CA functional assets as directed by the respective geographic combatant commanders or the President and/or Secretary of Defense. Guidance for planning CA activities is contained in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) manuals as well as in doctrinal publications.

Organization and Command Relationships

CMO are an inherent responsibility of command in order to ensure accomplishment of the commander's mission.

CMO encompass the activities JFCs take to establish and maintain relations with civil authorities, the general population, and other organizations. JFCs plan and conduct CMO to facilitate military operations and help achieve politico-military objectives derived from national and alliance and/or coalition strategic objectives.

The organization and command relationships for conducting CMO can vary.

The standard principles of effective command and control and staff operations apply to CMO just as they do for any other military operation. The mission of the joint force, size and scope of the forces dedicated, and resources required will determine the extent of the organization and command relationships.

Combatant Command (Command Authority)

Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, CDRUSSOCOM exercises combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of assigned CA. US Joint Forces Command and US Pacific Command provide all non-US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) assigned CA to gaining geographic combatant commands.

Operational Control

When directed by Secretary of Defense, the gaining combatant commander of attached CA normally will exercise operational control of those forces through subordinate commanders.

Support to Multinational Forces

When authorized by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander may transfer CA to the operational control or tactical control of a US commander within a multinational command structure.

Organizing for Interagency Operations

Coordination of CMO with the interagency community and other civil organizations may be accomplished at different levels and with varying organizations. CA may participate in these organizations as directed by the combatant commander or subordinate JFC to provide their expertise in dealing with civilian organizations/authorities, the populace, and other civil concerns.

Humanitarian Operations Center

Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC). The HOC primarily is an international and interagency policymaking and coordinating body that does not exercise command and control but seeks to achieve

unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation.

*On-Site Operations
Coordination Center*

On-site operations coordination center (OSOCC). The United Nations may establish a structure called the OSOCC as a support organization to a HOC. The OSOCC assists in gathering, evaluating, collating, and disseminating HOC information. The OSOCC also may provide facilitation services for HOC meetings.

*Humanitarian Assistance
Coordination Center*

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC). In a humanitarian assistance operation, the combatant command's crisis action organization may organize as a HACC. The HACC assists with interagency coordination and planning, providing the critical link between the combatant commander and other USG agencies, nongovernmental, international, and regional organizations that may participate in a humanitarian assistance operation at the strategic level.

Executive Steering Group

The Executive Steering Group. The Executive Steering Group plays a policy role and is charged with interpreting and coordinating operational area aspects of strategic policy. The Executive Steering Group may be composed of the principals from the joint task force, the US Embassy, nongovernmental and international organizations present in the operational area, and other USG organizations as appropriate.

*Civil-Military
Coordination Board*

Civil-Military Coordination Board. This board is the joint task force commander's vehicle for coordinating CMO support. The intent is to develop a coordination structure, utilizing any or all of the coordinating organizations (e.g., HOC, executive steering group, Civil-Military Coordination board, civil-military operations center [CMOC]), that permits rapid decision making, provides effective communications, and promotes unity of effort among the various elements involved in a CMO.

*Civil-Military Operations
Center*

Civil-Military Operations Center. A CMOC is an ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander, subordinate JFC, or other commanders to assist in the coordination of activities of participating military forces, and other USG agencies, nongovernmental, regional, and international organizations.

*Civil-Military
Cooperation (CIMIC).
The CIMIC is not US
doctrine but rather North
Atlantic Treaty*

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). CIMIC covers a wide variety of activities ranging from sustaining life to restoring government.

As in a CMOC, CA provide the expertise that creates an atmosphere where effective relationships with the military, nonmilitary organizations,

Organization doctrine representing its approach to describing civil-military activities.

and local populations can be fostered. Based on their experiences, CA have made significant contributions as part of the CIMIC process.

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force.

CA may participate in a joint civil-military operations task force.

The joint civil-military operations task force may be established to meet a specific CMO contingency mission or support humanitarian or nation assistance operations, a theater campaign of limited duration, or a longer duration CMO concurrent with or subsequent to regional or general conflict, depending on President and/or Secretary of Defense, or theater guidance.

Civil Affairs Functional Specialties

Individual CA are specially trained to effectively plan and conduct CA activities and provide support to combatant command CMO requirements.

There are four broad categories of functional specialties — Government Functions, Public Facilities Functions, Economics and Commerce Functions, and Special Functions.

Each functional specialty is related to a certain extent, to every other CA functional specialty, and their interconnecting relationships obviate exclusive interest within any functional area. At the same time, some of the individual functions impose requirements for specialist personnel in more than one skill.

Services' Civil Affairs

US Army CA

All US Army CA stationed in the continental United States are assigned by the Secretary of Defense to CDRUSSOCOM, who has COCOM over assigned forces. However, there is one CA unit assigned to the Commander, US Pacific Command.

USSOCOM provides one Army Active Component CA battalion consisting of regionally oriented companies and structured to deploy rapidly and provide initial CA support to military operations. The unit's primary use is providing rapid, short-duration CA generalist support for nonmobilization contingency operations world-wide. It is not designed or resourced to provide the full range of CA functional specialty skills.

More than 95 percent of USSOCOM's authorized Army CA positions are provided by the US Army Reserve. Army Reserve CA vary in size, organization, and capability and consist of commands with subordinate brigades, battalions and companies. These units, organized around

functional specialties, provide assistance, assessment, planning, advice, and coordination skills at a level of expertise not normally found in military units.

US Marine Corps CA

US Marine Corps dedicated CA structure is maintained entirely within the Reserve Component (RC) and consists of two civil affairs groups (CAGs), each commanded by a colonel. Both of these CAGs are primarily Marine expeditionary force support, which are part of a Marine air-ground task force. While every effort is made to recruit and train Marines with a broad variety of military and civilian skills, each member of the CAG is a CA generalist.

US Air Force

The United States Air Force does not maintain CA. However, a variety of functional organizations and capabilities within the Air Force Reserve Command and Air National Guard, as well as the active force, can support or complement CA activities. These include legal, air mobility, chaplain, supply, health services (to include dental care and preventive medicine services), security forces, special operations forces, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, civil engineering, bioenvironmental, and meteorological specialists who can provide operations and staff support.

US Navy

The United States Navy does not maintain CA. However, a variety of capabilities within the US Navy can support or complement CMO and CA activities. These include, but are not limited to, sealift, airlift, legal, religious ministry, supply, and health service support capabilities. Agility, reach, and flexibility provided by Navy force and platforms, combined with their self-sustaining capability, can play a vital role in supporting or complementing CMO and CA activities. This is especially true when HN infrastructure is severely taxed or damaged.

US Coast Guard

The Coast Guard does not maintain CA. However, the Coast Guard can provide a variety of capabilities, assistance, equipment, and training in helping a country organize and establish a coast guard.

Planning and Coordination

Planning Process

CA planning is based on national military strategy and is consistent with a variety of legal obligations such as those provided for in the US Constitution, statutory law, judicial decisions, Presidential Directives, departmental regulations, and the rules and principles of international law, especially those incorporated in treaties and agreements applicable to areas where US forces are employed.

*Theater Security
Cooperation Plan (TSCP)*

The theater security cooperation plan (TSCP) primarily is a strategic planning document intended to link geographic combatant commander-planned regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives.

CA Support to the TSCP

CA functions are a key part of all military operations, including peacetime engagement activities, and must be fully integrated into all plans. TSCP activities provide opportunities to establish and maintain military-to-civil relations in the region before a crisis.

*CA Contributions to the
TSCP*

Liaison and Coordination — With the full approval of and in coordination with the geographic combatant commander and appropriate US Ambassador, CA personnel conduct visits among multinational and indigenous security forces, and United States government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, as well as US forces and international organizations.

Education and Training — CA are uniquely qualified to train and prepare others for conducting TSCP activities due to their area and linguistic orientation, cultural awareness, and experiences in military-to-civil and military-to-HN advisory and assistance activities.

Area Assessments — TSCP activities provide an ideal opportunity for CA to collect current open source information obtained in the course of their normal duties to update assessments prior to a crisis in a geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility.

*Analyzing Civil
Dimension*

In the course of mission analysis, the centers of gravity concept is useful as an analytical tool while designing campaigns and operations to assist commanders and staffs. CMO planners must look beyond the traditional military-to-military construct in considering the impact of the civil dimension on operations. While the civil dimension applies to both adversary and friendly centers of gravity, in some cases, such as military operations other than war, it can dominate the focus of analysis. Additionally, analysis of the civil dimension is a continuous process throughout an operation.

Predeployment Planning

The early deployment of CA in the operational area can be a great force multiplier, setting the stage for the introduction of follow-on forces into an environment that has benefited from specialized interaction with the local population.

Mobilization of Reserve Component (RC) CA must be a consideration during predeployment planning.

Transition Planning

CMO (CA) planners play a major role in transition planning and based on their expertise, may be the best group to perform this function. In order for these planners to accomplish this task, a clearly identifiable end state and transition or termination criteria for the operation must be developed.

Force Protection

CA must address their particular force protection concerns with JFCs. For example, it may be inappropriate and counterproductive for CA in full combat attire to conduct liaison with local officials. These types of concerns should be addressed early in the planning process.

CA, because of their ability to work with the populace and their overall expertise, can provide JFCs insight into force protection concerns before they become major issues.

Coordination with Other Government Agencies

The significance of the close coordination between CMO and interagency operations is that CA throughout history have displayed the ability to coordinate and work with a multitude of agencies and organizations.

Much of the success of CA in dealing with these many varied agencies and organizations is based on their diverse backgrounds (e.g., lawyers, engineers, police chiefs, international bankers, veterinarians, agriculturalists, and city planners).

CONCLUSION

This publication provides planning guidance and considerations for the use of designated CA and conducting CA activities in support of the JFC across the range of military operations.

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER I OVERVIEW

“It is the inherent responsibility of commanders at all levels to maintain proper, prudent, and lawful relations with the civilian populace and government indigenous to their area of operations. The conduct of such relations is called Civil-Military Operations (CMO). To assist in conducting CMO, civil affairs forces will be made available to commanders when their operations affect, or are affected by, the indigenous civilian populace, resources, government or other civil institutions or organizations in the area of operations.”

DOD Directive 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*

1. Authority for Conducting Civil Affairs Activities

The authority to conduct civil affairs (CA) activities or exercise controls in a given area or country may arise as a result of military operations, international agreement, or an agreement between the United States Government (USG) or appropriate military commander, and the government of the area or country in which US forces may be employed.

a. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, states that CA activities and civil-military operations (CMO) shall be executed consistent with applicable treaties to which the USG is a party, other international and US law, Presidential Directives, Executive Orders, and other pertinent DODDs and policies.

b. **Commanders plan and conduct CA activities to support CMO.** CA activities encompass the activities that military commanders take to establish and maintain relations between their forces and the civil authorities, general population, and nongovernmental institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where the commander’s forces are employed. Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations may entail interaction between US, multinational, and indigenous security forces, and governmental and nongovernmental agencies. These activities may occur before, during, after, or in the absence of other military actions. Factors such as mission, policy, and the relationship of the government of the country concerned to the United States have an influence on CMO and CA activities.

“The US military can expect challenges from ever-increasing missions in a civil-military environment. As such, CA [civil affairs] forces offer unique capabilities that not only enhance the mission but also ultimately advance the US political and economic interests.”

FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*

c. International law, principally the law of armed conflict (LOAC), places certain responsibilities on occupying powers. These responsibilities include taking all possible measures to ensure public order and safety, while respecting to the extent possible the laws of the occupied country, in order to establish civil administrations and to control or conduct governmental matters both during and after hostilities. International law, in accordance with state actions, determines whether a state is an occupying power triggering the occupation rights and responsibilities. Occupation occurs when territory is actually under the authority of a power, and generally follows the cessation of hostilities in the occupied territory. Occupation is a question of fact based on the ability of the occupying power to render the occupied

government incapable of exercising public authority. However, mere presence of foreign forces in a state does not confer occupation rights or responsibilities on that force. Foreign forces present in a sovereign state by consent exercise rights and responsibilities arising from international agreements. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led force in Bosnia (Stabilization Force and its predecessor Implementation Force) administer the region in accordance with the Dayton Accords. The Stabilization Force is not an occupying force and has neither the rights nor responsibilities of an occupying force.

For further detail concerning CA policy and responsibilities, refer to DODD 2000.13, Civil Affairs, and Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

2. Civil-Military Operations, Civil Affairs, and Civil Affairs Activities

CMO and CA activities contribute to shaping the battlespace by focusing on the civil dimension and its impact on military operations. Analysis of the civil dimension will also identify those factors which can limit the impact of military operations on the civilian population.

Chapter VII, “Civil Affairs Planning and Coordination,” subparagraph 3d, contains a detailed discussion of the effect of the civil dimension on military operations.

a. **Civil-Military Operations.** The purpose of CMO is to facilitate military operations, and to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. CMO are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They also may occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. CMO may be performed by designated CA, by other military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces.

(1) CMO occur across the range of military operations.

(2) The relative effort and resources devoted to CMO vary with the nature of the joint force’s primary mission. CMO requirements should be considered during the deliberate and crisis action planning processes.

“CMO [civil-military operations] are conducted to minimize civilian interference with military operations, to maximize support for operations, and to meet the commander’s legal responsibilities and moral obligations to civilian populations within the commander’s area of control.”

JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations

“These forces [civil affairs forces] are designed to secure support from the civilian population, fulfill important civil requirements consistent with military missions, and create as positive an effect as possible on friends, allies, and governing authorities.”

JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations

“All CA [civil affairs] activities support CMO [civil-military operations]. They embrace the relationship of military forces with civil authorities, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], IOs [international organizations], and populations in areas where military forces are present.”

FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations

b. **Civil Affairs.** CA refer to designated Active and Reserve Component (AC and RC) forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct CA activities and to support CMO. Figure I-1 highlights how CA forces should be utilized as directed in DODD 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*.



Figure I-1. Utilization of Civil Affairs

c. **Civil Affairs Activities.** CA activities refer to activities performed or supported by CA that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve the application of CA functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of CMO. Use of dedicated CA and the conduct of CA activities will enhance planned CMO by helping to ensure civil authorities and the indigenous population understand the requirement for compliance with controls, regulations, directives, or other measures taken by military commanders to accomplish their military missions and attain US objectives. Figure I-2 depicts some of the activities that may be conducted by CA as outlined in DODD 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*.




Figure I-2. Activities Conducted by Civil Affairs

3. Relationship Between Civil-Military Operations, Civil Affairs, and Civil Affairs Activities

a. CMO are an inherent responsibility of the joint force commander (JFC) and during war are conducted to both keep civilian populations within the commander’s operational area from interfering with military operations and to minimize the military’s impact on the civilian population. In military operations other than war (MOOTW), there may be more emphasis on using CMO forces with specific capabilities to provide relief to the populace in the operational area. Although MOOTW may involve both combat and noncombat operations, a balanced effort to provide stability using both combat forces to defeat hostile forces and CMO assets to strengthen the civilian infrastructure must be planned for by the JFC. CMO planning enhances the transition to civilian control from the outset of operations.

b. The JFC normally establishes a distinct, full-time CMO staff element comprised of CA to centralize direction and oversight of planning, coordination, implementation, and conduct of CMO. While CA and psychological operations (PSYOP) units may form the nucleus of any CMO, the joint force enablers performing CMO include other special operations forces (SOF), legal support, engineer, transportation, health service support, military police, security forces, and maneuver units. The following illustrates typical examples of CMO.

(1) Several bridges important to the commercial activities and economy of the region within the JFC's operational area were heavily damaged during initial joint urban operations. While the bridges were not supporting the joint force's main supply route, the CMO staff advised the JFC of the bridges' importance to the local area. Accordingly, joint force engineers were ordered to make emergency repairs while the CMO staff coordinated with the foreign national government for longer range and more substantial repairs. Joint force PSYOP and public affairs personnel coordinated publicity of the joint force's support to this project.

(2) Most road networks and other infrastructure were destroyed by a hurricane in a number of foreign countries within an adjoining region. A US joint task force was established to conduct CMO to provide assistance to the populace in these affected countries. Initial helicopter support was provided to distribute relief supplies as well as conduct search and rescue operations in areas inaccessible by other means. Once helicopter units were able to provide life saving support to the populace, engineer and bridging units were deployed to commence rebuilding the road networks and other infrastructure, where possible. As the engineer and bridging units repaired the road networks, additional transportation units (e.g., truck units) were deployed to provide support to the populace and reduce the requirement for helicopters.

OPERATION DESERT STORM

[304th Civil Affairs Brigade]:

“ . . . Provided the interface between the Support Command and the KTF [Kuwaiti Task Force]/Civil Affairs Task Force on issues concerning the emergency reconstruction and restoration phases in Kuwait. . . . (1) Developed Letter of Instruction for convoy movement into Kuwait including procedures for clearing TCN [third country nationals] drivers at the border. (2) Provided military escorts for various businessmen, Interagency Environmental Assistance Team representatives, USIS [United States Information Service] agents, and government commercial officers visiting Kuwait. Counseled US firms desiring to [do] business in Kuwait. (3) Developed a database directory for the Kuwaiti government of over ninety companies and 128 proposals for goods and services offered to support the Kuwaiti restoration effort. (4) Facilitated the acquisition and delivery of fire fighting equipment, cranes, and generators for the Kuwaiti reconstruction effort. (5) Developed a directory of 174 proposals and 85 resumes from individuals and companies offering their services to clean up the oil spill, and/or extinguish the oil fires in Kuwait.”

**SOURCE: 304th Civil Affairs Brigade
Command Report, Operation DESERT STORM**

c. CA assist the JFC by performing a comprehensive mission analysis and participating in developing courses of action that consider the civil implications of the commander's missions. These forces have a primary role in planning, coordinating, and conducting CMO by the joint force. CA are organized, trained, and equipped to support CMO and conduct CA activities.

d. CA activities usually are planned, directed, and conducted by CA due to the complexities and demands for specialized capabilities involved in working within areas normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments or authorities. Chapter V, “Civil Affairs Functional Specialties,” discusses the four broad functional specialty skill categories of government, public facilities, economics and commerce, and special functions unique to the CA that enable them to bridge the gap between the joint

force and the civil sector. While all CA activities support CMO, they also are a distinct element of CMO. The following examples depict the specialized nature of CA activities.

(1) A region within the JFC's operational area becomes contaminated as a result of upwind oil field fire deliberately set by a hostile neighboring despot. The region's primary economic resources are agriculture and livestock, both of which are affected by the fires. Long-term complications can severely limit the stocks of food available to local inhabitants and impact levels of employment within the region's economy. This may in turn require the JFC to assume responsibility for providing life-sustaining needs of the civilian population. A CA economics and commerce functional specialist team is deployed to assist in determining a solution to the problem. Working with the foreign national government and its regional representatives, the team coordinates with international organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to restore the region's food and agriculture systems, thus avoiding adverse effects on both the civilian populace and joint force operations.

KEY TERM

Dislocated Civilian

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN: A broad term that includes, but is not limited to the following:

Displaced person: A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country.

Evacuee: A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation.

Expellee: A civilian outside the boundaries of the country of his or her nationality or ethnic origin who is being forcibly repatriated to that country or to a third country for political or other purposes.

Internally displaced person: Any person who has left their residence by reason of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of their own country.

Migrant: A person who: (1) belongs to a normally migratory culture who may cross national boundaries; or (2) has fled his or her native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution.

Refugee: A person who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left their home or country of their nationality and is unwilling or unable to return.

Stateless person: A civilian who has been denationalized or whose country of origin cannot be determined or who cannot establish a right to the nationality claimed.

(2) The landing force of an amphibious task force encounters larger numbers of dislocated civilians in the landing area than anticipated, thus impeding operations. The landing force commander, realizing that his unit is unable to handle the volume of dislocated civilians, directs the staff to request a CA special functions team from CA supporting the JFC. CA dispatched includes specialists who develop and implement plans and provide oversight of the dislocated civilian operations, which centralize and safeguard the masses of dislocated civilians. In support of the CMO plan, CA coordinate with the joint force supporting elements for food, shelter, and health services (to prevent and control the outbreak of disease that could threaten military forces). While engineers construct camps for the dislocated civilians, transportation units move the dislocated civilians out of dangerous areas, military police/security forces ensure enemy prisoners of war are separated from the dislocated civilians and health service support units tend to the immediate medical requirements. CA conduct extensive coordination with IOs, NGOs, and the foreign nation government (once the area is secure and returned to friendly control). CA maximize the use of these organizations, reducing the requirements placed on the US military forces to meet JFC legal obligations as well as enabling operations to continue unimpeded by the dislocated civilians.

d. Figure I-3 depicts the relationship between joint force military operations, CMO, and CA activities.



Figure I-3. Civil-Military Operations Relationships

4. US Policy Regarding Civil Affairs

a. **General.** The pattern and objectives of CMO and supporting CA activities in friendly, neutral, hostile, or occupied countries in any given area will be consistent with US, international, and applicable host nation (HN) law and will depend on such variables as US foreign policy, the requirements of the military situation, participation of multinational forces, and other factors. In general, **CA are used to the full extent of the law** to implement US foreign policy and achieve US objectives in the context of military strategy and force capabilities. **Specific guidance** as to policy, plans, procedures, and doctrine to be followed in any given country **may change during the onset of hostilities or after the outbreak of an armed conflict** as circumstances warrant. In the absence of guidance, military commanders should take the initiative to request it and be prepared to execute command CA responsibilities and attain US objectives.

b. **Policy Flow.** Because of the politico-military nature and sensitivity of CMO and CA activities undertaken by US commanders, whether in a unified or multinational context, their conduct will be governed by deliberate policy developed and promulgated by the President and/or Secretary of Defense. Policy decisions generally are transmitted to commanders through command channels. Guidance for specific policies concerning the degree of civil-military interaction to be followed in any operational area may be transmitted from the President and/or Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. **US Commanders Serving as Multinational Commanders.** Policies normally are developed by agreement between member nations of a multinational force and provided to commanders through a council of ministers or a similar policymaking body in which the United States participates. US policy may be transmitted directly from the President and/or Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Should multinational CA guidance be in conflict with international law or specific national instructions, commanders will request guidance from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. **Geographic Combatant Commanders.** Policies concerning the scope of CA responsibility and procedural guidance normally are covered in an Executive Order or by a policy directive originating within the National Security Council (NSC). Commanders should receive guidance transmitted through the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Commanders provide guidance to subordinate commanders, including specific instructions regarding the exercise of authority for CA activities. Commanders maintain close liaison with US ambassadors and representatives from the Department of State to ensure effective coordination and delineation of CA responsibilities and activities.

e. **Functional Combatant Commanders.** Policies concerning the scope of CA responsibility and procedural guidance normally are covered in an Executive Order or by a policy directive originating within the NSC. Functional combatant commanders should receive guidance transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that specifies their supporting CA responsibilities to the geographic combatant commander.

f. **Component Commanders.** CA policy guidance or direction will be provided by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate JFC in specific instructions for the delegation of authority and scope of responsibility for execution of CA activities.

For further guidance concerning responsibilities for CA, refer to Chapter III, “Responsibilities for Civil Affairs.”

5. Principles for Planning

Certain general planning principles apply to the activities of CA. They are the basis for initial planning in the absence of specific guidance. These planning principles are listed in Figure I-4 and described below.

a. **Mission.** CA conduct activities to support the commander’s operational objectives, which may include fulfilling obligations to civilian noncombatants as required by international law, agreements, and policies of the United States.

b. **Command Responsibility.** Authority to conduct CA activities, especially the requirement for assuming the responsibility of civil administration within the operational area, is a matter of national policy, as a result of strategic or operational necessity. As such, the JFC should plan for the use of CA and other types of forces that can conduct CMO. Employment of CA to conduct civil administration requires Presidential or Secretary of Defense approval.

c. **Continuity and Consistency of Policy.** Essential to the success of CA activities, in light of their inherent complexity and political sensitivity, is a comprehensive and clear political-military plan with supporting guidance reflecting Department of Defense (DOD) CMO policy transmitted through command channels by the theater (or campaign) CMO plan.

For further detail concerning political-military plans, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

d. **Reciprocal Responsibilities.** Under Article 64 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the commander of an occupying force has the legal right to require the inhabitants within an operational area to comply with directives necessary to accomplish its obligations as an occupying power, to wit: to maintain the orderly government of the territory and to ensure the security of the occupying forces’ personnel, property, and administration. However, Article 53 and other articles of the convention accord to the inhabitants the right to freedom from unnecessary interference with their property and individual liberties. In all operations, commanders retain certain obligations and responsibilities for the treatment, control, and welfare of civilians.

e. **Economy of Personnel and Resources.** The activities of CA should be limited, where possible, to those involving coordination, liaison, and interaction with existing or re-established civilian authorities. Maximum use of local or indigenous resources should be made consistent with satisfaction of minimum essential civil requirements.

f. **Humanitarian Considerations.** Commanders’ plans should ensure that humanitarian assistance (HA) consistent with international law would be provided to minimize the suffering of noncombatants. The commander’s rules of engagement should reflect the LOAC, the Geneva Conventions, US policy, and the military situation and should anticipate the contact between military forces, indigenous people, and other noncombatants.




Figure I-4. Planning Principles

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

Looting compelled General Thurman to begin the civil affairs Operation BLIND LOGIC on 20 December. At 0953 on 21 December, General Powell told Thurman that the National Command Authorities had formally approved the plan's execution, including deployment of nearly three hundred civil affairs reservists. General Thurman created a civil-military operations task force combining some of his own troops with those of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, expected to arrive on 22 December, and three hundred reservists who would follow over the next three weeks.

[General] Kelly and his staff agreed that [Operation] BLIND LOGIC made a poor name for an operation requiring great skill and high purpose. They renamed the civil affairs operation PROMOTE LIBERTY. The first stage of [Operation] PROMOTE LIBERTY concentrated on public safety, health, and population control measures.

On 22 December, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion landed in Panama. General Hartzog greeted the commander with an extensive list of tasks: restore basic functions throughout Panama City, establish a police force, provide emergency food distribution, create a night watch using helicopters with spotlights, protect property, supervise Panamanian contractors in cleaning up the city, restore the production and distribution of newspapers, and develop a grassroots organization to "sell" the [President] Endara government to the public.

SOURCE: Joint History Office
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Operation JUST CAUSE Panama

6. Operational Parameters

a. **Threat.** Armed conflict may erupt anywhere in the world as a result of shifts in military and economic power centers. Often these emerging centers have differing or fragmented strategic goals. At the same time, however, instances of instability and conflict that center on the diplomatic, economic, and informational (vice military) instruments of national power, involving nonlethal application of military forces, are likely to increase. Additionally, entities such as multinational corporations, NGOs, and IOs

will see an increase in their influence. The influence of other groups and organizations (e.g., drug cartels, international criminal organizations, and terrorist networks) also may escalate. The loyalties of these groups will be unto themselves and in some cases, their activities will assume aspects of statehood, controlling territory, levying taxes, and even raising armies. The problem of achieving maximum civilian support and minimum civilian interference with US military operations requires the coordination of intelligence efforts, security measures, operational efficiency, and the intentional cultivation of goodwill. Failure to use CA in the analysis of political, economic, and social bases of instability may result in inadequate responses to the root causes of the instability and result in the initiation or continuation of conflict.



During Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, personnel of the 411th Civil Affairs Battalion calmed a restless crowd after a US BLU-97B cluster bomblet exploded killing an Albanian boy and severely wounding several others.

b. Relationships within the United States, its Territories, and Possessions. In the United States, Federal law establishes the primacy of civil authorities. DODDs provide amplifying guidance. When directed by appropriate authority during domestic support operations, commanders may use forces, including CA, to provide support to civil authority to assist in restoring basic services and facilities destroyed or damaged, help prevent loss of life and wanton destruction of property, and protect or restore government infrastructure and public order. During periods of hostilities, commanders may have added responsibilities. In addition to the more critical security considerations for their personnel, plans, equipment, and facilities, commanders may have important supporting roles for civilian community civil preparedness and/or emergency operations, disaster relief, and key facility protection measures. In accordance with appropriate DODDs, accomplishment of military support to the civil sector requires coordination of plans and procedures between the Department of Defense and other USG agencies (e.g., Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]).

c. Relationships in Foreign Countries. International law and agreements may require US forces to closely coordinate with HN and multinational forces. Of increasing relevance in today's changing world are instances where military support or even intervention is required to improve the capability, stability, and legitimacy of friendly governments and forces on one hand, and relieve disease, undue hardship, or unrest on the part of the civilian population on the other. In formerly contested areas, inherent antagonisms arising from nationalism, propaganda, or privation added to shattered political and

economic systems will present complications for commanders. These adverse circumstances may include extensive shortages of supplies, utilities, and service functions, as well as numbers of displaced persons clogging movement routes, threatening security, and competing for existing shelter and supplies. The manner in which civilians and noncombatants are treated and the way relations between US forces and the various different political, cultural, and religious groups are fostered, can tip the scale between civilian cooperation or active or covert opposition. Violations of local laws or customs by US forces can seriously undermine the mission's chance of success.

“As we stand on the threshold of the 21st century, the United States, like the rest of the world, faces a dynamic and uncertain security environment. However, we are in a period of great opportunity. The values that we hold dear — freedom, democracy, and free-market economics — are being embraced in many parts of the world. At the same time, the changing global economy and the proliferation of information technology continue to transform cultures, commerce, and governmental actions. Nonetheless, the world remains an uncertain place, with increasingly complex and dangerous national security threats. We continue to face challenges in many regions of the world. Moreover, as we saw in Somalia, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, failed states or states under stress create instability, internal conflict and humanitarian crises. In some cases, governments lose their ability to maintain public order and provide for the needs of their people. In their place, the conditions for civil unrest, famine, refugee flow, and aggressive reaction by neighboring states are created. Despite reduced Super Power tensions, freedom and democracy are under attack in many parts of the world. Achieving a free, peaceful world may require appropriate action on our part and on the part of our like-minded allies and friends. That action will involve military civil affairs personnel, as evidenced by the unprecedented number of recent civil affairs deployments. Given the instability in the world, we should anticipate similar requests to be lurking just over the horizon,”

**Mr. Frank L. Jones
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Special Operations Policy and Support
Worldwide Civil Affairs Conference 2000**

CHAPTER II

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO MILITARY OPERATIONS

“As we look to the future, it is critical that we maintain a presence and develop relationships in regions that are important to our national interest. Our challenge is to maintain an effective military presence throughout the world within a tighter budgetary environment. In order to do so, we must avoid high-cost solutions and seek greater international cooperation. Our civil affairs personnel allow us to do just that. . . The work of our civil affairs personnel plays a critical role in promoting regional stability, preventing or reducing conflicts and threats, and deterring aggression and coercion worldwide. And in turn, civil affairs capabilities provide a wide range of options for our regional combatant commanders, ambassadors, and policymakers.”

H. Allen Holmes
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict)

1. General

Presidential and DOD policy guidance as well as mission orders will determine the objectives and scope of joint CA activities.

a. Operational requirements may involve application of CA activities. CA activities may range from coordinating the removal of civilians from a combat zone, through efforts to interface between US forces, multinational forces, HN, and other governmental or nongovernmental agencies, to the exercise of full military control over an area or hostile government or population. **The variety of CA activities needed to support military operations necessitates corresponding flexibility** in CA organization, planning, and execution.

b. Commanders use CA to coordinate with governmental organizations, NGOs, and IOs based on mission requirements and in coordination with the US Embassy Country Team.

“A joint effort between the US military, contractors, and nongovernmental organizations is what’s making it possible to meet the needs of the Kosovar refugees at the first US-funded refugee camp in Albania.

Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE established the camp . . . to provide food, shelter, and other necessities for refugees displaced by the continued Serbian aggression and ethnic cleansing efforts in the Kosovo region. . . . ‘I think that this camp will be one of the very best,’ said Army Col. [Colonel] Carol Miller, the chief of civil affairs team for JTF [Joint Task Force] SHINING HOPE . . . One of the reasons for this is that we involved the NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] up front.”

Air Force News
26 May 1999

c. CA annexes or portions of theater security cooperation plans (TSCPs), operation plans (OPLANs), operation orders (OPORDs), or operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs) shall be **reviewed by competent legal authority** for conformance with international and US law, treaties, and Presidential Directives.

d. **CA activities require comprehensive planning** and are more effective with maximum adaptation to, and utilization of, local political-social structures and resources.

2. Command and Staff Civil Affairs-Relevant Functions

a. CA contributions to an operation are embedded in the ability to rapidly analyze key civil aspects of the operational area, develop an implementation concept, and assess its impact throughout the operation. CA activities are accomplished through the normal staff functions as follows:

(1) **Supporting.** Provide adequate CA support to US forces during combat operations to minimize noncombatant interference with operations and to minimize the impact of operations on noncombatants.

(2) **Assisting.** Assist other US forces, USG agencies, HN civil or military authorities, or other designated officials, in conjunction with the US Embassy Country Team, when developing and implementing foreign internal defense (FID) and other nation assistance programs or complex emergency responses.

(3) **Advising.** Recommend appropriate actions to commanders to secure and maintain those positive civil-military relationships that have been identified as essential for mission accomplishment.

(4) **Coordinating.** Conduct dialogue or other direct interaction on behalf of the commander with other DOD and/or USG agencies, multinational, or HN governmental civil and military authorities, NGOs and IOs, or other designated groups, to facilitate a positive and mutual understanding of objectives and the commander's action to achieve them.

(5) **Analyzing.** Perform research, examination, monitoring, and interpretation of cultural, linguistic, sociological, political, economic, military, and (in conjunction with PSYOP staff officers) psychological factors pertinent to a given region, country, or operational area. Evaluate developing trends that may impact military operations such as dislocated civilian migration, availability of food and supplies. The analysis could be used as a basis for area studies, assessments, or advice provided to commanders.

(6) **Informing.** Provide the commander with area assessments and other political, economic, and cultural estimates and background data required for mission planning and execution.

(7) **Planning.** Coordinate plans to employ CA with commands, USG agencies, NGOs, IOs, and HN civil and military authorities to determine the best method of supporting assigned missions.

(8) **Preparing.** Draft proposed CA estimates, assessments, agreements, OPLAN, OPORD, and CONPLAN annexes, and other documentation relevant to CA support for operations.

For further guidance on developing annexes to plans and orders, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II (Planning Formats and Guidance).

(9) **Training.** Provide instruction to US forces, HN civil, military, or designated officials and general population in identifying, planning, and implementing programs that are useful to the civilian population and which strengthen the HN internal defense and development.



During Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, civil affairs representatives from the 411th Civil Affairs Battalion help carry boxes of clothing into a family shelter in Gnjiland, Kosovo. Civil Affairs in Kosovo are responsible for making sure the relief supplies go to the people who need them the most.

“Seven soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, Fort Lewis, Wash., and four soldiers from the U.S. Army Reserve 426th Civil Affairs Battalion, Los Angeles, Calif., deployed to Nepal on Oct. 22 for Exercise BALANCE NAIL 98-1. They deployed to support the Commander in Chief, Pacific’s cooperative engagement strategy. The special operations soldiers are using this combined training event to focus training on humanitarian civil affairs activities, medical cross training tasks, and civil affairs engineering assessments.”

**US Army NEWS RELEASE
NO. 97-112**

(10) **Supervising**

(a) As directed or approved by the appropriate US authority, perform oversight of US or foreign personnel or agencies engaged in planning and conducting CA activities.

(b) When directed by the President and/or Secretary of Defense, perform oversight and assume functions normally performed by civil government in those cases where political institutions, economic systems, or other processes of civil administration are disrupted or rendered ineffective by hostilities or other emergency conditions.

(11) **Evaluating.** Perform review and analysis of CA activities to determine and enhance their effectiveness in supporting military operations and achieving US objectives.

(12) **Assessing.** Through predeployment and on-site assessments, CA assess factors existing with the local area and its population both in terms of how these factors can affect military operations and how military operations can impact the populace.

(13) **Liaison.** CA are specially trained and suited to perform CMO liaison with the varied civil agencies and multinational partners in the operational area.



A member of the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade and a local repairman test a well after rebuilding it in Cuthberts Mission at Timehri, Guyana, during Exercise TRADE WINDS 99. This exercise helps teach this Caribbean community how to conduct disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

3. Conventional Operations

“Across the theater, high praise has been levied on the efforts of the US Army Reserve Civil Affairs assets. A large part of their ability to interact effectively with the local population, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], and representatives from other governmental and supra-governmental organizations is the very fact that they are the reservists who bring to the operation their civilian perspective and transferable skills.”

Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience

a. CA support conventional forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They plan, manage, and assist in conducting CMO at all levels and across the range of military operations. This support is provided to both geographic combatant commands and subordinate commands as required.

b. CA supports military relationships with civil authorities, civilian populace, NGOs, IOs, and other government agencies. Being regionally oriented, language-qualified, culturally attuned, experienced

in providing international assistance, and possessing expertise in basic functions of civil governance, CA become a force multiplier in conventional operations.

c. In conventional operations, the historical requirement of coordinating with civil agencies, and assisting the civilian populace often falls within the mission purview of CA. This includes interaction with both stabilized and dislocated civilians within the operational area. Commanders use CA to prepare a dislocated civilian control plan that will help in minimizing interference due to dislocated civilian movement and other ongoing operations. If used effectively, CA also can minimize the magnitude and duration of military involvement in functions that are essentially civil in character. This allows the commander to focus on accomplishing the operational mission.

4. Special Operations

a. Special operations (SO) are operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with conventional operations. Political-military considerations frequently shape SO, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. SO differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.

b. SO have become an integral part of a theater campaign across the range of military operations. While SO can be conducted unilaterally in support of specific theater or national objectives, the majority of SO are designed and conducted to enhance the likelihood of success of the overall theater campaign. SO must complement — not compete with — conventional operations.

For further guidance on SO, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

c. Culturally oriented, linguistically capable CA assets may be tasked to support other SOF that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct, among other missions, FID, unconventional warfare (UW), and direct action missions. The President and/or Secretary of Defense objectives guiding SO are coordinated through the Department of State with host-governments (FID operations) and with resistance organizations (UW operations). **CA support to SO includes, but is not limited to, that depicted in Figure II-1 and as explained below:**

(1) **Information Operations.** See paragraph 8 for more detail concerning information operations.

(2) **Psychological Operations.** CA and PSYOP are mutually supportive within CMO. During MOOTW, PSYOP support various CA activities; establish population control measures; gain support for the government in the international community; and reduce support or resources to those destabilizing forces threatening legitimate processes of the HN government. While CA advise commanders on the most effective military support to friendly or HN civilian welfare, security, and developmental programs, PSYOP promote these efforts through various means and methods

of influence and information dissemination. PSYOP publicize the existence or successes of these CMO activities to generate confidence in and positive perception of, US and HN actions to the target population. CA support to PSYOP may include:

- (a) Support the theater PSYOP plan through coordinated public information activities and providing feedback on the effectiveness of the PSYOP plan.
- (b) Synchronize, deconflict, coordinate, and integrate the plans and objectives of CMO and PSYOP.
- (c) Represent CA concerns in PSYOP activities.
- (d) Coordinate with the PSYOP task force to ensure consistency between PSYOP messages and CA activities, and operations security (OPSEC) without compromising CA credibility.
- (e) Provide liaison to local agencies and civilian authorities and to facilitate access to and use of HN facilities and infrastructure for PSYOP and PSYOP use.
- (f) Develop projects and activities that support the theater PSYOP plan.
- (g) Assist in the development of PSYOP studies, surveys, and products evaluations.



Figure II-1. Civil Affairs Support to Special Operations

For further guidance on PSYOP, refer to JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FUNCTIONS

Special operations have been a part of our military history since the colonial era. In every conflict since the Revolutionary War, the United States has employed special operations tactics and strategies to exploit an enemy's vulnerabilities. These operations have always been carried out by specially trained people with a remarkable inventory of skills. More recent history has caused the United States to maintain specialized forces capable of performing extremely difficult, complex, and politically sensitive missions on short notice, in peace and war, anywhere in the world. In 1987, Congress mandated the creation of the US Special Operations Command with the responsibility to prepare and maintain combat-ready special operations forces (SOF) to successfully conduct special operations, including civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP). . . . SOF provide the nation with rapidly deployable and flexible joint task forces for both war and peacetime activities. In peacetime, SOF can assist a nation in creating the conditions for stable development — thereby reducing the risk of or precluding armed conflict. By training indigenous forces to provide their own security, and using integrated CA and PSYOP programs to strengthen government infrastructures, small teams can help prevent local problems from developing into threats to internal and international stability. SOF work closely with the host nation government, military forces, and population to assist them in resolving their own problems. Their efforts to resolve or contain regional conflicts or respond to natural disasters may preclude, in some cases, the need to deploy large conventional forces. . . . In war, SOF conduct operational and strategic missions that directly or indirectly support the joint force commander's (JFC's) campaign plan. SOF missions originate with the JFC — often with the advice of the joint force special operations component commander — and are directed toward exactly the same ends as the operations of conventional forces. It is as an integrated part of a joint or combined force that SOF prove of greatest assistance to the conventional commander. SOF can help the JFC seize the initiative, reduce risk, facilitate maneuver, and achieve decisive results by attacking operational and strategic targets. SOF also can carry out PSYOP to deceive and demoralize the enemy. As force multipliers, SOF work with indigenous forces to increase their contribution to the campaign plan, and conduct coalition support to help integrate multinational forces into a cohesive, combined task force to carry out coalition goals. Additionally, CA and PSYOP can contribute directly to the commander's maneuverability by reducing the number of civilians on or near battlefield areas. Additionally, SOF play a vital role in post-conflict operations. Many of the talents used in pre-conflict situations are applicable after fighting has ceased, and are directed toward establishing (or re-establishing) the infrastructure required for a peaceful, prosperous society. SOF training skills, coupled with CA and PSYOP expertise, help speed the return to normal conditions, thereby allowing conventional forces to quickly re-deploy.

SOURCE: Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 2000

(3) **Unconventional Warfare Operations.** CA personnel train, advise, and assist other SOF and indigenous forces in planning and executing programs for population and resource control, civic action, political mobilization, civil administration, and infrastructure development aimed at expanding their legitimacy within contested areas.

(a) CA support special forces units in the conduct of UW. These forces provide advice and assistance relating to social, economic, and political considerations within an operational area. Additionally, CA provide the following support to special forces units: (1) Advice on the impact of proposed operations on the local populace in the operational area. (2) Recommendations on the development of resistance organizations and gaining and keeping popular support in the operational area. (3) Guidance on the operation of dislocated civilian camps.

(b) The most important role of CA in UW is supporting the demobilization and effective transition of power from resistance forces to the legitimate government upon cessation of hostilities.

For further guidance on UW, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

(4) **Foreign Internal Defense Operations.** CA forces assist other SOF, indigenous forces, and host-government agencies in planning and implementing population and resource controls, civic action, security and clearance operations, and other initiatives aimed at achieving political mobilization and internal stability.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN ECUADOR

Soldiers from the US Army Special Operations Command recently played a role in the on-going war against cocaine production in Ecuador. By sharing their knowledge and experience in weaponry, small unit tactics and airborne and water infiltration techniques with the Ecuadorian military, they provided the training needed to minimize the production and distribution of illegal cocaine.

In order to be most effective, they took measures to close the gap between the Ecuadorian military and its civilian populace. A representative from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), Fort Bragg, NC, advised an Ecuadorian commander on interaction with communities most likely to be targeted as catalysts for the growth of an illegal empire. . . .

“We’re trying to build stronger civil-military relations here,” said Sgt. [Sergeant] 1st Class David Williams, team sergeant for Tactical Support Team 16, Company A, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) attached to 7th SFG (A) [Special Forces Group] . . . “We need to keep coming back. That’s the only way to build a good relationship between the military and civilians.”

Williams assisted the Ecuadorian civil affairs colonel with operational affairs, accessed the local population in the operational area and provided civic action to the people in those areas by handing out toothbrushes, soap, notebooks, pens and pencils . . .

“The important thing is to visit local towns after the exercise to make sure no damage was caused by any of the operations,” Williams said, “and if there is any damage, those people will need to be compensated.”

**SOURCE: Army LINK News
Public Affairs US Army**

(a) CMO span a very broad area in FID and include activities across the range of military operations. Using CMO to support military activities in a FID program can enhance preventive measures, reconstructive **efforts, and combat operations in support of a HN's internal defense and development program.**

(b) **Civil Affairs.** CA are vital to support theater FID programs from planning to execution. CA are a valuable resource in planning and facilitating the conduct of various indirect, direct support (not involving combat operations), and combat operations in support of the overall FID effort. CA support the reconstitution of a viable and competent civil service and social infrastructures. CA also assist the HN by providing assistance to the executive, legislative, or judicial entities within the HN governmental structure.

(c) **Civil Affairs Employment Considerations in Foreign Internal Defense.** The following are areas that commanders must consider when employing CA in planning and executing FID programs.

1. CA expertise must be incorporated in the planning as well as into the execution of military activities in support of FID programs.

2. Successful FID activities have hinged upon HN public support. Integrating CA and PSYOP with FID activities can enhance popular support for the operation.

3. The sovereignty of the HN must be maintained at all times. The perception that the United States is running a puppet government is contrary to the basic principles of FID. This is important to remember when providing civil administration assistance.

4. HN self-sufficiency must be a goal of all CA assistance.

For further guidance on FID, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

(5) **Combatting Terrorism.** CA participate in their own force protection and antiterrorism programs and support the antiterrorism programs of other units or agencies by planning and conducting CMO. **CA do not participate in counterterrorism activities.**

(6) **Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Direct Action, and Special Reconnaissance.** While CA normally are not directly involved in these SOF missions, they can provide planners in-depth knowledge of the cultures and relationships found within geographic regions. CA can play crucial roles in consequence management.

5. Civil Administration

“Military forces shall not undertake civilian sector rehabilitation activities and military government activities unless directed by the Secretary of Defense, or designated representative.”

DODD 2000.13, Civil Affairs

Civil administration is an action undertaken by US commanders when directed by appropriate authority. Agreements must be negotiated and concluded in accordance with DODD 5530.3, *International Agreements*. **CA support consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration** that supports US and multinational objectives.

a. CA are trained and organized to plan and conduct essential CA activities to assist commanders in the most effective policy implementation concerning reorganizing or reconstituting government structures.

b. Regardless of the program adopted, military commanders should be aware that the manner in which they carry out established policies has a significant bearing on subsequent courses of action (COAs) designed to achieve US security objectives.

c. Support to civil administration has domestic and international considerations. Support to civil administration fulfills obligations arising from US laws, HN laws, international treaties and agreements, and obligations under international human rights law.

d. US forces may be asked to conduct civil administration in a territory with an ongoing conflict. If the conflict is of an international character, Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions applies. If it is of an internal character, Common Article 3 applies. This article requires a baseline for humane treatment of all persons, including detained combatants to the internal conflict. Additional provisions also may be found in the Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Although the United States is not a signatory, many of the US allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are signatories and are bound by the terms of the agreements. Some provisions of the protocols may be considered as customary international law.

e. Civil Administration in Friendly Territory

(1) Civil administration missions in friendly territory are undertaken pursuant to an agreement with the government of the area concerned.

(2) Friendly governments may request military forces perform basic government functions across the range of military operations. Any Presidential and/or Secretary of Defense directed use of military forces must also incorporate plans for the disengagement and transition of these functions back to the appropriate authorities or HN. As the situation stabilizes, civil functions performed by joint or multinational forces also should return to the appropriate civilian agencies. Generally, the transition is gradual and requires detailed, long-range planning.

(3) When authorized, the JFC, assisted by appropriate legal staff, negotiates a support arrangement for civil administration with a foreign nation's government. The civil administration support arrangement defines the expected nature, extent, and duration of the required assistance. It also defines the limits of authority and the liability of military personnel and defines the civil-military relationships that will exist.

f. Civil Administration in Hostile or Occupied Territory

(1) In a civil administration where the United States is an occupying power of foreign territory, international law contains provisions as to the authorities and responsibilities of the occupying power and the obligations of the submitting government, should such a government exist. Furthermore, the exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial authority by the United States as occupying power will be determined by the President. Consistent with established policy, a sound local administration is developed, always subject to the authority of the occupying power. An informed populace is fostered through news media, public discussion, and the formation of acceptable governmental institutions.

(2) Alliances, coalition forces, or nations may be required to conduct civil administration activities across the range of military operations, acting on the authority of a nation, alliance, coalition of nations, or the United Nations. The territory under administration is effectively under military control. The occupying force has an obligation under various treaties to ensure public order and safety and the just and effective administration of, and support to, a hostile or occupied territory. Specific obligations are laid out in these conventions and must be complied with by the occupying force.

(3) Within its capabilities, the occupying force must maintain an orderly government in the occupied territory. Subject to requirements of the military situation, the JFC must analyze military activities likely to increase tensions in the occupied territory as well as those likely to facilitate and accelerate a return to a civil administration. This is especially important in multi-ethnic, multi-racial, or multi-cultural environments where a chosen COA will almost invariably be seen as partisan by one or more of the parties to a conflict.

6. Multinational Operations

a. With the ever-increasing involvement with multinational forces, it is imperative that the US military forces fully understand the special considerations arising when working with military and paramilitary forces of other nations.

b. Political and military intentions of multinational partners will impact planning and operations. The agendas and interests of other nations will differ from those of the United States in many ways. In many instances, multinational forces will not be able to influence the planning effort without prior approval of their home country and its commitment to the concept of operations and mission.

c. The JFC should take into account cultural differences between the US and multinational partners. The JFC should establish standardized procedures that facilitate interoperability among participating forces. All parties involved also should use commonly accepted international terms.

“Increasingly, crisis response operations bring together more and more countries, working together. Multinationality is often considered both a military and a political necessity — militarily because resources can be combined and specialized skills utilized, and politically because it gives greater legitimacy to the operation. In addition, nations working together can learn from each other both on the professional as well as on the cultural level. The crisis response operation in Kosovo is an excellent example of the value of multinationality. One of the things that convinced President Milosevic in the end to accept Western demands was the large number of countries behind NATO’s actions. Support was expressed in various forms ranging from participation in combat operations to opening air space to allied planes to declarations of support.”

**North Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly Committee Reports
Multinationality in Crisis Response Operations
Mrs. Ingrid Rasmussen, Special Reporter**

d. **Civil Affairs Support.** CA bridge the gap between the US military, HN military, and civilian authorities supporting an operation. CA also can provide support to non-US forces during multinational operations. Multinational CA activities should be prioritized through the multinational force’s CMO plan to maximize efficiency of these low density, high demand forces. Commanders should establish liaison with civil authorities, local populace, IOs, and NGOs. This will assist the commander in transitioning responsibility, if directed, to these organizations upon mission completion. One means by which the commander can accomplish this interface is through a civil-military operations center (CMOC). CA staff the CMOC and conduct liaison with the local populace. CA are trained in skills that make them an optimal choice to form the core of a CMOC team into which functional specialties are integrated. CMOC is discussed in more detail in Chapter IV, “Organization and Command Relationships.”

e. In addition to operating as part of a joint force, CA must be prepared for multinational operations with land, air, and naval forces of other nations. Unity of effort in multinational operations proceeds from the political and strategic leadership of the alliance and/or coalition. Participating nations normally develop directives covering a multinational command’s politico-military objectives. They include objectives and policies for the conduct of CMO. CA may provide staff augmentation for joint or multinational headquarters (HQ) in support of multinational CMO. US military standard staff planning and coordination as well as interagency coordination activities are the most likely mission support activities that CA will undertake in the joint and/or multinational environment. Combatant command and Service senior level officials experienced and versed in applicable plans, policies, and programs are best suited to staff teams responsible for conducting joint and/or multinational operations.

For further details concerning operating with multinational forces, refer to JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

7. Domestic Support Operations

Domestic support operations are those activities and measures taken by the DOD to foster mutual assistance and support between the DOD and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies.

[Hurricane ANDREW] “Because a Disaster Assistance Operation [domestic support operation] is essentially a Civil-Military Operation for the military and demands extensive Civil Affairs participation, a lack of Civil Affairs assets can be detrimental to mission success. Until the Civil Affairs assets deployed into the operational area, their normal mission activities were conducted by the units’ staffs and leaders. Units did a very good job in conducting these operations. However, the staffs lacked the special skills and experience of Civil Affairs personnel.”

**Center for Army Lessons Learned
Newsletter No. 93-6**

a. Domestic support operations usually follow Presidential designation of a **Federal Disaster Area or a Federal State of Emergency**. Domestic support operations include the efforts and resources from federal agencies, state and local governments, and voluntary organizations. DODDs referring to military support to civil authorities currently are being consolidated into military assistance to civil authorities directives. DODDs regarding military assistance to civil authorities set forth policy and responsibilities as well as govern the use of the military during domestic support operations. **When the US military responds to domestic emergencies, it normally will be in support of other Federal agencies** (e.g., FEMA or the Department of Justice). However, the Federal Response Plan designates the Department of Defense, through the US Army Corps of Engineers, the primary agency responsible for public works and engineering.

b. Domestic support operations are divided into three broad categories: military support to domestic relief operations, military support to civilian law enforcement agencies, and military support to crisis management or consequence management operations involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incidents. US military support to domestic support operations may be a result of civil disturbances, earthquakes, wildfires, floods, hurricanes, oil spills, mass immigration emergencies, radiological emergencies, chemical spills, or other public disasters or equivalent emergencies that endanger life and property or disrupt the usual process of government.

c. In the event of an emergency, US military forces must be prepared to assist civil authorities in restoring essential services, repairing facilities, and taking such actions as directed to ensure a return to normalcy. **Laws and regulations limit the use of US military forces in domestic support operations.** The primary statute restricting military support to civilian law enforcement is the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), (18 United States Code (USC) 1385), and the primary regulation is DODD 5525.5, “DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.”) The PCA prohibits most direct participation in search, seizure, arrest, or similar law enforcement activity by military personnel in support of civilian law enforcement; exceptions include the use of National Guard personnel on state status and cases involving nuclear material.

d. The expertise of CA (e.g., assisting in assessments, transition planning, and skills in functions that normally are civil in nature) in working crisis situations, and their ability to operate with civilian organizations, makes CA units/personnel ideal for conducting domestic support operations. CA should never be considered as a substitute for other military forces.

For further detail relating to military support to civil authorities and military support to civilian law enforcement agencies, refer to the Federal Response Plan with Terrorism Annex, DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA), DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, and JP 3-07.7, Joint Doctrine for Civil Support.

8. Information Operations

“Information operations doctrine recognizes that CA [civil affairs] specialists help the commander shape his military information environment. The routine meetings with civil authorities represent both an opportunity for CA to collect information for the commander as well as an opportunity to disseminate selected messages to key leaders and decisionmakers among FWFs [former warring factions]. . . . CA units are one of the primary means of delivering themes and messages to the local population through their daily activities. While themes and messages may be developed and approved several headquarters higher, it is the responsibility of the CA elements who are routinely interfacing with the local officials to deliver these messages and provide feedback as to their effectiveness.”

Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 99-15

a. **General.** Information operations are concerned with affecting adversary information and information systems while protecting one’s own information and information systems. To accomplish this goal, commanders, their staffs and specifically information operations planners work to deconflict, integrate, synchronize, and coordinate various capabilities and activities to achieve information operations objectives that support the JFC’s mission objectives. CMO should also be coordinated to successfully accomplish information operations.

b. Information Operations and Civil-Military Operations

(1) Information provided by friendly, adversary, and neutral parties has a significant effect on commanders and their staffs ability to establish and maintain relations between joint forces and the civil authorities and general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas.

(2) Depending on the nature and mission of specific joint operations, other joint force capabilities and activities used to conduct information operations can complement, support, or otherwise affect CMO efforts. Working through the combatant command or subordinate JFC information operations cell or information operations working group, CMO and information operations planners seek to ensure that other information operations and related activities are consistent with and supportive of CMO objectives to the greatest extent possible. CMO and information operations planners also seek to ensure CMO are consistent with, deconflicted with, and conducted in concert with combatant command or JFC information operations.

PUBLIC INFORMATION AND THE MILITARY

One purpose of information operations is to shape the public information dimension of the operating environment in a manner favorable to friendly forces. By its nature, publicly disseminated information has a great impact on public perceptions that in turn create diplomatic stress on the political environment within which military decisions are made. This stress can be decisive. Prior to the advent of automated data processing and high-speed communications systems, commanders had a somewhat free hand and more time to react to information transmitted from the battlespace. By contrast, today, commanders can come under almost instant public scrutiny and criticism creating political pressures that can divert a mission from its original purposes due to the effects of media. Consequently, to mitigate the effects of uncontrolled, instantaneous information transfer from the battlespace, commanders must develop a continuous staff process that rapidly assesses the media impact of contemplated military actions on the political environment, and helps frame follow-on actions. Recent US military experiences in the Balkans and Haiti illustrate that the extreme complexity of multifaceted information environments can be managed to some degree by coordinating public information and diplomatic efforts via an information operations cell of limited membership. During the Kosovo Bombing Campaign, the cell included as its core members, the Commander, SFOR [Stabilization Force] in Bosnia and Herzegovina; other senior military leaders; diplomatic representation; a Public Information Officer (PIO); and the PSYOP [psychological operations] and Civil Affairs officer. Other members were added in accordance with operational coordinating requirements as they arose. The relatively small size of the information operations cell made it a flexible instrument for rapidly developing public information operation strategy and plans, and coordinating their implementation. To coordinate their activities, the information operations staff supporting the members of the cell used a matrixing technique that established categories of actions to be undertaken based on overall combatant commander guidance, and then posted actions in chronological sequence in columns on a master layout. The overall matrix served as an instrument to coordinate activities in order to obtain an information operation crescendo at certain points in individual information operations, and to deconflict activities among the various military activities that had the potential for neutralizing or undermining each other, particularly in activities involving in public affairs (Public Information) and PSYOP.

SOURCE: Colonel Bill Darley
Public Affairs Officer
US Special Operations Command

c. **Information Operations Cell.** CMO planners should ensure that they take an active part in the information operations cell meetings and planning efforts to ensure that CMO considerations and concerns are clearly understood and addressed.

(1) The information operations cell, in coordination with other elements of the joint task force (JTF) staff, **develops and promulgates information operations planning direction** for the entire JTF that is disseminated to components and subordinate JTFs for further planning of Service and functional component unique information operations activities.

(2) The information operations cell is formed from **select representatives from each**

staff element, component, and supporting agency responsible for planning, coordinating, integrating, and deconflicting information operations capabilities and related activities. **This cell merges capabilities and related activities into a synergistic plan.** The cell coordinates staff elements and/or components represented in the information operations cell to facilitate the detailed support necessary to plan and coordinate information operations. The actual composition of members of the information operations cell may vary based on the overall mission of the joint force, the role of information operations in accomplishing the JFC's objectives, and the adversary's or potential adversary's capability to conduct information operations. For example, the information operations cell may assist in the CMO mission by assisting the HN in the defense of computer network systems that may simplify military to civilian support in the restoration of critical infrastructure during the postconflict phase.

(3) JFCs who ensure active CA representation in information operations planning will develop and execute more effective operations. This can be attributed to the following:

(a) CA activities are important contributors to information operations because of their ability to interface with key organizations and individuals in the information operations environment.

(b) CA activities can support and assist the achievement of information operations objectives by coordinating with, influencing, developing, or controlling indigenous infrastructures in foreign operational areas.

For further guidance on information operations, refer to JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

9. Public Affairs

a. **General.** By their nature, CA missions normally have positive results and are of interest to the local populace, their news media representatives, internal military audiences, and domestic news organizations. Public affairs personnel and CA are to disseminate information to local population. Public affairs elements will assist CA in passing information to the appropriate audiences through the media outlets. Close coordination between CA and public affairs is essential so that the information required for release by one staff element does not conflict with or complicate the work of the other.

b. **Limitation.** PSYOP activities must remain separate and distinct from public affairs. However, CA does not face such a limitation and may utilize PSYOP to communicate with the public. Methods employed by PSYOP to support CA public information operations include mobile loud speakers, leaflets, and cinema grade movies.

c. Tasks public affairs may undertake in support of CA include the following:

(1) Coordinate releases to the media with all appropriate agencies to ensure consistency of information to the local population.

(2) Develop and disseminate media releases about CA efforts to local, national, and international media as well as to command information outlets.

(3) Assist news media in covering known CA activities.

(4) Post digital images and stories of CA activities on an unclassified website.

(5) In coordination with CA, ensure the publication and broadcasting of information to protect dislocated civilians.

For further guidance on public affairs, refer to JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.



Civil affairs personnel meet with city of Kalesija fire department and public safety chiefs. This is an example of civil affairs disseminating information operations messages to key local leaders.

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER III RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

“The Secretary of Defense shall issue civil-military operations missions and guidance through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of the combatant commands.”

DODD 2000.13, Civil Affairs

1. General

This chapter outlines the responsibilities for CA as they relate to the following: the President and/or Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense/the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD[SO/LIC]), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the geographic combatant commanders, the Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and subordinate JFCs.

2. Responsibilities

a. President and/or Secretary of Defense

(1) Because of the politico-military nature and sensitivity of CA activities undertaken by US commanders, whether in a joint or multinational context, CA activities shall be governed by deliberate policy developed and promulgated by the President and/or Secretary of Defense.

(2) Policy decisions are transmitted to commanders through command channels. Guidance for specific policies concerning the degree of civil-military interaction to be followed in any operational area should be transmitted from the President and/or Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Department of Defense/ASD(SO/LIC), serving under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for:

(1) Acting as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on the policy and planning for DOD CA activities.

(2) Working within the interagency process as appropriate and translate national security objectives into specific defense policy objectives achievable through CA activities.

(3) Supervising the formulation of DOD CA activities in plans and policy.

(4) Overseeing the implementation of DOD CA activities according to policies and programs.

(5) Providing policy advice, assistance, and coordination with other offices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and DOD officials regarding CA activities and the use of CA

in their responsible areas.

(6) Acting as OSD point of contact for the Department of Defense:

(a) Coordinating CA activities as they relate to the activities of other USG agencies, international, nongovernmental and non-profit organizations, and the private sector, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

(b) Monitoring interagency use of DOD forces for the conduct of CA activities. Report to the Secretary of Defense whenever it appears that questions may arise with respect to legality or propriety of such use.

(7) Coordinating with OSD Director of Administration and Management to approve the detail of CA forces to duty with interagency groups and non-DOD US organizations.

(8) In conjunction with the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff and Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment, Joint Staff, reviewing CA program recommendations and budget proposals from the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the CDRUSSOCOM.

(9) Reviewing and coordinating requests for deployments for CA and making recommendations to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

(10) Developing and publishing DOD-wide standards for CA training and qualifications.

(11) Participating in, and initiating OSD review processes of, CA activities integrated in component plans and programs to ensure compliance with policy.

c. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for:

(1) As the principal military advisor to the President, NSC, and the Secretary of Defense, providing advice on the employment of CA and the conduct of CA activities.

(2) Providing guidance to the geographic combatant commanders for the integration of CA activities into military plans, including TSCPs.

(3) Developing, establish, and promulgate joint doctrine for CA.

(4) Formulating policies for coordinating joint training in CA activities.

(5) Submitting deployment orders for CA to the OSD in accordance with current DOD Instructions for coordinating deployments.

“The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the President and Secretary of Defense in performing their command functions. The Chairman transmits to the commanders of the combatant commands the orders given by the NCA and, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, oversees the activities of those commands. Orders issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense normally are conveyed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.”

JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)



General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the principal military advisor to the President, NSC, and the Secretary of Defense

[A combatant commander’s functions will include:] “Organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; employing forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;”

DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components

- d. Geographic Combatant Commanders have responsibility for:
 - (1) Planning, supporting, and conducting CA activities. These activities shall be designed to achieve the following:
 - (a) Support national security policy and DOD goals and objectives; and
 - (b) Support the goals and programs of other USG agencies related to CA activities consistent with missions and guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense.
 - (2) Designate a staff element within the HQ with responsibility for coordinating CA activities.
 - (3) Ensure the integration of CA activities into TSCPs.

(4) Provide for training of US CA as required to execute theater-specific plans. The training shall be coordinated with CDRUSSOCOM for assigned CA and with the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command.

e. CDRUSSOCOM is responsible for carrying out the relevant responsibilities specified in subparagraph 2d above and to:

(1) Provide combatant commanders with CA from assigned forces that are organized, trained, and equipped to plan and conduct CA activities in support of combatant commanders' missions.

(2) In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of the Army, provide for CA that are capable of providing functional expertise in civilian sector disciplines necessary for CA assessments, civil assistance, civil administration, and military government missions.

(3) Provide education and individual training in planning and conducting CA activities for DOD and non-DOD personnel.

(4) Under the direction of ASD (SO/LIC), assist in developing DOD-wide standards for CA training and qualifications.

(5) Under the direction of ASD (SO/LIC), assist in developing training opportunities for CA with other USG agencies, international, nongovernmental and non-profit organizations, and the private sector in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

(6) Under direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assist in integrating CA activities into joint strategy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

(7) Establish standards to ensure interoperability of all US CA.

(8) Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense program recommendations and budget proposals for activities and equipment unique to SO for assigned CA.

(9) Exercise authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds for activities and equipment unique to SO for assigned CA.

(10) Validate requirements for the activation, mobilization, and deployment of assigned CA.

f. **The Commander, United States Joint Forces Command** is responsible for carrying out the responsibilities specified in subparagraph 2d above and to:

(1) Coordinate with the United States Marine Corps (USMC) for CA from assigned forces that are organized, trained, equipped to plan and conduct CA activities.

(2) Effect integration of CA into joint doctrine, training, and exercises as warranted.

(3) Ensure CA activities are properly represented in joint training exercise scenarios.

(4) Coordinate with USSOCOM for the development of collective training standards related to CA.

g. The Secretaries of the Military Departments is responsible for:

(1) Developing and maintaining programs necessary to support CA activities to meet their Service and combatant command requirements.

(2) Providing for CA in their force structures or requesting such CA from the Secretary of Defense, who will then coordinate the request with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) For those Secretaries of the Military Departments with CA in their RC, providing for the timely activation and mobilization of such units and personnel as required to perform CA activities in accordance with DODD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve*.

(4) Assuming DOD-wide responsibilities for specific CA activities as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

(5) Coordinating with the CDRUSSOCOM for training and education as it relates to CA activities.

(6) **The Secretary of the Army** is responsible for:

(a) Carrying out the responsibilities specified in subparagraph 2g above.

(b) In accordance with the force levels, programs, plans, and missions approved by the Secretary of Defense, recruiting, training, organizing, equipping, and mobilizing units and personnel to (1) meet the CA requirements of the CDRUSSOCOM and (2) provide CA requested by the other DOD components as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

h. **Services.** As heads of their respective Services, the Chiefs of the Services have the capability to support USG agencies, OSD, the other Services, and multinational commanders and US combatant commanders with appropriate forces or specialists capable of performing CA activities, as well as with techniques and items of equipment typical or peculiar to their Service. Additionally, the Chiefs of the Services have responsibility for considering the following:

(1) Supporting US policy and combatant commander CA requirements across the range of military operations, when required.

(2) Directing their respective Services to include sufficient coverage of CA responsibilities

in Service planning.

(3) Making recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the adequacy and supportability of CA portions or annexes of combatant command campaign plans, OPLANs, or CONPLANs as a part of normal review procedures.

i. Subordinate Joint Force Commanders is responsible for:

(1) Planning, integrating, and monitor the employment of available CA functional assets in appropriate operational areas. Guidance for planning CA activities is contained in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) manuals as well as in doctrinal publications.

(2) Complying with national policies, US law, international law (including the law of armed conflict), and agreements with the civilian populace and government of a country in which US military forces are stationed or employed.

(3) Taking actions necessary, in accordance with formal agreement or specific guidance, to control dislocated civilians, maintain order, prevent and treat disease, provide relief of civilian suffering, and provide maximum protection and preservation of property and other resources usable to achieve US military objectives.

(4) Ensuring all assigned or attached personnel are fully aware of the importance of their actions while in contact with or in the presence of civilian authorities or population.

(5) Informing all assigned or attached personnel of indigenous cultural, religious, and social attitudes or customs and sensitivities and of their expected or actual effects on the outcome of military operations.

(6) Communicating civilian attitudes and needs to higher command levels and appropriate government agencies and NGOs.

(7) Securing the understanding, acceptance, and support of indigenous civilians to reduce or minimize frictions inherent in stationing or employing US military forces.

(8) Employing CA to secure necessary assistance, supplies, facilities, and labor from indigenous sources and to deal with local civilians and governments on the commander's behalf.

(9) Incorporating CA estimates and assessments in developing strategy and objectives for OPLANs, as appropriate.

(10) Ensuring staffs and organizations within commands have sufficient CA representation with political, legal, cultural, linguistic, and economic-related skills to plan and conduct CA support required by plans.

(11) Ensuring that employment of CA and conduct of CA activities are coordinated with

respective US Embassy Country Teams, applicable US agencies and international and private charitable organizations, and HN military and civilian authorities.

(12) Implementing multinational CA plans consistent with international law, the law of armed conflict, and US law and treaty obligations with the government and civilian population in countries where US forces are employed.

(13) Requesting guidance from the establishing authority (e.g., combatant commander) on implementation of multinational policies and objectives, as appropriate.

(14) Assisting regional friends and allies in planning and developing the operational skills and infrastructure necessary to ensure domestic stability through CA activities.

(15) Coordinating CA operational planning with appropriate multinational commanders and HN forces, as directed by the establishing authority (e.g., combatant commander) in conjunction with the US Embassy Country Team, as appropriate.

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IV ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

“Every US military organization has some capability to support CMO [civil-military operations]. Certain types of organizations are particularly suited to this mission and will form the nucleus of CMO efforts. These units are typically CA [civil affairs] and PSYOP [psychological operations] units. Others, such as, but not limited to, other SOF [special operations forces], engineers, HSS [health service support], transportation, and MP [military police] and security forces, act as enablers.”

JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations

1. Organization for Civil-Military Operations

CMO are an inherent command responsibility. CMO encompass the activities JFCs take to establish and maintain relations with civil authorities, the general population, and other organizations. The JFC is responsible for the organization and centralized direction of CMO in the assigned operational area. JFCs plan and conduct CMO to facilitate military operations in support of politico-military objectives derived from national strategic objectives. An integral part of the JFC’s responsibility is to maintain military-to-civil relations as well as ensure open and productive communications among governmental, nongovernmental, and international organizations.

a. CMO organization and command relationships are situationally dependent. Standard military principles of command and control (C2) and staff operations apply to CMO.

(1) CMO seek to minimize interference from the local population with the conduct of operations, and to minimize the effects of these operations on the local population.

(2) CMO also seek to maximize the effects of foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) and operations for the benefit of the local population.

b. CMO are supporting activities when the JFC is engaged in combat. In this situation, the JFC can structure the force to maximize combat effectiveness with CMO being conducted as a supporting mission to minimize interference with military operations. The JFC designates a staff element (usually the operations directorate [J-3]) to monitor the current operational environment to include CMO considerations. The J-3 can designate a specific CMO officer as required by the specific situation. During operational phases other than CMO, forces with specific CMO expertise (i.e., engineer, CA, medical) can be attached to other force components augmenting the operation.

c. Mission needs under a CMO exclusive scenario may necessitate the consolidation of CMO assets into a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF). In this example, it is possible that designation of a subordinate JFC is not required and the JCMOTF commander is commanding the operation. When a subordinate JFC is designated, formation of a JCMOTF still is an appropriate option if there are a large number of CMO forces involved in the operation. However, if only a small number of CMO forces are supporting operations, they should be part of the joint special operations task force.

d. The JFC organizes the force to optimize its ability to plan and conduct CMO when it is the primary mission of the joint force. This task organization may dictate changes in both the joint force headquarters and component force structure. Traditionally, only operations and intelligence staffs are positioned forward. Administration, logistic, and CMO (typically CA) staff elements are located in the rear area because of their responsibilities throughout the operational area.

(1) Relationships (degree of interaction) and physical location of various staff elements in the headquarters may change significantly from more traditional structures. The CMO officer (typically a CA officer) and staff may be collocated with the operations and intelligence staff elements and the information operations cell to more efficiently exchange information and requirements. Additional liaisons (including a CMOC) and communications may be required to exchange information with nonmilitary and/or HN organizations involved in CMO.

(2) Subordinate organizations may be functionally or geographically organized, or a combination of both, depending on the nature of the mission and the needs of the JFC. They may require robust communication and liaison capabilities. These organizations normally are structured to provide efficient CMO support and often have minimal capabilities for security and self-sustainment. This is an important factor in the vulnerability and risk assessments conducted during planning and must be monitored on a continuous basis because CMO are inherently conducted in areas that are politically and socially unstable.

(3) A JTF may be designated as a JCMOTF. However, there can be disadvantages if it is the only military force operating in a given operational area. JCMOTFs are organized in a manner that makes it difficult to transition to non-CMO missions and risk factors significantly increase when a relatively lightly armed CMO force is faced with an unanticipated security threat or a transition to combat operations. Whether established as a JCMOTF or a JTF, the force must include sufficient intelligence resources to provide warning of potential operational threats.

For further detail concerning organizing for CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

2. Command Relationships

a. US Army Reserve CA are separately organized into regionally aligned commands with subordinate brigades, battalions, and companies. Therefore, time-phased force and deployment data and task organizations must specify all unit identification codes of CA elements requiring deployment. **The functional composition of CA varies** with mission, availability and qualifications of personnel, and supported command requirements. **The supported combatant commander provides centralized control of and guidance to CA activities.** The J-3 or its equivalent (USSOCOM uses the Center for Operations, Plans, and Policy [SOOP]) normally provides centralized control. The J-3 or SOOP retains primary responsibility for oversight of CA.

b. **Combatant Command (Command Authority) (COCOM).** Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, **CDRUSSOCOM exercises COCOM of assigned CA.** US Joint Forces Command and US Pacific Command provide all non-USSOCOM assigned CA to gaining geographic

combatant commands.

c. **Operational Control (OPCON).** When directed by the Secretary of Defense, the gaining combatant commander of attached CA normally will exercise OPCON of those forces through subordinate commanders.

d. **Support to Multinational Forces.** When authorized by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander may transfer CA to the OPCON or tactical control of a US commander within a multinational command structure.

For further guidance on command relationships, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

3. Humanitarian Operations Center, Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, Executive Steering Group, Civil-Military Coordination Board, Civil-Military Operations Center, and Civil-Military Cooperation Center

Coordination of CMO with the interagency community and other civil organizations may be accomplished at different levels and with varying organizations (e.g., humanitarian operations center [HOC], humanitarian assistance coordination center [HACC], executive steering group [ESG], civil-military coordination board, CMOC, and civil-military cooperation [CIMIC] center). The decision to establish one or more of these organizations will be determined at various levels of command and/or authority. CA may participate in these organizations to provide their expertise in dealing with civilian organizations/authorities, the populace, and other civil concerns.

For further detail concerning HOCs, HACCs, CMOCs, and CIMIC centers, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. For further detail concerning ESGs, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.

a. Humanitarian Operations Center

(1) **The HOC primarily is an international and interagency policymaking and coordinating body** that does not exercise C2 but seeks to achieve unity of effort among all participants in a large FHA operation. Close joint force coordination with the affected country, United Nations, and other key members of the humanitarian relief community forms the core of FHA operations. Effective coordination is the key to successful turnover of FHA responsibilities to the affected country or United Nations, NGOs, and IOs.

(2) The HOC normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations, or possibly the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) during a US unilateral operation. **HOCs, especially those established by the United Nations, are horizontally structured organizations with no C2 authority**, and all members are ultimately responsible to their own organizations or countries.

(3) On-site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC). The United Nations may establish a structure called the OSOCC as a support organization to a HOC. The OSOCC assists in gathering, evaluating, collating, and disseminating HOC information. The OSOCC also may provide facilitation services for HOC meetings.

b. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center. Effective coordination is the key to successful turnover of FHA responsibilities to the affected country or the United Nations, NGOs, and IOs.

(1) In an FHA operation, the combatant command's crisis action organization may organize as a HACC. The HACC assists with interagency coordination and planning, providing the critical link between the combatant commander and other USG agencies, NGOs, and international and regional organizations that may participate in a HA operation at the strategic level.

(2) Normally, the HACC is a temporary body that operates during the early planning and coordination stages of the operation. Once a CMOC or HOC has been established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the combatant command's staff and crisis action organization. If a combatant commander chooses to organize a HACC, liaisons from other USG agencies (e.g., USAID, OFDA, and US Public Health Service), United Nations, US Army Corps of Engineers representatives, key NGOs, international and regional organizations, and host country agencies also may be members of the HACC in large-scale FHA operations.

c. Executive Steering Group

(1) The ESG may be composed of the principals from the JTF, the US Embassy, nongovernmental and international organizations present in the operational area, and other organizations as appropriate. Lacking another similar forum, the ESG can provide high-level outlet for the exchange of information about operational policies as well as for resolution of difficulties arising among the various organizations. The ESG plays a policy role and is charged with interpreting and coordinating operational area aspects of strategic policy. A commander at any echelon may establish an ESG to serve as a conduit through which to provide information and policy guidance to participating agencies.

(2) The ESG may be charged with formulating, coordinating, and promulgating local and theater policies required for the explanation, clarification, and implementation of US policies. The ESG should either be co-chaired by the JFC and Ambassador or assigned outright to either individual, depending on the nature of the US mission.

d. Civil-Military Coordination Board. This board is the JTF commander's vehicle for coordinating CMO support. Membership is typically restricted to key representatives from the JTF staff sections involved in CMO. A senior member of the JTF staff serves as chairperson of this board (e.g., JTF deputy commander or chief of staff). If a CMOC has been established at the JTF level, the CMOC director would be a key member of the board and also may serve as its chairperson. Civil-military coordination board variations:

(1) During multinational operations, the JTF commander may choose to include multinational partners on the board or may choose to limit the membership to US-only and utilize the ESG as the vehicle for working multinational support for CMO. The type of C2 structure (i.e., lead nation, parallel, combination) and the level of staff integration in the JTF should drive the decision for which board membership option to use.

(2) Depending on the situation, the JTF commander may choose to include selected members from the US Country Team on the board.

(3) Under certain conditions (i.e., the mission of the operation is primarily FHA) the JTF commander may decide it would be advantageous to expand the board's membership to include representatives from key IOs and NGOs. Coordination with these organizations usually occurs through the HOC and the JTF commander should weigh any expected advantages of expanding the board membership with the disadvantage of making this board so large that it becomes too cumbersome and inefficient. The intent is to develop a coordination structure, utilizing any or all of the coordinating organizations (e.g., HOC, ESG, civil-military coordination board, and CMOC), that permits rapid decisionmaking, provides effective communications, and promotes unity of effort among the various elements involved in CMO.

e. **Civil-Military Operations Center**

(1) A joint force must be able to work with all organizations and groups to accomplish a mission. A relationship must be developed between military forces, USG agencies, civilian authorities, involved international and regional organizations, NGOs, and the population.

(2) Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting place of these elements. Not a new concept, the CMOC has been effectively employed as a means to coordinate civil and military operations and plays an execution role. The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent — flexible in size and composition. A CMOC may be established at any echelon to facilitate coordination with other agencies, departments, organizations, and the HN. In fact, more than one CMOC may be established in an operational area, and each is task-organized based on the mission.

KEY TERM

Civil-Military Operations Center

- Established by the geographic combatant commander, subordinate joint force commander, or other commanders
- Coordinates civil-military activities of engaged military forces, other United States Government agencies, and nongovernmental, regional, and international organizations
- There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent

(3) The transition from conflict to postconflict or during FHA requires the supported commander to shift support priorities toward accomplishment of the CMO mission.

(4) A CMOC is formed to:

(a) Carry out guidance and institute JFC decisions regarding CMO,

(b) Exchange information,

(c) Perform liaison and coordination between military organizations and other agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the needs of the populace,

(d) Provide a partnership forum for military and other participating organizations,

(e) Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support from the NGOs and regional and international organizations. The CMOC then forwards these requests to the joint force for action. It is important to remember that these organizations may decide to attend CMOC meetings but may choose not to consider themselves members of the CMOC to maintain the perception of their neutrality. Many of these organizations consider the CMOC as a venue for interagency discussions but not as an interagency forum.

(5) **CMOCs are tailored to specific tasks associated with the collective national or international mission.** A JFC builds a CMOC around a nucleus of organic assets and includes CA, logistic, legal, and communications personnel. The JFC also invites representatives from the following organizations as a minimum:

(a) Liaisons from Service and functional components and supporting infrastructure, such as ports and airfields.

(b) USAID and/or, separately or through OFDA.

(c) Department of State, US Embassy Country Team, and other USG representatives.

(d) Military liaison personnel from participating countries.

(e) Host country or local government agency representatives.

(f) Representatives of NGOs and regional and IOs (e.g., United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees and International Committee of the Red Cross).

(g) The composition of a notional CMOC is illustrated in Figure IV-1. It is not the intent of this figure to emphasize the CMOC as a coordination center for all activities but rather to illustrate organizations a JFC may consider cooperating with.




Figure IV-1. Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS LESSONS

- “The real ‘peacekeepers’ in a peace operation are the humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) that provide both aid for the present and hope for the future.
- The HROs can be our allies, but they must at least be part of our planning and coordination efforts.

Along the way, there was a rediscovery of the need to consider military, diplomatic, and humanitarian efforts as parts of a common whole. Although there was no longer a single government in Somalia, there were at least 49 different international agencies, including UN bodies, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], and HROs. Dealing effectively with those agencies became the primary challenge for CMO [civil-military operations] in Somalia . . . one of the most important initiatives of the Somalia operation was the establishment of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) . . . the CMOC became the key coordinating point between the task force and the HROs. Liaison officers from the major multinational contingents, together with the US command, used this center as a means of coordinating their activities...The staff of the CMOC was deliberately kept small in order to keep it focused on its mission of coordination and information exchange.”

SOURCE: *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*
Kenneth Allard

“ . . . And it’s moving quickly into the next important step, which is providing humanitarian assistance to the many refugees and displaced persons in the East Timor area. In that regard we have sent a team of experts who are experienced in working with nongovernmental relief organizations to set up what’s called a Civil-Military Operations Center, a CMOC, in Darwin. This will build that close working relationship between the INTERFET [International Force, East Timor] force and the relief organizations.”

**Admiral Dennis Blair, US Navy
Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command
News Briefing 24 September 1999**

(6) Political representatives in the CMOC may provide avenues to satisfy operational considerations and concerns, resulting in consistency of military and political actions. Additionally, the CMOC venue appeals to NGOs because it avoids guesswork by providing these organizations a single-point of coordination with the military for their needs, ensuring that the unified efforts of a joint force and the relief community are focused when and where they are most needed. A CMOC also is an excellent forum for nongovernmental and international organizations to describe conditions they have witnessed in portions of the country where friendly military forces do not possess current information. Although US forces may be latecomers compared to many relief agencies and international organizations, they bring considerable resources with them.

(a) The military cannot dictate what will happen, but can coordinate a team approach to problem resolution.

(b) **A JFC cannot direct interagency cooperation among engaged agencies.** Military personnel must avoid the inclination to be directive in nature when dealing with representatives of these organizations. Instead, they should seek negotiated relationships needed to develop opportunities for military and civilian organizations to complement one another’s efforts. Working together at the CMOC on issues like security, logistic support, information sharing, communications, and other items, as well as the shared goal of improving conditions for the local populace, can build a cooperative spirit among all participants.

(7) The CMOC conducts regularly scheduled meetings to identify participants capable of fulfilling needs. Validated requests go to the appropriate joint force or agency representative for action.

(8) Figure IV-2 depicts some of the CMOC functions.

(9) A joint force public affairs office representative needs to attend regularly scheduled CMOC meetings. In an effort to provide information that is non-contradictory in nature, the public affairs representative should strive to obtain group consensus on messages and press releases.

(10) Location of the CMOC. The CMOC is distinct and separate from the joint force operations center, regardless if it is geographically collocated. There will be separate requirements for access to each for non-joint force personnel.




Figure IV-2. Civil-Military Operations Center Functions

(11) The officer in charge of the CMOC typically reports to the CMO officer on the J-3 staff, if one has been appointed. He or she also might be assigned to the J-3, the chief of staff, or the commander of the JCMOTF, if established. During certain operations, such as the conduct of FHA, the JFC might assign a deputy commander or the chief of staff as the Director of the CMOC, perhaps with another officer assigned to provide detailed supervision of its operation. As with any other staff officer, the CMOC officer requires access to the JFC based on the situation and mission.

“No two operations are alike. I want you to remember that because the most important thing we can do is to understand that there is so much differences in these operations that they don’t lend themselves to recipes or checklists. The danger when we start to take on doctrine is we want to prepare a syncro-harmonization matrix for every operation. When we do that, we develop a ‘hammer to fit’ mind-set. And, so we are going take — by God — that CMOC if it is set up a certain way, and it is going to work in this operation. That is, if we did it this way in [Operation] PROVIDE COMFORT, it is going to work in [Operation] PROVIDE HOPE, and it is going to work in [Operation] RESTORE HOPE, or [Operation] ABANDON HOPE, or whatever operation. But, it won’t. You are going to screw it up. I think the Ambassador (Oakley) has already mentioned the need for flexible thinking and reward for initiative.”

**General Anthony Zinni,
US Marine Corps
Commander in Chief, US Central Command, 1997-2000
National Defense University Symposium, June 1999**

f. Civil-Military Cooperation Center

(1) CIMIC is not US doctrine but rather North Atlantic Treaty Organization doctrine representing its approach to describing civil-military activities. The purpose of CIMIC is to create and sustain conditions that will support the attainment of a lasting solution to a crisis. CIMIC covers a wide variety of activities ranging from sustaining life to restoring government. These activities normally would be the responsibility of civilian organizations — CIMIC works to transition these activities to appropriate civilian organizations.

(2) As in a CMOC, CA provide the expertise that creates an atmosphere where effective relationships with the military, nonmilitary organizations, and local populations can be fostered. Based on their experiences, CA have made significant contributions as part of the CIMIC process. This has been evident in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

(3) CIMIC supports the JFC’s plan and the activities performed within the CIMIC process assist in mission accomplishment, which leads to a stable and sustainable end state.

KEY TERM

Civil-Military Cooperation

- Resources, arrangements, and activities, in support of mission, which foster liaison, coordination and cooperation between NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and civil populations, including national and local authorities.
- This includes liaison, cooperation and coordination with international, national, and nongovernmental organizations and agencies.

“The foremost advantages of CIMIC [civil-military cooperation] are the economy of resources and the synergy found in a kind of massing of forces. Invariably, regional disasters calling for intervention draw on not only military forces . . . but also humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) organizations from government and civil society. Most of the HA/DR organizations . . . specialize in a certain area of need. In the best situations, military commanders find opportunities to assist these organizations . . . CIMIC’s chief strength is that it allows decision makers to focus their resources on the aspects of a peacekeeping [peace operations] problem where they can be best used. In fact, it broadens the scope of possibilities for solutions. . . . In the face of competing demands on scarce resources, experienced leaders in military, government, and nongovernment positions are keen to build this functional capability into their organizations. CIMIC has become a common term in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] lexicon.”

**Civil Affairs Journal and Newsletter
Volume 53, Number 3,
May/June 2000**

“Complex civil-military problems require sophisticated civil-military cooperation.”

**Major General A. P. Ridgway CBE
Chief of Staff Allied Command Europe
Rapid Reaction Corps
Worldwide Civil Affairs
Conference 2000**

For further guidance concerning CIMIC, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, and Allied Joint Pub-9, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine.

4. Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

A JCMOTF provides the JFC a subordinate command to exercise necessary OPCON or tactical control and coordinating support functions for those occasions when the size and scope of the CMO mission requires such a robust organization.

“The Marines of the 4th CAG-F [Civil Affairs Group-Forward] are tasked as the Refugee Reconnaissance Return Teams (RRRT) within the CJCMTF [combined joint civil-military task force — Operation JOINT FORGE]. The mission of the RRRTs is to perform assessments of the municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Essentially, this includes conducting interviews with local municipal authorities such as mayors, police chiefs, hospital and clinic administrators, and banking officials. In addition to these interviews, the RRRTs conduct surveys of the local infrastructure to include the economy, security, agriculture, industry, transportation, media, and housing. The information gathered from the aforementioned interviews and surveys is compiled into reports called Municipal Information Reports (MIRs) . . . The MIRs are available to and used by refugees, who wish to know the status of their hometown, and NGOs who are helping refugees and displaced persons return to their pre-war homes.”

**Civil Affairs Journal and Newsletter
Volume 52, Number 6 November/December 1999**

a. **The JFC designates the JCMOTF commander.** A JCMOTF is composed of units from more than one Military Department and is formed to carry out CMO in support of a theater campaign or other operations. Although the JCMOTF is not a CA organization, there may be a requirement for strong representation of CA. Because of their expertise in dealing with NGOs, IOs, and other governmental agencies, they will greatly enhance the opportunity for success. The JCMOTF may be established to carry out missions of limited or extended duration involving military forces' interface with civilian populations, resources, or agencies and affected country forces, NGOs, United Nations agencies, and IOs. The JCMOTF should be functionally organized around an existing command structure (e.g., engineer, health service support, transportation, and support) with CA augmentation.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE US SOUTHERN COMMAND

As a civil affairs officer at the US Southern Command, one of my duties was to prepare units for civic action rotations in Central and South America. The first events in the mid-1980's were called Exercise BLAZING TRAILS, then evolved to Exercise STRONG ROADS, and finally to Exercise NEW HORIZONS. The basic mission was civil-military operations to show US interest in the region. The basic unit was a Reserve Component engineer element. Rotations deployed as battalion task forces: the main focus was engineering, but the units were augmented with civil affairs, psychological operations, signal, security, transportation, and health service support personnel. Units had a clinic for the troops, and the mission-included medical, dental, public health, and veterinary care in the area. These units were civil-military task forces, usually joint civil-military operations task forces; they just were not called by that name.

SOURCE: Lieutenant Colonel Michael M. Smith, US Southern Command, J-3/J-5, 1986-1987 and 1994-1997

(1) The JCMOTF may be established to meet a specific CMO contingency mission or support humanitarian or nation assistance operations, a theater campaign of limited duration, or a longer duration CMO concurrent with or subsequent to regional or general conflict.

(2) Figure IV-3 depicts some of the possible responsibilities of the JCMOTF.

POSSIBLE JOINT CIVIL – MILITARY OPERATIONS TASK FORCE RESPONSIBILITIES

- Advising the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on policy, funding; multinational, foreign, or host nation (HN) sensitivities; and their effect on theater strategy and/or campaign and operational missions
- Providing command and control or direction of military HN advisory, assessment, planning, and other assistance activities by US joint forces
- Assisting in establishing US or multinational and military-to-civil links for greater efficiency of cooperative assistance arrangements
- Performing essential coordination or liaison with HN agencies, Country Team, United Nations agencies, and deployed US, multinational, and HN military forces and supporting logistics organizations
- Assisting in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects, to build civil acceptance and support of US operations, and to promote indigenous capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social development
- Planning and conducting joint and combined civil-military operations training exercises
- Allocating resources and sustaining and coordinating combat support or combat service support elements, including necessary medical, transportation, military police, engineer, and associated maintenance and communications capabilities
- Advising and assisting in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures and services and otherwise facilitating transition to peacekeeping or consolidation operations and associated hand-off to other United States Government (USG) agencies, international organizations, or HN responsibility
- Assessing or identifying HN civil support, relief, or funding requirements to the CJTF for transmission to supporting commanders, Military Services, or other responsible USG agencies
- Establishing combat identification standing operating procedures and other directives based on CJTF guidance

Figure IV-3. Possible Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Responsibilities

b. JCMOTF Staff Organization. Figure IV-4 depicts a notional JCMOTF.




Figure IV-4. Notional Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

(1) The composition of this organization should be representative of the forces comprising the JTF. A JCMOTF may have both conventional and SO forces assigned or attached to conduct specific missions.

(2) A JCMOTF normally is a US joint force organization, similar in organization to a joint special operations task force or JTF and is flexible in size and composition, depending on

mission circumstances. It normally is subordinate to a JTF.

(3) In rare instances, and depending on resources availability, a JCMOTF could be formed as a standing organization.

(4) A JCMOTF can be formed in theater, in the continental United States (within the limits of the law), or in both locations, depending on scope, duration, or sensitivity of the CMO requirement and associated policy considerations.

For further detail concerning a JCMOTF, refer to CJCSM 3500.07, Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide, and JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER V CIVIL AFFAIRS FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTIES

“The threat of global war has receded since the end of the Cold War, but the world remains a highly uncertain place, with increasingly complex and dangerous national security threats. Consequently, the work of civil affairs forces has grown more and more salient.”

Defense Issues: Volume 12, Number 32 — Civil Affairs: Reflections of the Future

1. General

This chapter outlines the functional specialties in which individual CA personnel are specially trained. (Not all Services’ CA are trained in or conduct the functional specialties as discussed in this chapter.) Many functional specialties are related, to a certain extent, to every other CA functional specialty, and their interconnecting relationships obviate exclusive interest within any functional area. At the same time, some of the individual functions impose requirements for specialist personnel in more than one skill. As an example, the food and agriculture function may require specialists associated with forestry, manufacturing, processing, storage, and distribution. There are 16 functional specialties that fall into 1 of 4 broad categories. The 4 broad categories and 16 functional specialties are depicted in Figure V-1 and discussed below.

2. Functional Areas

Normally, there are 16 CA functional skills that are organized into 4 functional teams and correspond with those civilian sectors most likely to have an impact on CMO. Each mission may require a different emphasis on skills and team composition.

“Often a root cause of conflict . . . is a failure of civil infrastructure to meet the needs of the population. The skills needed to manage a country’s infrastructure — sanitation, public transportation, legal systems, and other public services — can be maintained only by people with similar civilian backgrounds. Highly skilled personnel from the Reserves have performed such jobs in Panama, the Persian Gulf, and Haiti . . . (and they offer) expertise that exists only in the Reserve CA [civil affairs] units.”

**General Wayne A. Downing,
US Army Commander in Chief,
US Special Operations Command, 1993-1996**

a. **Government Functions.** The government functions team conducts assessments of government resources and systems and determines how these may impact CMO. Team members coordinate with foreign nation administrators and representatives of other associated organizations to support the commander’s objectives. The government team provides recommendations, and when appropriate, direction to reestablish, maintain, sustain, and/or improve governmental services in the operational area, to include occupied territories.

(1) **Public Administration**

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing

foreign nations' public administration systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.

(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public administration systems and the impact of those systems on successful attainment of US strategic and operational goals and objectives.




Figure V-1. Civil Affairs Functional Specialties

(c) Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public administration systems, agencies, and resources.

(d) Coordinate with foreign nation government administrators and agencies in support of CMO.

(e) Advise and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating government systems and agencies.

(f) Advise and assist in developing technical administrative requirements, policies, and procedures for providing government services to the local population.

ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Perhaps the single most important contribution to the return to normality in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be attributed to Sergeant First Class (SFC) Audrey Johnson. This civil affairs noncommissioned officer, who has a master's degree in computer science and works in information management in civilian life, single handedly saved the Bosnian elections. After the date for the election was announced, it was discovered that there were no registration records. If it had been necessary to delay the elections, it would have caused considerable embarrassment to the moderate Bosnian politicians and to the United States, which was, de facto, their guarantor. While everyone was concerned, SFC Johnson began to look for the records. She found them and reported that she thought it would be possible to digitize them. Soon thereafter, she created a new digital registration list. It then had to be printed. As a result of Bosnian policy, the contract was awarded to a local printing firm. However, it became immediately obvious that this firm could not handle a printing job of this size. At this point, SFC Johnson looked for alternatives and discovered that the US military headquarters in Naples, Italy, could print her list. Subsequently, the registration list was printed and the election was held on schedule.

**SOURCE: Brigadier General Tom Matthews
Commander, 353rd Civil Affairs Command**

(2) Public Education

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing foreign nations' public, religious and sectarian, and private education systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.

(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of education systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

(c) Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public education systems, agencies, facilities, and resources.

(d) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for the public education system to support government administration (primary, secondary, and post-secondary educational systems).

(e) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining public education systems and agencies.

(f) Assist in coordinating assistance and resources from foreign nations, IOs, NGOs, and USG agencies to support local government education systems as part of CMO.

(3) Public Safety

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing

foreign nations public safety systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.

(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public safety systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

(c) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government public safety systems to support government administration (police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, and penal systems).

(d) Assist in employing public safety resources to support government administration, CMO, and military use.

(e) Assist in coordinating assistance and resources from foreign nations, IOs, NGOs, and USG agencies to support local government public safety systems as part of CMO.

HAITI INTERVENTION

Civil affairs (CA) personnel, organized as Ministerial Advisory Teams (MATs) arrived in Haiti with the intervention forces. While their job was to assess and advise all ministries in Haiti, they spent most of their time working with the Ministry of Justice, given that a democracy cannot exist without justice and the rule of law. CA soldiers with civilian experience as judges and members of various police organizations examined the three essential elements of any legal system, the police, the courts, and the prisons. In order to determine if the system was working, they tracked individual cases, from the arrest, through the trial, and into prison, if the person was convicted. They wanted to verify that those arrested received due process, and to observe how those who were convicted were treated. They also wanted to verify that, once they had served their sentence, they were released, something which, apparently, had not always happened in Haiti. They also spent considerable amount of time in rural areas interviewing local justices. They found in general that justice could not function on the island because of pandemic corruption. The wealthy elite offered the poorly paid judges what for the latter were enormous sums of money to rule in their favor. If the judges did not, they had them killed. As a result, the MAT recommended that judges be paid decent wages and that they be protected.

**SOURCE: Colonel Daniel Rubini
358th Civil Affairs Brigade**

(f) Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public safety systems, equipment, and facilities.

(g) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government public safety systems and agencies.

(4) **International and Domestic Law**

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing

the foreign nation's legal systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, laws, codes, and statutes.

(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of legal systems and the impact of those on CMO.

(c) Assist in educating and training US personnel in the foreign nation's legal systems, including obligations and consequences of behavior under those systems.

(d) Assist in educating and training multinational forces in the law of armed conflict and international human rights.

(e) Advise and assist in international law issues.

(f) Coordinate, assist, and advise local foreign nation judicial agencies, as necessary.

(g) Conduct liaison and monitor the local foreign judiciary system to deconflict differences in the administration of laws, agreements, and policies.

(5) Public Health

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing the foreign nation's public and private health systems, sanitation systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.

(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of health and sanitation systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

(c) Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public health systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.

(d) Coordinate the use of the foreign nation's governments and private health resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.

(e) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public health services and resources to support government administration (clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, food preparation and storage, ambulance transportation, skilled personnel, and education).

(f) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government public health systems and agencies.

(g) Assist in coordinating assistance and resources from foreign nations, IOs, NGOs, and USG agencies to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.

(h) Advise and assist foreign nations, IOs, NGOs, and USG agencies in preventing, controlling, and treating diseases (education, immunization, and sanitation).

b. Public Facilities Functions. The public facilities team consists of functional specialists in public transportation, public works, and public communications. It provides technical expertise, planning assistance, and staff advice to the supported command. The team assesses resources and systems by sector and determines the impact of these on CMO. Team members coordinate with the foreign nation's administrators and representatives of other associated organizations to support the commander's objectives. The public facilities team provides recommendations and direction in maintaining, sustaining, and improving the foreign nation's services.

(1) Public Transportation

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing the foreign nation's public and commercial transportation systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.

(b) Determine capabilities and effectiveness of transportation systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

(c) Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing transportation equipment, facilities, and systems.

(d) Coordinate the use of government and commercial transportation resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.

PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IN BOSNIA

The public transportation system in Sarajevo was no longer functional. Many of the tracks upon which the trolleys ran had been sabotaged. It would have been relatively easy to replace the trolleys with busses. However, Admiral Smith felt that it was important to reintroduce the trolleys, as a symbol of return to normality. A civil affairs officer who in civilian life was Vice President for Operations of the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority, worked with the Bosnian Ministry of Transportation to get the trolleys running again. He also convinced a Norwegian explosive ordnance disposal unit to ensure that all the mines had been safely removed from the tracks.

**SOURCE: Brigadier General Tom Matthews
Commander, 353rd Civil Affairs Command**

(e) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial transportation resources to support government administration (motor vehicles and roads, trains and railways, boats and waterways, aircraft and airports, and pipelines).

(f) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government transportation systems and agencies.

(2) Public Works and Utilities

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing the foreign nation's public and commercial works and utilities systems, agencies, services, and facilities.

(b) Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public works systems and utilities systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

(c) Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public works and utilities equipment, facilities, and systems.

(d) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial works and utilities resources to support government administration (electric power, natural gas, water production and distribution; sewage collection, treatment, and disposal; sanitation; and public facilities).

(e) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, developing, and maintaining government works and utilities systems and agencies.

(f) Assist in employing (coordinating) public works and utilities resources to support government administration and CMO.

A RETURN TO NORMAL

In order to achieve the civilian end state objectives of the Dayton Accords, life in Bosnia had to return to some semblance of normalcy and ethnically cleansed persons had to be able to return home. This, of course, was difficult, given that many of the bridges to remote villages in the mountains were destroyed. CA [civil affairs] Project Action groups became very important in interfacing between local authorities, military engineers, and nongovernmental organizations. One CA captain, a lawyer in civilian life, was particularly effective in identifying useful projects, developing budgets and cost/benefits analyses, and presenting them to USAID [United States Agency for International Development]. All told, projects he sponsored received over \$5 million from various sources. An exceptional negotiator, he was able to bring Serbs and Muslims together to work on repairing water sources, given that water was essential to both groups.

**SOURCE: Colonel Bruce Haslam
358th Civil Affairs Brigade**

(3) Public Communications

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing government and commercial communications systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.

(b) Determine capabilities and effectiveness of communications systems and the impact of those systems on CMO and other military operations.

(c) Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing communications equipment, facilities, and systems.

(d) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial communications resources to support government administration (postal services, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, information networks, and print media).

(e) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government communications systems and agencies.

(f) Assist in employing public communications resources to support government administration, CMO, and other military operations.

c. **Economics and Commerce Functions.** The economics and commerce team consists of functional specialists in food and agriculture, economic development, and civilian supply. It provides technical expertise, planning assistance, and staff advice to the supported command. The team assesses resources and systems by sector and determines the impact of those on CMO. Team members coordinate with the foreign nation's administrators and representatives of other associated organizations to support the commander's objectives. The economics and commerce team provides recommendations and direction to maintain, reestablish, repair or reconstitute, sustain, and improve foreign nation services.

(1) **Food and Agriculture**

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing food and agriculture systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.

(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of food and agriculture systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

(c) Develop plans, policies, and procedures and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing food and agricultural systems and agencies for producing, processing, storing, transporting, distributing, and marketing.

(d) Coordinate the use of the foreign nation's government and commercial food and agricultural resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.

(e) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for food and agricultural resources (livestock, poultry, grain, vegetables, fruit, fish, fiber, and forestry) management to support government administration.

(f) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining food and agricultural systems and agencies.

(g) Assist in coordinating assistance and resources from foreign nations, IOs, NGOs, and USG agencies to support food and agricultural systems as part of CMO (crop and livestock

improvement, agricultural training, and education).

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT IN THE CARIBBEAN

In 1996, a civil affairs officer, who in civilian life is a doctor of veterinary medicine, was sent to Trinidad to establish a diagnostic lab to assess the impact of rabies on the island and its inhabitants. He discovered that it was a severe problem. For unexplained reasons, rabid vampire bats gave the disease to cattle, but not to dogs — who were the usual carriers on other Caribbean islands. He conducted similar programs in Grenada, St. Vincent, and Barbados. These programs not only saved the lives of many locals, they also protected American tourists who were not aware of the fact that the danger of rabies was ever present.

**SOURCE: Colonel Irving McConnell
358th Civil Affairs Brigade**

(2) Economic Development

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in monitoring and assessing the foreign nation's economy, economic systems, commercial activities, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.

(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of economic systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

(c) Develop plans, policies, and procedures and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing economic and commercial systems, agencies, and resources.

(d) Advise and assist with budgetary systems, monetary and fiscal policies, revenue-producing systems, and treasury operations.

(e) Advise and assist in price control and rationing programs.

(f) Recommend and support plans to prevent black market activities.

(g) Conduct liaison and coordinate with local government administration agencies and commercial enterprises in support of CMO.

(h) Advise and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating economic and commerce systems, agencies, and organizations.

(i) Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements of employing economic controls (price controls, rationing programs, prevention of black market activities, monetary and fiscal policies, and labor).

(j) Advise and assist in employing local commercial resources, including labor, to support government administration, CMO, and military use.

(k) Assist in coordinating assistance and resources from foreign nations, IOs, NGOs, and USG agencies to support local economic development as part of CMO.

OPERATION DESERT STORM

The headlines in the *Kuwait Times* on Saturday, October 19, 1991, read: “Kuwait to rebuild economic base: Major role for private sector.” The liberation of Kuwait must be ascribed to one of the greatest and most varied coalitions of military forces ever assembled. The financial rebirth of the country, however, is in large measure the result of the civilian professional training and tireless work of the small group of Reserve CA [civil affairs] soldiers who comprised the Economics and Commerce Team of the Kuwait Task Force (KTF). As early as November of 1990, the Team, led by a LTC [lieutenant colonel] who, in civilian life is an international banker with many years of experience in Southwest Asia, began to plan the humanitarian assistance and the reconstruction of Kuwait. The team worked with officials of the Kuwait government in exile and with the US Embassy staff. The team’s major concern was to protect the currency of the country. “A country,” its leader said, “has two major symbols of its sovereignty, its flag and its currency. And the currency touches everyone.” Because of his reputation as a man of absolute integrity and because of his many contacts in the Middle Eastern banking world, the Kuwaiti government in exile trusted the CA officer implicitly. They followed his advice by identifying a controller of financial contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars for the post-war reconstruction, in the establishment of the necessary letter of credit, and in putting in place the proper controls. They also put him in charge of guaranteeing the physical security of their Central Bank. He found the head of security of the bank and insured that the building, its assets and its records were protected. He then searched for and found the Kuwaiti bankers who had not fled the country, many of whom were in hiding because they still feared for their lives: they were not sure that the Iraqis had been entirely chased out of the country. The KTF financial section also coordinated the training of Kuwaiti banks on the use of US export financing programs. With its currency safe and with an excellent understanding of US business methods, thanks to the CA KTF Economics and Commerce Team, the Emirate of Kuwait was ready to begin to “rebuild its economic base.”

**SOURCE: Colonel George Thomas
358th Civil Affairs Brigade**

(l) Advise and assist the Staff Judge Advocate and contracting officials in the foreign nation’s cultural intricacies. Ensure compliance with international laws and conventions regarding use of labor.

(3) Civilian Supply

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing public and commercial supply systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.

(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of civilian supply systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

(c) Determine the availability of local supplies.

(d) Identify private and public property available for military use.

(e) Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing government and commercial supply systems and facilities.

(f) Coordinate the use of government, commercial, and private property, facilities, supplies, equipment, and other resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.

(g) Advise the JFC on the impact military operations and civilian relief efforts have on the civilian supply system.

(h) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government and commercial supply systems and agencies.

(i) Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements for government and commercial supply resources to support government administration (transportation; storage; distribution, including rationing; and the use of captured and salvaged items).

(j) Establish policies and procedures on custody and administration of public and private property.

(k) Assist in coordinating foreign nations, IOs, NGOs, and USG agencies to support local civilian supply needs as part of CMO.

d. **Special Functions.** The special functions team consists of functional specialists in emergency services, environmental management, cultural relations, civil information operations, and dislocated civilians operations. It provides technical expertise, planning assistance, and staff advice to the supported command. The team assesses resources and systems by sector and determines the impact of those systems on CMO. Team members coordinate with the foreign nation's administrators and representatives of other associated organizations to support the commander's objectives. The special functions team provides recommendations and direction to maintain, sustain, and improve the foreign nation's services.

(1) Emergency Services

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying, protecting, and assessing government emergency-services capabilities and resources to respond to the employment of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and hazardous material incidents.

(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of emergency service systems and

the impact of those systems on CMO.

(c) Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing emergency services systems, equipment, and facilities.



During Operation NOBLE RESPONSE, a US Army civil affairs officer visits village leaders from the village of Madogashi, Kenya, in concert with an airdrop of corn by a US Marine Corps C-130 Hercules, to assist in providing disaster relief assistance to flood victims in Kenya.

(d) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government emergency services systems to support government administration during NBC or hazardous material incidents (police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, and restoration of vital services).

(e) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government emergency service plans, policies, and procedures.

(f) Assist in coordinating and employing emergency service resources to support government administration, CMO, and military use (mitigation, detection, warning, response, and recovery).

(g) Assist in coordinating assistance and resources from foreign nations, IOs, NGOs, and USG agencies to support local government emergency service systems as part of CMO.

(2) **Environmental Management**

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing the foreign nation's environmental and pollution control systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.

(b) Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of environmental and pollution

systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

(c) Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing environmental resource management systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.

(d) Coordinate the foreign nation's government and private environmental management resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration to mitigate, prepare, respond to, and recover environmental activities.

(e) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for environmental management services and resources to support government administration (plans, policies, and procedures to protect natural resources and provide pollution control).

(f) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, developing, and maintaining government environmental management systems and agencies.

(g) Advise, assist, and support the coordination of the foreign nation's, IOs, NGOs, and US assistance and resources to support local government environmental management as part of CMO.

For detailed guidance, refer to DODD 4715.9, Environmental Planning and Analysis, DODD 6050.7, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Department of Defense Actions, Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 4715.5, Management of Environmental Compliance at Overseas Installations, DODI 4715.5-G, Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document, and JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.

(3) Cultural Relations

(a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on the foreign nation's social and cultural matters and determine the impact of those matters on CMO.

(b) Assist in familiarizing, educating, and training US personnel in the foreign nation social, cultural, religious, ethnic characteristics, codes of behavior, and language.

(c) Advise and assist in locating, identifying, preserving, and protecting significant cultural property and in determining ownership.

(d) Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in protecting, preserving, and restoring significant cultural property and facilities (religious buildings, shrines, and consecrated places; museums; monuments; art; archives; and libraries).

(e) Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government, community, and private systems and agencies to protect, preserve, and restore cultural property.

(f) Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining cultural

property systems and agencies.

(g) Assist in locating, identifying, and safeguarding cultural property and in determining ownership.

(h) Assist in coordinating assistance and resources from foreign nations, IOs, NGOs, and USG agencies to support local government relations as part of CMO.

(4) Civil Information

(a) Advise and assist in developing and coordinating public information activities to support government administration, CMO, and a consistent message.

(b) Advise, assist, develop plans, and provide operational oversight, supervision, and, as required, control of the employment of civil information (mass media) agencies and resources to support CMO (radio, television, computer, print, and newspaper), both public and private.

JOINT TASK FORCE SHINING HOPE

“ . . . The CA [civil affairs] teams included personnel from both the active duty and reserve components. An active duty detail came from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, while individual reserve personnel were tasked from both the 353rd Civil Affairs Command and the 308th Civil Affairs Brigade. The CA teams worked as the bridge between all non-military entities and the JTF [joint task force] commander and staff. The CA teams were the best-suited military element to differentiate between the requirements and desires of the UNHCR [United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees], NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], and refugees. The CJCS [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] order stated camp construction standards would be developed in coordination with the government of Albania, USAID [United States Agency for International Development] and UNHCR. The diligent efforts of the CA and DART [disaster assistance response team] were essential in building consensus among these players and ensured Camp Hope was constructed to an appropriate standard. They also ensured the NGOs were supported in their mission to operate and maintain the camp.”

**SOURCE: *Joint Center for Lessons Learned*
Bulletin Volume II, Issue II**

(c) Assist PSYOP forces in planning, developing, and disseminating proclamations, ordinances, and notices.

(d) Advise and assist the public affairs officer in maintaining cultural awareness while dealing with the media.

(e) Recommend information control and civil censorship policies.



During Operation SUSTAIN HOPE, civil affairs personnel from Fort Bragg, NC, talk with US missionaries about the Turkish refugee camp in Murrez, Albania. They are part of the civil affairs team visiting the camp to survey the set up for future camps

(5) Dislocated Civilians

- (a) Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing dislocated civilians activities.
- (b) Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in protecting, caring for, controlling, processing, and repatriating dislocated civilians in support of CMO.
- (c) Assist in planning, organizing, and coordinating foreign nations', IOs', NGOs', and USG agencies' assistance, and resources to support local government care, control, processing, and repatriation of dislocated civilians as part of CMO.

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VI SERVICES' CIVIL AFFAIRS

"[Operation PROVIDE COMFORT] CA [civil affairs] assets performed a variety of missions that would have been foreign to other military assets. They administered DC [dislocated civilians] camps, coordinated with the NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], PVOs [private voluntary organizations], and UN [United Nations]-related entities, facilitated visits throughout the area of operation by civilian visitors, performed area assessments, and coordinated extensively with host-nation authorities in Turkey. They also conducted extensive interviews with the NGOs and PVOs in northern Iraq and determined the scope and timing of the expected arrival of their supplies."

Center for Army Lessons Learned
Newsletter No. 92-6

1. US Army

All Army CA units stationed in the continental United States are assigned by the Secretary of Defense to Commander, US Special Operations Command. One CA unit is assigned to the Commander, USPACOM.

a. **Active Component.** USSOCOM provides one Army ACCA battalion consisting of regionally oriented companies and structured to deploy rapidly and provide initial CA support to military operations. It is immediately available for contingencies and is prepared for a variety of operational environments worldwide. The unit's primary use is providing rapid, short-duration CA support for nonmobilization contingency operations. It is not designed or resourced to provide CA functional specialty skills. Unit organization may be internally modified and task-organized to support theater-specific mission requirements.

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

At 0100 20 Dec, soldiers of the 96th CA [Civil Affairs] BN [Battalion] conducted a combat parachute assault with the 1-75th Rgr [Ranger] Regt [Regiment] into Tocumen Airport. As tracers filled the area, the CA teams moved into the terminal building and assisted in quieting the airline passengers. When several PDF [Panamanian Defense Force] soldiers attempted to take some passengers hostage, the CA team used its knowledge of the language and local culture to convince the PDF soldiers to release the hostages. For the next several weeks, the CA teams translated, served as liaison to the local civil government, conducted assessments to determine where help was most urgently needed, and assisted commanders in taking care of a huge refugee population.

**SOURCE: Center for Army Lessons Learned
Newsletter No. 90-9**

b. **Reserve Components.** More than 95 percent of USSOCOM's Army CA authorizations are provided by the Army Reserve. Army Reserve CA vary in size, organization, and capability and consist of commands, brigades, and battalions. These units, organized around functional specialties, provide assistance, assessment, planning, advice, and coordination skills at a level of expertise not

normally found in military units. These organizations may be internally modified and task-organized for specific requirements. All levels of CA are capable of establishing and operating a CMOC.

(1) There are currently four CA commands (CACOMs), each commanded by a brigadier general. These commands provide CA support to geographic combatant commanders. The CACOMs are flexible, multipurpose organizations for training, equipping, mobilizing and deploying task-organized teams, in support of CMO, for the geographic combatant commander. They accomplish this mission by providing CMO staff augmentation to component and joint staffs, as required. A typical CACOM consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, one CA battalion SO and one or more CA brigades that typically consist of two to four battalions. The CACOMs' capabilities include providing technical expertise in 16 functional specialties that primarily mirror civil government (see Figure V-1 of this publication); providing Civil Affairs Planning Teams to component commands; providing a Civil Affairs Plans, Programs and Policy Team; providing liaison with government organizations, IOs and NGOs; and, training, equipping, mobilizing and deploying assigned or attached CA.

(2) CA brigades are aligned with a corps or theater Army component. They support corps, JTFs, theater support commands, and theater Army area commands. Each CA brigade provides predeployment C2 of assigned battalions and provides staff support to other component/services and joint theater staffs as required. The brigade accomplishes its mission by attachment of subordinate elements to supported commands. A brigade consists of a headquarters and headquarters company and one or more CA battalions. The brigade's capabilities include providing technical expertise in each of the 16 functional specialties, providing interface between local civil authorities and the US military forces, and establishing procedures for host-nation support.

(3) CA battalions provide CA support at the division; corps support command, area support group, or other headquarters down to brigade level. Battalions in the US Army Reserve are organized as either an RC CA battalion or RC CA battalion (SO). The battalions provide CA generalists, organized around the fundamental tactical CA unit — a Civil Affairs Team Alpha, and limited functional specialty expertise to supported commands. The battalion's capabilities include providing functional expertise in public administration, public facilities, public health, civilian supply and dislocated civilians operations; providing Civil Affairs Planning Teams; and, planning, training and preparing US and foreign nation military forces to execute CA activities in support of CMO.

(4) Employment Considerations. US Army Reserve CA are separately organized into commands, brigades, and battalions. Their employment as attached forces requires detailed management by unit identification code of time-phased force and deployment data and task organizations. Supported unit commanders are responsible to provide the vast majority of administrative and logistic support to CA, as these capabilities are not organic to CA.

2. US Marine Corps

a. USMC commands have the capability to plan and conduct CMO across the range of military operations. Dedicated CA structure is maintained entirely within the RC and consists of two civil affairs groups (CAGs), each commanded by a colonel. While every effort is made to recruit and train Marines

with a broad variety of military and civilian skills, each member of the CAG is a CA generalist. The CAGs are organic to the Marine expeditionary force (MEF): they augment and reinforce the capabilities of the MEF or other Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). USMC CAGs are not apportioned separately under the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, but are inherent when a MEF is provided to a combatant command for planning or operations. Each CAG is regionally oriented to the projected employment of the MEF it supports. MAGTF commanders request USMC CA support via their Marine Corps component commander. USMC CA participate in theater security cooperation efforts when made available by their component commanders.

b. USMC CMO are typically centrally planned by the MAGTF staff for decentralized execution by assigned forces. Each MAGTF has organic air, ground, C2, and logistic capabilities that provide immediate and integrated CMO options to the JFC. Operational Maneuver from the Sea, implementing Ship-to-Objective Maneuver and Seabased Logistics, enables rapid execution of USMC CMO, without the need to first establish extensive infrastructure ashore. Initial CA support to a deployed MAGTF might first be provided by qualified Marine volunteers, prepared to deploy within days of a validated request, even if no Presidential Reserve Callup Authority is authorized. Further support may next be provided by additional volunteers, by Presidential Reserve Callup Authority of CAG elements for contingencies, or by mobilization of entire CAGs. Regardless of size, USMC CA elements will require support from the MAGTF in such areas as transportation, health services, supply, and messing. However, even when CA are assigned, the MAGTF remains a self-sustaining force.

c. USMC CMO are performed to directly support the MAGTF's assigned mission, which is typically of limited duration, performed under austere conditions, and expeditionary in nature. These missions might include noncombatant evacuation operations, the offload of maritime pre-positioning ships, HA in response to complex emergencies, amphibious operations, or employment as an enabler for follow-on operations. These types of limited contingency operations will rarely allow for exhaustive coordination of details or extensive planning prior to execution. Instead, the MAGTF must understand the goals and priorities of the JFC, chiefs of missions, and US Embassy Country Teams within the operational area. CA and CMO are initially focused on confirming, updating and disseminating the assessment of the situation, providing an initial response to emergencies, stabilizing the operational area, and enhancing the legitimacy of the force. Even initial CA plans prepare for a transition of responsibilities to other agencies, whether other US military forces, other USG agencies, IOs, or NGOs. Marine CA also are prepared to assist a supported Navy commander. This support might be required when an amphibious task force is tasked to transship evacuees, provide emergency medical support to civilian casualties, or control sea approaches, pier space, or cargo handling.

d. As a self-contained, combined arms force, the MAGTF may become involved in sustained operations ashore. These situations will allow more detailed coordination, both with the combatant commander's theater CA assets, and with IOs, NGOs, and USG agencies operating in the MAGTF's area of operations. Deployed CA forces (and those accessed via reach-back) facilitate mission accomplishment by focusing on noncombatants. They leverage the MAGTF's resources, especially in C2 systems, by integrating the complementary capabilities of other agencies in order to achieve success and allow timely redeployment of the force. Throughout, Marine CA efforts help the commander to meet moral and legal responsibilities while accomplishing the military mission.

3. Additional Support to Civil Affairs

a. The United States Air Force (USAF) does not maintain CA. The Air National Guard (ANG) provides Judge Advocates with CA training for special requirements. Also, a variety of functional organizations and capabilities within the Air Force Reserve Command and ANG as well as the active force, can support or complement CA activities. These include legal, air mobility, chaplain, supply, health services (to include dental care and preventive medicine services), security forces, SOF, civil engineering, bioenvironmental, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and meteorological specialists who can provide operations and staff support. In supporting combatant commanders, the USAF upon request can provide specially qualified personnel for service in Army or joint CA as specialists. CA-specific functions are primarily performed by the ANG judge advocates. When required, CA liaisons should be provided to the USAF Headquarters and each deployed Aerospace Expeditionary Force.

(1) **Air National Guard Readiness Center.** Access to ANG personnel with CA-related skills is accomplished through the Air National Guard Readiness Center, an active Air Force unit that exercises administrative control over such personnel ordered to active duty under conditions short of full mobilization.

(2) **Air Force National Security and Emergency Preparedness (AFNSEP) Agency.** Although not a CA organization, AFNSEP can play a significant role for the USAF concerning CA activities. AFNSEP oversees and assists commanders in implementing the Air Force's military support to civil authorities, Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, Continuity of Operations, and National Security Emergency Preparedness programs. The overall purpose of these programs in the Air Force is to support civil authorities' abilities, in an all-hazards environment, in minimizing the loss of life and property by providing sufficient capabilities at all levels of government to meet essential defense and civilian needs during any national security emergency. AFNSEP is comprised of a team of active and reserve personnel. The agency is responsible for the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of Palau, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Like CA personnel, AFNSEP Reservists often bring with them valuable functional skills from their civilian occupations. In general, however, the concepts for CMO that apply to AFNSEP regard only domestic support operations, and consequence management resulting from the accidental or intentional release of CBRNE contaminants.

b. The US Navy (USN) does not maintain CA. However, the agility, reach and flexibility provided by Navy forces and platforms, combined with their self-sustaining capability, can play a vital role in supporting or complementing CMO and CA activities. This is especially true in the early stages of an operation, during transition, or where HN infrastructure is severely taxed or damaged. Naval assets can provide the JFC tremendous flexibility by producing fresh water and electrical power; providing secure meeting areas or limited emergency shelter, to include critical care; or moving critical resources (medicine, fuel, food, etc.) ashore, via multiple means. The capability to provide timely support from "over the horizon" not only enhances friendly force protection but enhances the idea of sovereignty for the HN/local government. The type and extent of USN capabilities available to support CMO and CA activities will vary with the size, structure, and operation tempo of Navy forces assigned to a JFC.

c. **Coast Guard Model Maritime Service Code.** The Coast Guard does not maintain CA. However, the Coast Guard can provide a variety of capabilities, assistance, equipment, and training in helping a country organize and establish a coast guard. The Coast Guard *Model Maritime Service Code* is a valuable reference for other nations to use for establishing a maritime force. The reference is for maritime states to use in developing or refining their governmental infrastructure and provides organizational suggestions and statutory examples of how a maritime state's Coast Guard or Navy might be established. Generally, maritime forces have four principal missions: military operations and preparedness, law enforcement, maritime safety (including search and rescue) and enforcement of shipping and navigation laws. The *Model Code* is modeled on the organization and authority of the US Coast Guard. The sample legislation provided in the *Model Code* enhances the security and safety of the maritime state, protects the mariner and the marine environment, and allows the maritime state to exercise its rights and meet its obligations under international law. The Coast Guard may provide technical assistance to individual states to aid them in implementing an effective maritime infrastructure.

4. Summary

The following quotation depicts how CA have provided support to various countries in many different types of situations — a force multiplier.

CIVIL AFFAIRS AT WORK

On a daily basis, Civil Affairs personnel are creating immediate, direct, tangible benefits in host countries around the world by supporting humanitarian demining missions, democratization seminars, disaster preparedness missions and joint combined exchange training. By making a difference in the lives of the local populace, Civil Affairs personnel are also helping to strengthen the goodwill of the United States in the eyes of the world. . . . let me give you some specific examples. SGT [Sergeant] Dana I. K. Apo and SGT Kevin H. Cook deployed along with eight other reservists from the 322d Civil Affairs Brigade located in Hawaii to assist in establishing the Civil-Military Operations Center in East Timor. The mission in East Timor demonstrates how well Civil Affairs forces can shape the international environment.

In Bosnia, Major Robert Stachen of the Connecticut Air National Guard, negotiated treaties that reopened air space over Bosnia to commercial aviation, and Colonel Ben Lucas of the Maryland Air National Guard brought forth the new criminal code for the Republica Srpska National Assembly. In Kosovo, Gunnery Sergeant Jerry Morgan, Staff Sergeant Lance Waring and Staff Sergeant Michael Hall, all reservists from the US Marine Corps 4th Civil Affairs Group, arrived in theatre 36 hours after their initial alert to work with over 500 displaced persons near the village of Gnjlane.

In Mozambique, Army SFC [Sergeant First Class] Ernest Hoppe and SFC Tim Kohring from SOCEUR [Special Operations Command, US European Command] deployed to help organize relief efforts to cope with the humanitarian disaster that resulted from severe flooding. In Uzbekistan, LTC [Lieutenant Colonel] Kim Langley deployed in October 1999 as a communications expert and performed an analysis of the Uzbeki communications infrastructure and its vulnerability in case of a disaster.

In Panama, a team from the 350th Civil Affairs Command deployed to Panama City to facilitate the first Civil Military Relations Symposium (CMRS) in that country with senior representatives of several Panamanian government agencies.

Clearly, Civil Affairs forces are invaluable public diplomacy multipliers, while at the same time accomplishing their primary mission of support to the military commander. They are shaping the international environment and responding to crises and contingencies.

**SOURCE: Mr. Frank L. Jones
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Special Operations Policy and Support
Worldwide Civil Affairs Conference 2000**

CHAPTER VII

CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING AND COORDINATION

“During the past decade, the use of America’s armed forces in situations around the world has increased dramatically. The overriding lesson from these operations is that we must bring all our resources to bear — our political, diplomatic, military, and economic — if we expect to be successful solving non-military problems, especially those that are rooted in religious, cultural, or ethnic strife.”

General Henry H. Shelton, US Army

1. Planning Process Considerations

CA planning is based on national strategic objectives and a variety of legal obligations such as the provisions of the US Constitution, statutory law, judicial decisions, Presidential Directives, departmental regulations, and the rules and principles of international law, especially those incorporated in treaties and agreements applicable to areas where US forces are employed. Therefore, the planning process should include consultations with appropriate legal staffs. Additional guidance to assist combatant commanders in developing CA plans and annexes is contained in:

a. Civil Affairs Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, JOPES, and applicable Service directives.

b. CA assessments and estimates that are prepared for combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs in their prescribed format. CA estimates weigh relevant political, economic, sociological, and military factors to form a basis of CA planning.

For further detail concerning CA estimates, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Appendix E.

c. JOPES integrates all elements of deliberate or crisis action CA planning. Inter-Service support, interagency coordination, and theater-unique procedures must be planned and coordinated in order to support CA activities.

“American military forces have a long history of unconditional service in operations that support broad national purposes. From surveying railroad rights-of-way in the 19th century to participating in humanitarian relief efforts for victims of natural disasters in the present, the Armed Forces maintain as their inherent secondary purpose the advancement and production of national interests in MOOTW [military operations other than war].”

JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

2. Theater Security Cooperation Plan and/or Peacetime Engagement

The TSCP primarily is a strategic planning document intended to link geographic combatant commander-planned regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives. The TSCP is based on planning guidance provided in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Enclosure E, *Engagement*

Planning Guidance. Combatant command planned and supported operations and activities produce multiple benefits in readiness, modernization, and engagement. However, peacetime military engagement activities must be prioritized to ensure efforts are focused on those that are of greatest importance, without sacrificing warfighting capability. TSCP identifies the synchronization of these activities on a regional basis and illustrates the efficiencies gained from geographic combatant commander engagement activities that support national strategic objectives. Geographic combatant commanders and executive agents will develop TSCPs for their assigned theaters or designated countries inclusive of the execution year plus activities for the next two fiscal years.

“Today, the military forces of the United States are working together with friends and allies from all over the world, not in combat operations but in promoting peace, stability, and the rule of law. These military endeavors are part of a national security strategy aimed at shaping the international environment through military, diplomatic, and economic initiatives to help reduce tensions. Through peacetime military engagement efforts with other nations, we help foster institutions and international relationships that can help stop crises from occurring, and if they do occur, prevent them from escalating into conflict.”

**General Henry H. Shelton, US Army
Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff**

a. **Categories of Engagement Activities.** Since many of these activities involve the use of US funds, care must be taken to ensure that all legal procedures and restrictions on their use are followed. The following categories of engagement activities will be included in the TSCP:

(1) **Operational Activities.** These activities are conducted in conjunction with or part of ongoing operations that have significant engagement value and that support the combatant commander’s theater strategy. These activities include routine and continuing operations, not crisis response or episodic activities of an emergent operational nature. Examples could include missions using forces present overseas such as peace operations, FHA, sanctions enforcement, and counterdrug operations.

(2) **Security Assistance.** This category of engagement activity impacts all levels of the USG as well as those planned by the combatant commanders and executive agents in coordination with the senior military representatives of the US Embassy country teams or, where assigned, security assistance officers. Security assistance activities in the TSCP Activity Annexes include foreign military financing, foreign military sales, international military education and training, enhanced international military education and training, potential direct commercial sales, and Excess Defense Articles program. Security assistance is a significant aspect of the combatant commander’s theater strategy. Compelling justification is required for programs that raise contentious security assistance issues. This justification must link the combatant commander’s TSCP strategy to prioritized regional objectives defined in the National Security Strategy.

(3) **Combined Exercises.** This category highlights the nature, scope, and frequency of peacetime exercises designed to support theater, regional, and country objectives. Combined exercises include those sponsored by both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. Many of these exercises are CMO, to include road building, school

construction, and medical, dental, and veterinarian civic action projects.

(4) **Combined Training.** This category includes scheduled unit and individual training activities with forces of other nations. It does not include Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-sponsored and combatant commander-sponsored exercises that are included in the Combined Exercises category. Joint Combined Exchange Training is a special category of combined training that involves US SOF training with the armed/security forces of a friendly foreign country. By law (10 USC 2011), US SOF participating in Joint Combined Exchange Training must be the primary beneficiary of training received during the Joint Combined Exchange Training. Joint Combined Exchange Training is designed to give SOF the opportunity to accomplish mission essential task list training. An additional benefit of a Joint Combined Exchange Training activity is improved interoperability with foreign forces participating in the exercise.

(5) **Combined Education.** This category includes activities involving the education of foreign defense personnel by US institutions and programs both in the continental United States and overseas. In some cases, the supported combatant commander or executive agent has direct control over the allocation of education quotas.

(6) **Military Contacts.** This category includes senior defense official and senior officer visits, counterparts visits, ship port visits, participation in defense shows and demonstrations, bilateral and multilateral staff talks, defense cooperation working groups, military-technical working groups, regional conferences, State Partnerships for Peace, and personnel and unit exchange programs. Scheduling of these activities is addressed, as feasible, for the period covered by the TSCP.

(7) **Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA).** This category includes those planned activities for which specifically allocated HCA funds are requested and planned. They primarily are humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, assistance in the form of transportation of humanitarian relief, and provision of excess nonlethal supplies for HCA purposes. Other forms of HCA, such as demining training, also may be applicable to this category.

(8) **Other Engagements.** This category consists of engagement activities conducted by the combatant commander or executive agent that do not properly belong in one of the previous categories. Examples include those planned as part of the implementation of the provisions of arms control treaties and other related obligations.

“ . . . Just as preventive medicine promotes conditions that support good health, preventative defense supports security and stability. . . . US strategy involves peacetime activities, crisis response, and the capability to fight and win in major regional conflict. . . . Peacetime engagement embraces combined exercises, port calls, meetings, and exchanges of information and people. Successful engagement develops trust and confidence among states and establishes mechanisms for working together.”

**Admiral Joseph W. Pruher, US Navy
Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command, 1996-1999
JFQ Autumn/Winter 1997-98**

b. **Civil Affairs Support to the TSCP.** CA functions are a key part of all military operations, including peacetime engagement activities, and must be fully integrated into all plans. TSCP activities provide opportunities to establish and maintain military-to-civil relations in the region before a crisis. CA staff, and other military staff, should build relationships with contacts from USG agencies, NGOs, IOs, and the HN military before crises develop in the region. CA contributions to the TSCP can include:

(1) **Liaison and Coordination.** With the full approval of and in coordination with the geographic combatant command Plans staff and appropriate US Embassy Country Team, CA personnel conduct visits among multinational forces, indigenous security forces, US forces, government agencies, NGOs, and IOs.

(2) **Education and Training.** JFCs and staffs can be trained by CA to assist them in obtaining the knowledge and techniques necessary to positively influence friends, allies, and HN counterparts and governments during TSCP activities. CA are uniquely qualified to train and prepare others for conducting TSCP activities due to their area and linguistic orientation, cultural awareness, and experiences in military-to-civil and military-to-HN advisory and assistance activities.

(3) **Area Assessments.** TSCP activities provide an ideal opportunity for CA to collect current open source information obtained in the course of their normal duties to update assessments prior to a crisis in a geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility.

For further guidance on TSCP, refer to CJCSM 3113.01A, Theater Engagement Planning.

3. Planning Considerations

Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). TSOCs provide C2 of Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF deployed in theater. They ensure that SOF capabilities are employed and that SOF are synchronized with conventional military operations. TSOCs also ensure SOF personnel participate in theater mission planning and that theater component commanders are thoroughly familiar with SOF capabilities in addition to operational and support requirements. Regardless of the command relationship, TSOCs are the link between theater SOF and the geographic combatant commanders.

a. **CA Selection.** Selection of CA in support of a plan or order should be based on a clear concept of CA mission requirements. **JOPES integrates all elements of deliberate or crisis action CA planning**, and identifies, resources and phases requiring CA.

(1) Effective CA activities will assist JFCs in accomplishing regional objectives and assigned missions, regardless of the operational area. JFCs must guard against creating long-term civilian dependence on military resources by the local population, HN, NGOs, and IOs.

(2) Successful accomplishment of CA objectives in large part depends on adequate plans and policy determinations, an adequate staff capability, and availability of dedicated CA to assist the commander in carrying out responsibilities for CMO. It is important that CA be concentrated on those tasks that are most likely to lead to mission accomplishment.

(3) CA should be involved as early as possible in deliberate or crisis action planning processes to accomplish required coordination efforts.

(4) CA should develop Annex G, “Civil Affairs,” of all plans and orders.

(5) General planning considerations are shown in Figure VII-1.



Figure VII-1. Civil Affairs General Planning Considerations

b. **Military Operations Other Than War.** Plans for contingency operations may be joint, multinational, or single-Service. CA annexes to such plans should, as a minimum, consider the items listed in Figure VII-2.

CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

- ◆ Extent of US military involvement and role of US Government agencies in civil-military operations
- ◆ Liaison requirements with other Department of Defense elements; US Government agencies, including the Country Team; multinational forces; host-nation government officials; other foreign government officials; other civilian organizations; and international public and private groups
- ◆ Additional lead time normally necessary for Reserve component civil affairs availability
- ◆ Procedures for transition, continuation, or termination of civil affairs- relevant functions of other agencies, as directed or required
- ◆ Identification of, and relations with, friendly and hostile personalities and groups
- ◆ Security and hostile force disarmament requirements in uncertain environments
- ◆ Organization and degree of effectiveness of the host-nation government, the condition of the economy, the nature of cultural and social institutions, and the prevailing perceptions and attitudes of the population

Figure VII-2. Civil Affairs Planning Considerations for Military Operations Other Than War

For further guidance on MOOTW, refer to JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

c. **War.** The JFC's need to assume greater authority for CA activities should be reflected in the planning assumptions because certain areas may be devastated and lack self-sufficiency in facilities, services, and manpower as a result of hostilities; US and multinational forces may be required to provide emergency food, clothing, shelter, and medical supplies to civilians. At the same time, identification of CA requirements derived from analysis of both current operational and conflict termination missions may entail any combination of the planning considerations identified above for contingencies or crisis response operations.

(1) During the initial phases of operations, CA play a major role in the handling of dislocated civilians because of the rapid pace of operations, lack of indigenous resources, and limited access to the operational area by NGOs and IOs. The responsibility for movement and handling of dislocated civilians primarily should belong to NGOs and IOs — provided there is security for them to operate safely. CA may play a major role when access to the operational area

is limited. The movement and security of dislocated civilians within the operational area will place enormous burdens on the commander if the “right” forces, NGOs, and IOs to handle the situation have not been preplanned.

(2) The international community and international humanitarian law may demand that the military perform many of the functions normally handled by other sources.

For further guidance on war, refer to JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

d. **Analyzing the Civil Dimension.** The challenge to CMO planners is to successfully articulate their contribution to the JFC’s mission. In the course of mission analysis, the centers of gravity (COGs) concept is useful as an analytical tool while designing campaigns and operations to assist commanders and staffs in analyzing friendly and adversary sources of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Commanders and CMO planners must look beyond the traditional military-to-military construct in considering the impact of the civil dimension on operations. While the civil dimension applies to both adversary and friendly COGs, in some cases such as MOOTW, it can dominate the focus of analysis. Additionally, analysis of the civil dimension is a continuous process throughout an operation and looks at the following six interrelated factors.

(1) **Key Civil Geographic Areas.** Key civilian areas are localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander’s battlespace, which are not normally thought of as militarily significant. The commander must analyze key civilian areas in terms of how these areas affect the military’s mission as well as how military operations impact on these areas. Examples of key civilian areas that a commander should analyze are: areas defined by political boundaries (e.g., districts within a city, and municipalities within a region); locations of government centers; social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves; agricultural and mining regions; trade routes; and possible sites for the temporary settlement of dislocated civilians or other civil functions. Failure to consider key civilian areas can seriously affect the success of any military mission.

(2) **Infrastructures and Buildings.** Existing structures take on many significant roles. Bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams, are often considered high-value targets. Others, such as churches, mosques, and national libraries, are cultural sites that are generally protected by international law or other agreements. Hospitals are given special protection under international law. Other facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television and radio stations, and print plants may be useful for military purposes. Analyzing structures involves determining the location, functions, capabilities, application, and consequences of supporting military operations. Using a structure for military purposes often competes with civilian requirements for the same structure and requires careful consideration. Additionally, if exigent military operations require decisions whether or not to destroy specific structures, consideration must balance the short and long term effects of such actions.

OPERATION DESERT STORM

“Civil affairs soldiers were attached to every ground maneuver unit, including those of the Marines. They provided support for civilians in theater and aided other civilians affected by the war. They gave classes on area culture sensitivities to US troops, thereby defusing dangerous enemy propaganda, which proclaimed that the American and European forces were the ‘new crusaders’ and the ‘enemies of Islam.’ In the field, CA troops informed commanders of historical, religious, and cultural sites, thus preventing any serious damage and depriving Iraq of useful ‘incidents.’

Civil affairs troops demonstrated on occasion a better understanding of the differences between displaced civilians (DC) and enemy prisoners of war (EPW) than did US military police. In at least one case, CA troops were able to defuse a potentially riotous situation in which Kurds, Iraqi Army reservists and regulars, and Republic Guards had been mingled promiscuously.

The Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF) and the KTF [Kuwaiti Task Force], moved quickly into Kuwait City as the town was being liberated on 28 February. It found a city that had been ‘trashed’ by the Iraqis but not destroyed. The CCATF restored basic services from 1 March to 3 May 1991, working with the Kuwaiti Army and government officials.”

SOURCE: *To Free From Oppression*
United States Army Special Operations Command
Directorate of History and Museums

KOSOVO FORCE 2 INTEGRATED PLANNING

Preparation and planning for KFOR2 [Kosovo Force 2] began in earnest upon the cessation of the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] air operations in June 1999. At HQ LANDCENT [Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe] a multinational team of planners began to develop the follow-on plan upon the relief of the ARRC [Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps] in early autumn. A joint planning group (JPG) was formed representing a mix of Balkan experience, Services, and nations. The team was lead by Colonel Bauer (German Army), supported by Lieutenant Colonel John Powers (US Army), J-2 (Plans), Lieutenant Colonel Rich McPhee (US Army) J-5 (Plans), Lieutenant Colonel Albrecht Katz-Kupke (German Army), J-5 (Plans), Major Mike Boise (Canadian Army), J-5 (Plans), and Lieutenant Colonel Ferd Irizarry (US Army), J-9 (CIMIC [civil-military cooperation]). Immediately, the group was determined to ensure the plan did not repeat the mistakes learned from IFOR [Implementation Force] and SFOR [Stabilization Force]. By and large, the JPG followed NATO staff planning procedures. From the beginning, the process was fantastically iterative. Coupled with a telephone system that provided international commercial access and compatibility with the various NATO military systems, all staff sections had at least two stand-alone electronic mail systems: the NATO intranet system CRONOS and an unclassified internet compatible system. These features permitted near real time coordination between the ARRC, SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe], and key international organizations, such as the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). The commander, General Rheinart [German Army], established a permanent liaison element with the ARRC and implemented an aggressive staff reconnaissance and visitation program. Requests for information and other issues were addressed daily. From a CA [civil affairs] perspective, this meant that plan could reflect the significant combined influences of the climate —

given the agrarian nature of the people, (recognized adversaries the demobilized Kosovo Liberation Army, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces, and other non-state actors), indigenous institutions and potential economic activity (e.g., planting and harvesting), key international organizations and the NATO-led forces. Throughout the process every effort was made to incorporate the timelines and objects of key nonmilitary organizations. What evolved was a synchronization matrix reflecting a combination of key climatic periods — winter and spring flooding; decisive civil and military engagement points; and recommended military and civil lines of operation. The matrix made clear that success required the commander to view winter as a period of policymaking and pre-positioning, and summer as a period of reconstruction. The matrix enabled the commander to track the build-up of key civil capabilities, such as the arrival and employment of the United Nations Kosovo Police Force (UNKPF) and creation of an indigenous police force via the Kosovo police academy, agricultural activity, the winter shelter program, road and rail repairs, and establishment of UN municipal administrators as well as the rotation of military units. Ultimately, the matrix became Annex A to the base plan.

**SOURCE: Personal Notes
Ferdinand Irizarry, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army
J-9, KFOR2 12 Oct 1999**

(3) **Institutional Capabilities.** Capabilities can be analyzed from different levels. The analyst views capabilities in priority from the perspective of those required to save, sustain, or enhance life. Capabilities can refer to the ability of local authorities — be they HNs, aggressor nations, or some other bodies — to provide key functions or services to a populace (e.g., public administration, public safety, emergency services, food and agriculture). Capabilities include those areas with which the populace needs assistance in revitalizing after combat operations (e.g., public works and utilities, public health, economics, and commerce). Capabilities also refer to resources and services that can be contracted to support the military mission (e.g., interpreters, laundry services, and construction materials and equipment). The HN or other nations may provide these resources and services.

(4) **Influential Organizations.** These organizations are nonmilitary groups or institutions that influence and interact within the operational area. They generally have a hierarchical structure, defined goals, established operations, fixed facilities or meeting places, and a means of financial or logistic support. Some organizations may be indigenous to the area, such as church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, labor unions, criminal organizations, and community watch groups. Other organizations may be introduced to the area from external sources, such as multinational corporations, United Nations agencies, USG agencies, IOs, and NGOs.

(a) The commander must be familiar with the organizations operating within the operational area. He or she must be knowledgeable about their activities, capabilities, and limitations. He or she must understand how the operations of different organizations impact on his or her mission, how military operations impact on organizational activities, and how organizations and military forces can work together towards common goals, as necessary.

(b) The commander uses the CMOOC to keep advised of all these issues.

(5) **Key Communicators and Populace.** This general term is used to describe the nonmilitary personnel encountered by military forces during operations. The term includes all the civilians within an operational area as well as those outside this area whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. Individually or collectively, people impact military operations in positive, negative, or neutral manners. In MOOTW, US forces must be prepared to work closely with civilians of all types.

(a) There may be many different groups of people living and working within a given operational area. Like the discussion of organizations above, people may be indigenous to the area or introduced from external sources. An analysis of demographics should identify various capabilities, needs, and intentions of a specific population.

(b) It is useful to separate people into distinct categories that consider historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors. It is critical to identify key communicators as well as the formal and informal communication processes used to influence a given population.

(6) **Events.** Events include routine, cyclical, planned or spontaneous activities that significantly impact both civilian lives and military operations. Some civil events that affect organizations, people, and military operations are national and religious holidays, agricultural crop/livestock and market cycles, elections, civil disturbances and celebrations. Other events are disasters from natural, manmade, or technological sources that create civil hardship and require emergency response. Examples of events precipitated by military forces include combat operations, deployments, redeployments, and paydays. Once the analyst determines which events are occurring, it is important to template the events and to analyze them for political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

e. Predeployment Planning

“Lessons learned have shown that the early deployment of Civil Affairs personnel in the theater of operations can be a great force multiplier, setting the stage for the introduction of follow-on forces into an environment that has benefited from specialized interaction with the local population.”

Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience

(1) The early deployment of CA in the operational area can be a great force multiplier, setting the stage for the introduction of follow-on forces into an environment that has benefited from specialized interaction with the local population.

(2) The functional composition of CA varies with mission, availability, qualifications of CA, plus the supported commander’s preferences.

(3) Mobilization of RC CA must be a consideration during predeployment planning.

(a) USSOCOM maintains more than 95 percent of its Army CA authorizations in the Army Reserve.

(b) Army RC CA units can be expected to arrive in theater 30-45 days after Presidential Reserve Callup Authority for contingencies or upon mobilization.

f. **Post-Conflict Operations.** Post-conflict activities typically begin with significant military involvement, and then move increasingly toward civilian dominance as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are re-established. US forces frequently will be in transition from one mission to another. The transitions may include moving from peacetime engagements to MOOTW, transitioning from MOOTW to war, and transitioning from MOOTW to peacetime engagements. Transitions at the conclusion of any major military operation require significant preparation, planning and negotiations between USG agencies, NGOs, IOs, and the HN government. US forces, at the conclusion of hostilities, will support long-term US interests and strategic objectives including the establishment of security and stability in the region.

*“Continuous **situation assessment** in regard to commanders’ intent and mission accomplishment, employment of measures of effectiveness, and criteria for mission transition or termination will also be important. **Transition and termination** will require close coordination with all concerned and may be organized by military functions, while remaining understandable to nonmilitary agencies.”*

**JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance**

(1) Transition or termination occurs when either the mission has been accomplished or the President and/or Secretary of Defense so directs. CMO planners play a major role in transition and termination not only in the planning process (by establishing a transition mechanism) but also with assisting civilian organizations in clarifying their respective roles and responsibilities after US military forces leave the area.

(2) Criteria for transition or termination may be based on events, measures of effectiveness and/or success, availability of resources, or a specific date. A successful harvest or restoration of critical facilities in the crisis area are examples of events that might trigger termination of the mission. An acceptable drop in mortality rates, a certain percentage of dislocated civilians returned to their homes, or a given decrease in threat activity is statistical criteria that may prompt the end of US forces’ involvement.

(3) When other organizations (such as United Nations, NGOs, HN, and IOs) have marshalled the necessary capabilities to assume the mission, US forces may execute a transition plan.

(4) Transition may occur between the US joint force, another military force (e.g., United States, multinational, and affected country), regional organization, the United Nations, or civilian

organizations. A detailed plan addressing the various functions and to whom they will transition will greatly reduce the turmoil typically associated with transition. A comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities. A major aspect during transition is the movement of large numbers of military forces and civilians out of and/or within the operational area.

(a) An unclassified transition plan written in easily understood terms particularly is required when transitioning to nonmilitary organizations. Organizing the plan by specific functions (such as provision of food, restoration of facilities, and medical care) also enhances the transition.

(b) The joint force staff should periodically review the transition plan with all organizations that have a part in it. This will help ensure that planning assumptions are still valid, and determine if changes in the situation require changes in the transition plan.

(5) Termination plans should cover transition to post-disaster or emergency activities and conditions, as well as disposition of military forces. OPORDs and termination plans should be prepared simultaneously and in conjunction with the deployment plan, with the termination plan serving as a supporting plan to the OPORD. See Figure VII-3 for a sample checklist for termination planning.

(6) **Transition Planning.** CMO (CA) planners play a major role in transition planning and based on their expertise, may be the best group to perform this function. In order for these planners to accomplish this task, a clearly identifiable end state and transition or termination criteria for the operation must be developed.

(a) Transition planning is an integral part of operation planning and mission analysis.

(b) Transferring control of an operation from US military to a nonmilitary organization or another military force requires detailed planning and execution. Mission analysis (analysis of mission statement), an identifiable end state, interagency political-military plan, and the national policy will all play an important role in the transition process. Transferring control of an operation is situational dependent and each one will possess different characteristics and requirements.

(c) Transition planning must be initiated during the initial phases of operation planning to ensure adequate attention is placed in this critical area — plan for transition when planning for intervention.

(d) As the redeployment phase for US forces approaches, it is important to continue emphasizing force protection. The redeployment phase can be the most hazardous because the tactical focus shifts toward redeployment and away from force protection.

(e) Areas that will impact significantly on the development of a transition plan are:

1. Identification of issues.

2. Key events (past and present).
3. Work required to accomplish the transition.
4. A thorough knowledge of the organization or force taking over control of the operation.

SAMPLE CHECKLIST FOR TERMINATION PLANNING

- **Has the end state been achieved?**
 - **Have stated operational objectives been accomplished?**
 - **Have the underlying causes of the conflict been considered, and how do they influence termination planning?**
 - **Has the joint force commander identified post-conflict requirements?**
- **Can forces be safely withdrawn from the operational area? What are the force protection requirements?**
 - **What additional support will be required for redeployment?**
 - **What is the policy for redeployment? What is the relationship between post-conflict requirements and the redeployment of the joint force?**
 - **What is the policy for evacuation of equipment used by the joint force?**
- **Has coordination for redeployment of the joint force been conducted with appropriate commands, agencies, and other organizations?**
- **Has consideration been given as to when Reserve Components forces will be released?**
- **Has transition planning been accomplished in the event that operations are transitioning to another military force, regional organization, United Nations, or civilian organization?**
- **What arrangements have been made with other organizations to accomplish the post-conflict activities? For example, will there be humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure assistance requirements?**
- **Will the joint force be expected to support these types of activities?**

Figure VII-3. Sample Checklist for Termination Planning

(f) The CMOC is heavily involved in the transition process. The CMOC prepares to hand over its role as the facilitator between US forces and IOs, NGOs, other USG agencies, and local government agencies. CMOC personnel prepare a transition plan that includes all ongoing projects and coordination, points of contact for all agencies with which the CMOC has worked, possible resources, and any other information that may facilitate the transition process.

CMOC is discussed in more depth in Chapter IV, “Organization and Command Relationships.”

(g) All CMO assets involved in a mission must be prepared to assist in the planning and execution of transition operations. The civil dimension may be the most complex portion of this process. It is imperative that all teams and/or sections develop historical files to aid in the transition process. **The transition process must be considered from the initial planning of the mission.** CA play a major role in this planning because of their expertise and ability to operate with a variety of organizations.

(h) Figure VII-4 depicts a sample checklist for transition planning.

For further information on transition and termination planning, refer to the JP 3-0 series of publications and JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

g. Force Protection

(1) Force protection includes actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the adversary. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the adversary or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Elements of force protection include but are not limited to the following:

(a) **Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense.** US forces use hazard avoidance, protection of individuals and units, and decontamination to conduct sustained operations in NBC and WMD environments.

For further guidance concerning NBC, refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.

(b) **Antiterrorism.** Antiterrorism programs support force protection by establishing measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. These measures may include limited response and containment by local military forces. They also consist of defensive measures to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, information, and equipment.

For further guidance on antiterrorism, refer to JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.

SAMPLE CHECKLIST FOR TRANSITION PLANNING

- Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?
- Have stated operational objectives been accomplished?
- Who will fund the transition?
- What is the new mission?
- What US forces, equipment, and/or supplies will remain behind?
- What will be the command relationship for US forces that remain behind?
- What will be the communications requirements for US forces that remain behind?
- Who will support US forces that remain behind?
- Can intelligence be shared with the incoming force or organization?
- Will new rules of engagement be established?
- Will ongoing operations (e.g., engineer projects) be discontinued or interrupted?
- Will the United States be expected to provide communications capability to the incoming force or organization?
- Will the incoming force or organization use the same headquarters facility as the joint force?
- What is the policy for redeployment of the joint force?
- Will sufficient security be available to provide force protection? Who provides it?
- How will the turnover be accomplished?
- Who will handle public affairs for the transition?
- Have redeployment airlift and sealift arrangements been approved and passed to the United States Transportation Command?

Figure VII-4. Sample Checklist for Transition Planning

(c) **Security.** Security of forces and means enhances force protection by identifying and reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security operations protect flanks and rear areas in the operational area. Physical security measures deter, detect, and defend critical installations, facilities, information, and systems against threats from intelligence assets, terrorists, criminals, and unconventional forces. Measures include fencing and perimeter stand-off space, lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and electronic surveillance, and access control devices and systems. Physical security measures, like any defense, should be overlapping and deployed in depth.



This photograph depicts the tragic conclusion of a terrorist attack on the US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Force protection planning is a must for US forces

For further guidance on physical security measures, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations, and JP 3-10.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.

(d) **Operations Security.** Effective OPSEC measures minimize the “signature” of joint force activities, avoid set patterns, and employ deception when patterns cannot be altered. OPSEC measures are an integral element of information operations. Although strategic OPSEC measures are important, the most effective methods manifest themselves at the lowest level. Varying patrol routes, staffing guard posts and towers at irregular intervals, and conducting vehicle and personnel searches and identification checks on a set but unpredictable pattern discourage terrorist activity.

For further guidance concerning OPSEC, refer to JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.

(e) **Law Enforcement.** Law enforcement aids in force protection through the prevention, detection, response, and investigation of crime. A cooperative police program involving military and civilian and/or HN law enforcement agencies directly contributes to overall force protection.

(f) **Personal Security.** Personal security measures consist of common-sense rules of on- and off-duty conduct for every Service member. They also include use of individual protective equipment, use of hardened vehicles and facilities, employment of dedicated guard forces, and use of duress alarms.

(2) **Planning for Force Protection**

(a) JFCs and their subordinate commanders must address force protection during

all phases of deliberate and crisis action planning. All aspects of force protection must be considered and threats minimized to ensure maximum operational success. JFCs and their subordinate commanders must implement force protection measures appropriate to all anticipated threats, to include terrorists.

“ . . . I try to make the point that there is no way to guarantee 100 percent force protection while accomplishing the variety of missions we undertake out there. Somewhere, sometime, we are going to lose people again to terrorist or other actions that take advantage of our own less-than-perfect protective measures.”

General Anthony Zinni, US Marine Corps Commander in Chief, US Central Command, 1997-2000 Address at the US Naval Institute

(b) Supported and supporting commanders must ensure that deploying forces receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and personnel protection requirements prior to and upon arrival in the operational area.

(c) In addition, JFCs and their subordinate commanders must evaluate the deployment of forces and each course of action for the impact of terrorist organizations supporting the threat and those not directly supporting the threat but seeking to take advantage of the situation.

(d) **CA forces must address their particular force protection concerns with JFCs.** For example, it may be inappropriate and counterproductive for CA in full combat attire to conduct liaison with local officials. These type concerns should be addressed early in the planning process. Additionally, CA must address with JFCs how the various elements of force protection (discussed above) impact on how they perform their mission.

(e) CA, because of their ability to work with the populace and their overall expertise, can provide JFCs insight into force protection concerns before they become major issues.

For more detailed discussion of force protection, refer to JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

h. Joint Urban Operations

“Joint urban operations (JUO) are joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on, or against objectives on, a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where manmade construction and the density of noncombatants are the dominant features. . . . Urbanized areas possess all of the characteristics of the natural landscape, coupled with manmade construction and resulting in a complicated and dynamic environment that influences the conduct of military operations in many ways. The most distinguishing characteristic of JUO, however, is not the infrastructure but the density of noncombatants, that fundamentally alters the character of combat and noncombat operations.”

JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations

(1) In any operational area, most of the civil authority and the greater part of the population are likely to reside in one or more urban areas. Because of the numbers and density of civilians,

any urban operation will require a significant CMO (CA) effort on the part of the joint force.

(2) CMO conducted as part of urban operations strive to achieve the same objectives as in other types of operations. These are

(a) enhance military effectiveness,

(b) support national objectives, and

(c) reduce the negative impact of military operations or other destructive force on civilians.

(3) CMO and Urban Operations

(a) As with other activities, the complex, physical aspects of urban terrain can hamper CMO. The urban terrain can fragment and channel CMO efforts, particularly HA. It will be difficult to find and reach all those in need of support. Constricted terrain makes it more difficult to control large numbers of people in populace and resources control operations. Urban areas normally offer many buildings usable for shelter, medical care, and other forms of support, but the damage to those structures from military operations or natural or manmade disaster can make them unusable, thus adding to the support difficulties.

(b) Noncombatants are the primary focus of CMO, and urban areas may contain huge numbers of civilians. These numbers may range from the thousands to the millions. Depending on the circumstances, many will be displaced and in need of basic support. Services may be degraded or nonexistent. The requirement to control and support the noncombatant population can easily overwhelm local capabilities. Effective urban CMO requires knowledge of the ethnic, cultural, religious, and attitudinal characteristics of the populace. Noncombatant populations in urban areas are rarely homogenous, therefore effective CMO will require the understanding of neighborhoods, tribal relations, and the basic allegiances and daily life of the inhabitants.

(c) Urban infrastructure may be functioning with some degree of effectiveness, in which case CMO must work through and with local authorities and services. It may be necessary to repair physical infrastructure facilities and means, such as power plants or water stations, as part of CMO. Existing service infrastructure may be totally lacking or overwhelmed by circumstances, requiring the joint force to provide not only basic subsistence and shelter, but the full gamut of support personnel — police, legal, administration, engineer, sanitation, medical, transportation, and other.

(d) The proximity of civilians to military targets increases the requirement to actively screen the joint integrated prioritized target list for indirect fires and minimize the impact of collateral damage. The proximity to civilians increases the risks that diseases and other public health hazards will pose health risks to military personnel.

(4) **CMO Considerations in Joint Urban Operations.** Urban operations will include

CMO. Urban CMO can support overall operational objectives or be the main focus of operations, but are in any case the responsibility of the combatant commander to plan and conduct.

(5) **Planning Considerations.** Planning for CMO support of urban operations is generally the same as for other CMO with special emphasis on the nature of the urban area. General planning considerations were addressed earlier in this chapter. Additional planning considerations are below:

(a) CMO planners should carefully consider these aspects of the urban area — terrain, civilian populace, environment, and infrastructure.

(b) Some other factors to consider include legal implications, communications, culture, education, economic, religious, labor, health, and administrative infrastructure.

(c) NGOs, IOs, and interagency organizations also play a major part in all CMO but may be of more importance in urban operations.

(6) **Synchronization.** CMO must be synchronized both internally and with other operations. The relation of CMO to the overall operation can vary a great deal depending on the situation. Joint urban operations could require the full extent of CMO in one portion of an urban area while another is still being heavily contested. Most likely, regardless of the situation, civilians in the operational area will have a great impact on operations. Planning must be synchronized to ensure CMO and other operations (e.g., combat operations) support the USG overall objectives.

(7) **Support.** CMO may require support in a number of key areas from other forces (e.g., health service support, engineer, and military police).

For further explanation of forces that support CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

(8) **Other Operational Considerations.** The most important urban operation consideration is that CMO will most likely occur simultaneously with, not subsequent to, other operations — including combat. The JFC must therefore identify sufficient forces and synchronize the planning and execution of these operations as well as the support required. The relation of CMO to other operations in joint urban operations will vary, but CMO will be a significant part of any operation.

For further guidance concerning urban operations, refer to JP 3-06, Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations.

i. **Consequence Management (CM).** DOD defines CM as those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation.

(1) **Consequence management support to the United States, its territories, and possessions.** This type of response occurs under the primary jurisdiction of the affected state and local government. The Federal government provides assistance when required. When situations are beyond the capability of the state, the governor may request federal assistance from the President. The President may direct the Federal government to provide supplemental assistance to state and local governments to alleviate the suffering and damage resulting from disasters or emergencies. The agency with primary responsibility for coordination of federal assistance to state and local governments is FEMA. CM involves measures to alleviate the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by emergencies. It includes measures to restore essential government services, protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses, and individuals.

“I believe the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents the greatest threat that the world has ever known. We are finding more and more countries who are acquiring technology — not only missile technology — and are developing chemical weapons and biological weapons capabilities to be used in theater and also on a long range basis. So I think that is perhaps the greatest threat that any of us will face in the coming years.”

**Secretary of Defense
William Cohen January 1999**

(2) The Commander, United States Northern Command acts as the supported combatant commander for all CM operations conducted in the continental United States. The Commander, United States Northern Command exercises OPCON of all DOD forces in such operations with the exception of joint special operations task forces and the US Corps of Engineers supporting the lead Federal agency.

(a) United States Northern Command and United States Pacific Command are responsible for planning and executing military assistance to civil authorities for CM of incidents relating to CBRNE situations within the United States, its territories, and possessions that fall within their respective areas of responsibility.

(b) Additionally, there are standing forces such as Joint Task Force-Civil Support and two Army Response Task Forces (East and West) that may be tasked by US Northern Command to respond to CM situations. Other organizations with specific missions to respond to CM situations include the US Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, the US Army’s Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team, US Navy Response Task Force, and two US Air Force Response Task Forces (Air Combat Command and United States Air Forces Europe). The President also can federalize the National Guard Civil Support Teams.

(3) The Commander, United States Northern Command acts as the supported combatant commander for all CM operations conducted in Puerto Rico or the US Virgin Islands.

(4) The Commander, United States Pacific Command acts as the supported combatant commander for all CM operations conducted in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, American Samoa, or any of the other US possessions in the Pacific area of responsibility.

For further detail on consequence management support in the United States, refer to JP 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, and JP 3-07.7, Joint Doctrine for Civil Support.

(5) **Support to foreign consequence management.** DOD support to foreign CM operations focuses on providing specialized assistance to the Department of State, the lead Federal agency, or in response to the use of CBRNE contaminants against an ally, regional friend, or vital interest of the United States.

(6) Primary responsibility for managing and mitigating the effects of foreign weapons of mass destruction incident resides with the HN government. The Department of State is designated as the lead Federal agency for foreign consequence management operations in support of a foreign government. All DOD support will be coordinated through the responsible US Embassy Chief of Mission and Country Team.

For further detail concerning foreign consequence management, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3214.01, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management, and JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(7) **Civil Affairs Support to Consequence Management**

(a) CA will coordinate with appropriate USG agencies for support to CM operations.

(b) In CM operations, CA forces may provide liaison to USG agencies, conduct assessments of the situation, or provide other expertise as required.

j. **Mortuary Affairs**

“Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for controlling and coordinating mortuary affairs operations for the search, recovery, tentative identification, care, and evacuation of deceased personnel within their theaters. The responsibility extends not only to deceased personnel of US forces, but also to friendly, third country, and enemy dead. For humanitarian, health, and morale reasons, this responsibility may extend to the local populace. This responsibility also pertains to both military and civilian mass-fatality incidents.”

JP 4-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations

(1) The death of civilians and noncombatants presents a unique set of circumstances that requires specific political and cultural sensitivities. While not responsible for mortuary affairs, CA with their expertise in cultural awareness and contact with civil organizations may very well be the only answer.

(2) CA could act as intermediaries between the affected organization and the families to ensure the command honors cultural traditions and complies with local national regulations.

(3) CA can assist local agencies interface with military assets providing support to remove the remains. This can include handling customs, location of storage facilities, burial sites, and transportation options.

(4) CA advise the command on cultural traditions impacting the handling and removing of remains.

For further guidance on mortuary affairs, refer to JP 4-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.

k. Humanitarian Demining Operations. The general role of CA in these types of operations is to assist SOF and other forces in their efforts in supporting USG and geographic combatant commands in achieving their objectives.

(1) CA execute programs that build capabilities in management, administration, logistics, equipment maintenance, communications, and data processing. CA are instrumental in the establishment of the HN Humanitarian Demining Office and the coordination of support with NGOs and IOs.

(a) Special forces teams train HN cadre in techniques to locate, identify, and destroy landmines and unexploded ordnance.

(b) PSYOP teams assist HN governments develop and implement mine awareness programs to train local populations to identify, avoid, and report locations of landmines and unexploded ordnance until these threats are removed.

(c) CA train the HN demining headquarters in management and C2 of its subordinate elements. CA also provide liaison with the USG, United Nations, IOs, and local organizations to coordinate support of the HN demining infrastructure.

(2) CA possess the expertise to support other SOF, conventional forces, and civilian organizations in humanitarian demining operations. CA possess the unique skills that foster relationships with the civilian community, which allow them to be a logical choice as part of a team to assist foreign nations in demining operations.

For further guidance on military support to humanitarian demining operations, refer to CJCSI 3207.01, Military Support to Humanitarian Demining Operations, and JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

“DOD personnel are prohibited from actively participating in mine clearing operations or entering mined areas. The DOD HD [humanitarian demining] training program supports HN [host nation] efforts to clear minefields by destroying mines and incidental associated unexploded ordnance (UXO) in place; it does not support HN efforts to render mines and UXO safe.”

CJCSI 3207.1, Military Support to Humanitarian Demining Operations

1. Negotiation and Mediation

(1) Although negotiation normally is not a primary responsibility for CA, often it falls upon them. As the quotation below illustrates, CA often find themselves in the role of a negotiator, mediator, or even arbitrator at some point during operations. Each role requires different attributes, but there are many common ones and the following focuses on those common attributes and techniques.

(a) Negotiations do not exist in a vacuum. It is important to understand the broader issues of conflict and their changing nature.

(b) In many operations, it is essential to maintain dialogue with all parties, groups, and organizations — including of course the government if one exists, but also the opposition or various factions or militias.

(c) It also is important not to allow any one incident to destroy dialogue (even if force is applied) — creating an atmosphere of hostility will not lead to a resolution.

(2) Negotiation is an exercise in persuasion. It is a way to advance the command's interests by jointly decided action. Cooperation of the other parties is a must; consider them partners in solving problems.

“US Army reservist Maj. [Major] Robert Levalley [443rd Civil Affairs Battalion] is a negotiator, responsible for easing tensions between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs. . . . The building boom has Vica’s Serbs virtually up in arms and threatening to pack up and leave their houses, or, still worse, to rally the thousands of other Serbs in the area and confront their Albanian neighbors. As the minority in Kosovo, the Serbs feel the ubiquitous construction is giving the Albanians a permanency that will make it hard for Serbs to retain a foothold in the province. They are quick to use threats to gain leverage with the Americans. . . . Exasperated after months of unresolved back-and-forth on the building issue, Levalley can only ask for patience and further negotiations. ‘Try to have faith, try to hang in there,’ Levalley says. ‘We’ll meet again on Monday or Tuesday. And don’t leave.’ . . . Levalley is lucky if he can make even a small difference. He is one of just 60 civil affairs officers in the American sector, the only unit in a mission of more than 5,000 soldiers whose job is to deal directly with and mediate between Albanians and Serbs. . . . ‘We have to interact with the people,’ says Levalley ‘We’re beginning to make a difference.’”

Newsweek
14 August 2000

(3) Think carefully about the full range of the force's interests and prepare thoroughly for the full range of interests of the other parties. What are the underlying interests behind a particular position that a party has taken on a particular issue? People negotiate for different reasons such as:

(a) tasks (e.g., the lease of a compound);

(b) relationships (e.g., to get to know the other party and find out more information)

about whom that person is);

(c) status (e.g., legitimacy as a participant in the eyes of others).

(4) Think carefully about alternatives in negotiating an agreement. How will you as a negotiator be most persuasive in educating others to see a negotiated settlement as being in their best interests?

(5) Be attuned to cultural differences. Actions can have different connotations. The use of language can be different; yes may mean no. How people reason and what constitutes facts and what principles apply are shaped by culture. Solutions often are best when they come from the factions themselves. Nonverbal behavior such as the symbolic rituals or protocols of the arrangement for a meeting also is important. It is particularly important to look at opportunities for small interim agreements that can be seen as “trust building” steps that are necessary when it will take time to reach agreement on larger issues.

(6) Negotiations will be conducted at several levels: negotiations among US agencies and departments; between the multinational partners; between the joint force and United Nations agencies; between the joint force and local leaders. This complex web of negotiations requires the following to build consensus: tact, diplomacy, honesty, open mindedness, patience, fairness, effective communications, cross-cultural sensitivity, and careful planning.

“There are no panaceas or cookbook answers to negotiations and mediation and the broader context of conflict management and resolution. The process is complex and what works in one situation may not be applicable in the next operation.”

US Army Peacekeeping Institute

(7) **Procedures for Negotiation and Mediation.** Successful negotiations should be based on the following steps:

(a) **Establish communications.** The first step is to establish an effective means of communicating with the political and/or faction leader(s). Do not assume that certain leaders or elements are opposed to your efforts without careful investigation. Insist on fact finding before forming any opinions.

(b) **Carefully develop a strategic plan and diagram the results of your analysis.** Useful questions to answer in this analysis are:

1. What are the main issues?
2. Who are the relevant parties? First order? Second? Third?
3. What are these parties’ publicly stated positions? Privately stated positions?
4. What are the underlying interests behind these positions?

5. What are the bottom-line needs of each party?

6. What are their concerns? Fears? To what degree does “historical baggage” affect them?

(c) **There will be a negotiation on the conduct of negotiations.** This process must be addressed in the initial planning sessions.

(d) **Set clear goals and objectives.** Know what the joint force is trying to accomplish as well as the limits of its authority. Think carefully about how the joint force wants to approach the issues. Settle the easy issues first. Settle issue by issue in some order. Look to create linkages or to separate nonrelated issues. For example, security issues might be separated from logistic issues. Consider having details worked out at later sessions with the right people. Understand these sessions also will be negotiations.

(e) **Work with the parties to identify common ground on which to build meaningful dialogue.** Expect to spend considerable time determining the exact problem(s). At this stage, be problem-oriented rather than solution-oriented.

1. If a party perceives more benefits from an alternative to negotiations than to any outcome negotiations could produce, do not expect that party to negotiate to achieve an agreement. You need to educate and persuade them that negotiations will in fact produce the most benefits.

2. Focus on underlying interests. Differences in the relative value of interests, forecasts of future events, aversion to risk, and time preferences may offer opportunities to develop options for mutual gain.

3. Learn from the parties. Seek ways through partnering with them to find possible alternatives beyond their present thinking.

4. When necessary, assume the role of convener, facilitator, or mediator. Be patient.

(f) **Composition of negotiating forum and decision making mechanisms.** In some cases a committee or council can be formed with appropriate representation from the various interested parties. It is critical to identify the right participants in advance. For example, will it include Chief of Mission and JFC-level, mid-level, or working-level personnel?

1. In deciding what constitutes the appropriate construct for a meeting, consider the culture. For example, what role do women play in the society? How is status defined in the culture?

2. Composition of the committee or council also may include legal advisors, political representatives (e.g., Department of State, United Nations agencies, or others), military

representatives, and other civilian representatives from the joint force, NGOs, or IOs.

3. Members should possess the status and ability to deal with the leadership representing all involved parties.

4. For those members seen as part of the joint force, it is important that they understand the issues and speak with one voice. This will require a prior coordination within the joint force's delegation. They must understand policy and direction from higher authority.

5. Negotiations are time-consuming and can be frustrating. As the head negotiator, be attentive to whether you have the people negotiating who can effectively recommend that their superiors ratify an agreement reached. Are all the decision makers who will determine whether or not the agreement reached is implemented represented in the committee or council?

6. A supportive climate needs to be developed for the decision makers to complete an agreement. In that vein, it is useful to talk to those who are not decision makers but from whom the decision makers will need support. In this way, they may assist you in helping their decision makers reach agreement.

7. In zones of severe conflict and state collapse, it is frequently difficult to determine the legitimate community leaders with whom any lasting agreement must be made.

8. The JFC must ensure that all of his or her negotiators understand the scope and latitude of their authority. Their requirement to obtain the JFC's prior approval will empower them in their role as negotiator and/or mediator.

(g) **Establish the venue.** What is the manner in which meetings can be called? Can a neutral ground be found that is acceptable to all sides? Should US representatives go to the factional leader's location, or will this improperly affect the negotiations? What about the details such as the seating arrangements or specific settings traditionally used in the culture?

1. Selection of a negotiating venue also should be based on security for all involved parties, accessibility, availability of communications facilities, and comfort.

2. Ensure that appropriate information arising from or relevant to the negotiations is shared with all parties. The timing of this sharing may vary depending on the circumstances.

3. Sharing of information notwithstanding, all information generated from the negotiations may be held in confidence until officially released. That decision will depend on the nature of the talks. For example, if publicity may help create support and empower the negotiators to agree, release of information may be constructive. Flexibility is needed here rather than a hard and fast rule.

(h) **Cultural considerations.**

1. There are organizational cultures within the various agencies and departments of the USG that shape the context of negotiations. Equally important are national cultural differences.

2. It is imperative that experienced interpreters be part of the negotiating team. What is critical is their understanding of the cultural context of terms used. The team needs more than literal translators.

3. Negotiation is only one means of resolving conflict. It is worthwhile to consider indigenous conflict resolution techniques in selecting an approach. Adapting your techniques to indigenous ones (degradation of US objectives is not acceptable) may improve the prospects for a settlement.

4. There are differences in styles of reasoning, manner in which an individual negotiates, who carries authority, and behavior in such dimensions as protocol and time. For example, in our culture it is accepted that one may offer concessions early in a negotiation to reach an agreement. That approach may not have the same connotation in other cultures. Moreover, the concept of compromise, which has a positive connotation for Americans, may have a negative one in other cultures.

5. Where we as Americans tend to be direct problem solvers with a give-and-take approach, other cultures are indirect, most concerned with the long-term relationship, historical context, and principles. Issues of symbolism, status, and face may be important considerations.

6. For example, answers may not be direct and you will have to look for indirect formulations and nonverbal gestures to understand what the other party is telling you. In turn, this means you need to be careful with your wording and gestures so that unintended meanings are not sent. The other party may not say no directly to a proposal but that is what is meant.

7. If you cannot reach agreement, keep the dialogue going. At a minimum, seek agreement on when the parties will meet again. Look for something to keep the momentum alive. Go back to earlier discussions on common ground. Seek to keep trust alive in the process.

8. Within your own team, consider selecting one person who understands conflict dynamics and cross-cultural issues to look at the process of the negotiations and advise you. This individual can watch for body language and other indicators of how the process is working. In turn, he or she may be able to coach the JTF negotiators in more effective techniques.

(i) Implementation.

1. At the conclusion of negotiations, a report should be prepared to ensure all accomplishments, agreements, and disagreements are recorded for future use.

2. Consider giving one person the task of reporting and presenting to all participants what has taken place. This can build trust in the process if it is viewed as an honest effort to understand each side's position.

4. Coordination with Other Government Agencies

“The indisputable fact is that mission success depends upon combining military and civilian knowledge, skills, and capabilities: political, security, information, humanitarian, economic, and perhaps institutional building.”

**Ambassador Robert Oakley
National Defense University Symposium June 1999**

a. In CMO, coordination with other government agencies may be one of the top priorities. By understanding the interagency process, JFCs will be better able to appreciate their role in it. An appreciation of the skills and resources of various USG agencies and an understanding of how they interact with NGOs, IOs, and regional organizations is critical to mission accomplishment. Civil-military relations can create economic, political, and social stability as they facilitate communications and encourage the development of the affected nation’s materiel and human resources. JFCs utilize Annex V, “Interagency Coordination,” of plans and orders to provide guidance for incorporating the interagency community into military operations.

(1) The significance of the close coordination between CMO and interagency operations is that CA throughout history have displayed the ability to coordinate and work with a multitude of agencies and organizations.

(2) Much of the success of CA in dealing with these many varied agencies and organizations is based on their diverse backgrounds (e.g., lawyers, engineers, agriculturalists, and city planners).

b. Interagency Operations at the National Level. For the purposes of this publication, the term “interagency operations” refers to coordination, liaison, and other actions and activities taken “in the field” to promote unity of effort and mission accomplishment.

(1) The May 1997, White Paper concerning Presidential Decision Directive 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, states that integrated planning and effective management of agency operations early on in an operation can avoid delays, reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways, and create unity of effort within an operation that is essential for success of the mission.

(2) The intent of Presidential Decision Directive 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, however, is to define and describe actions and activities, including training, at the highest levels of the USG.

(3) The integration of political, economic, civil, and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of operations.

(4) The new, rapidly changing global environment that is characterized by regional instability, the challenges of pluralistic governments, and unconventional threats will require even

greater interagency cooperation with a fully functioning civil-military relationship. **Military operations must be synchronized with those of other agencies of the USG, as well as with multinational forces, NGOs, IOs, and regional organizations.** These actions must be mutually supporting and respect each others' mandates. In order to successfully undertake interagency operations, the roles and relationships among various Federal agencies, combatant commands, state and local governments, US Embassy Country Team, and other engaged organizations must be clearly understood and effectively coordinated.

(5) Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG as well as NGOs and IOs. Successful interagency coordination and planning enables these agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent, coordinated, and effective collective operation — unity of effort must be achieved. CA must have freedom of movement in the operational area to facilitate access to the community, NGOs, IOs, and others.

(6) **The common thread throughout all major operations, whether in war or MOOTW, is the broad range of agencies** — many with indispensable practical competencies and major legal responsibilities — **that interact with the Armed Forces of the United States.**

(7) **The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that planners consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these instruments to achieve the objective.** This consideration is especially necessary because the security challenges facing the United States today are growing in complexity, requiring the skills and resources of many organizations.

(8) Because **the solution to a problem seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of just one agency,** campaign plans, OPLANs, or OPORDs must be developed to leverage the core competencies of all available agencies, synchronizing their efforts with military capabilities toward a single objective. The President and/or Secretary of Defense employ the Armed Forces of the United States when they have deemed it necessary to use military means to promote national interests. The use of the military instrument of power as a component of the national security strategy takes the form of military objectives. These objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives. The military instrument often plays a supporting role to other national agencies. Understanding how military coordination efforts interface with other organizations toward mission accomplishment is key to the success in joint operations and unified actions.

(9) **Each organization brings its own unique capabilities and resources to the interagency table.** The synergy developed by combining these capabilities and resources is the strength of this interagency process. In one coordinated forum, the process integrates many views, capabilities, and options.

"I have a sense that what we sorely lack are effective means to really communicate with each other well in advance of any crisis. Because, as I said, a crisis is a crisis is a crisis. You basically need very much the same thing — maybe in different amounts and at different times. All this is contingent on being able to understand exactly what the other person, player, or organization is bringing to the table. You need a mechanism to do that. Right now, within the humanitarian community worldwide, that mechanism simply does not exist."

Mr. Roy Williams
Director, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
National Defense University Symposium June 1999

5. Coordination with International Organizations

a. Responding to humanitarian situations is a fundamental responsibility of the IOs system. This responsibility runs from the immediate response to the long-term amelioration of a crisis. This community will be represented by one or more of its agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or the World Food Program.

b. The body within this community charged with the coordination of the IOs humanitarian activities is the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). It does not, however, have the authority to enforce coordination. It plays a more facilitating and informational role. It also has responsibility for organizing the Consolidated Appeals Document, which presents to the donor community the best thinking of the IO community on their needs in relation to a specific crisis or crisis area.

c. The IOs relate to the United Nations OCHA in organizing joint assessments and reporting to the donor community.

d. IOs generally will have specific responsibility for certain specialties. For example, a major logistic role is played by the World Food Program in the delivery of food and determination of an appropriate nutrition standard. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees takes the lead in providing legal protection and material support to refugees or those in refugee-like situations.

e. The role of the IOs, along with that of the NGOs, is fundamental to the resolution or stabilizing of a humanitarian situation. They will be present and it is essential that contact be made at the earliest opportunity.

f. Taking individual action in reaction to an occurrence or perceived need without some form of consultation with the IO community can easily backfire. Providing humanitarian daily ration as an immediate solution to a food crisis can be exactly the wrong thing to do. While such relief efforts may provide a critical stopgap allowing civilian agencies to overcome a temporary problem, it may further distort the local market and cause its collapse.

g. Typically, the United Nations OCHA will have set up a coordination center. The NGOs will be aware of its location and role as will the US Embassy. The United Nations OCHA also will be in

contact with government ministries (if the government is functioning) as the main responsibility eventually will fall into the hands of the host country.

h. Prior to arrival in country, it is advisable to contact the United Nations OCHA headquarters in Geneva. This office will have the informational and communications links that will assist the military's in reaching its end state. It also should be the focal point for advance planning and sharing of information on objectives.

6. Coordination with Nongovernmental Organizations

a. The NGO community is a multifaceted one. There are a number of larger NGOs with wide experience both in operations and with finding ways to work together. There also are many smaller NGOs with a single programmatic focus. In many cases, they lack experience. They are all, however, highly motivated and often feel uncomfortable in dealing with a more structured community such as the military.

b. When humanitarian organizations choose, they set up coordinating structures usually by sectors such as health and food. One of the military's first tasks is to establish contact with these entities or any NGOs capable of providing assistance in contacting the larger community. A positive and open approach to this sort of outreach bears big dividends when it comes time to organize a CMOC. When possible and within force protection restraints, the military should coordinate with humanitarian organizations in the most open forum as possible (i.e., outside the wire). This type of cooperation will foster a better relationship between the military and humanitarian organizations.

c. The military may expect that NGOs come with a variety of resources but will, very often, lack logistic capability. That requirement will be high on their list of expectations on what the military brings to the problem.

d. NGOs probably will have arrived in the operational area before the military and often plan on staying for an extended period beyond the end of the present emergency. In some cases, they will have had a long history in the affected country working on development-oriented projects. NGOs often will have a very good sense of the place and situation.

"Ironically, the major supply problem was that there was much on hand. Humanitarian relief was flooding into Bangladesh, but it could not be moved to the forward areas. This was particularly true for items too big or too delicate to be manhandled by Bangladeshi workers. Non-government [nongovernmental] relief workers and government officials understood the problem, but were helpless to do much because they lacked the proper equipment; therefore, the assets the amphibious task force brought to Bangladesh became crucial to the operation's success."

Angels from the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh
Charles R. Smith

e. This knowledge and understanding should not, however, be equated with military intelligence. **NGOs will share what they know of the environment and conditions in general but they will hesitate or refuse to cooperate if there are any implications that this comes under the heading of "intelligence gathering."**

f. Conversely, NGOs will expect that the military will function as a partner in dealing with a difficult situation. For example, information on mine locations and areas of hostility should be shared. The daily security briefings in Pristina, Kosovo, conducted by the military became a rallying point for the entire humanitarian community.

g. NGOs see themselves as neutral. Their security often is dependent upon the host community sharing that perception.

h. A responsible end state will, in all likelihood, depend upon the manner in which the responsibilities of the military's presence are implemented in cooperation with the humanitarian community at large.

7. Additional Recommendations in Working with International Organizations and Nongovernmental Organizations

a. Whenever possible, the military should encourage civilian humanitarian/disaster relief professionals and their organizations to mutually plan, conduct, participate in or cooperate with CMO, FHA, and CA activities. Sharing pertinent information, particularly that related to security, will enhance communication between the military and these humanitarian organizations.

b. It should be recognized that, by and large, the humanitarian organizations will be in the operational area long before the military arrives and will be there long after the military departs. The military can learn from these organizations and assist in their programs — their effectiveness is a key to the military end state.

c. The hierarchical structures of the military and IOs/NGOs are different and this is especially apparent in the area of decision making. The military values planning, preparation, and timely staffing to provide a foundation for its leadership to make decisions. While IO/NGO hierarchies involve countries and boards of directors, operational level decision making is delegated to field level where the decisions are also implemented. Field level decisions are frequently made by consensus. Accordingly, the military should maintain flexibility in its dealing with IOs/NGOs and appreciate that different structures and corporate cultures are at work.

d. The military should understand and appreciate the specific mandates and operational requirements of IOs (especially the Red Cross) and NGOs and anticipate their need for operational independence and autonomy.

"Many of the nongovernmental organizations, such as CARE and the Red Crescent Society, had provided relief in Bangladesh for years and were accustomed to operating in their own ways, and all vied for a 'piece of the action'."

Angels from the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh
Charles R. Smith

e. NGOs, IOs, and other humanitarian players might possess information that could be relevant to military CMO but they may be unable to divulge that information to the military when doing so will jeopardize their organization's charter of impartiality and independence. The appearance of partiality or

no longer being independent can adversely effect these organizations ability to continue working in the operational area.

f. Coordination centers should be used to the greatest extent possible to facilitate communications while building trust and respect for the mandates of all organizations working with the military.

For further guidance on interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, and JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX A REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-57.1 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Treaties Available Through US Government Publications

a. The Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of August 12, 1949 (1949 GC), which include the following treaties to which the USG is a party:

(1) Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (GWS).

(2) Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GWS SEA).

(3) Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW).

(4) Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC).

b. Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907.

2. Federal Statutes

a. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, PL 99-433 (as amended and codified in various sections of title 10, USC, particularly 161-167).

b. National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1987, PL 99-661 (codified in various sections of title 10, USC, and other titles).

c. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, PL 87-195 (codified as amended in various sections of title 22, USC).

d. Title 10, USC section 401, "Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations."

3. Executive Branch Document

"US Capabilities to Engage in Low Intensity Conflict and Conduct Special Operations," the President's Report to Congress, 1987.

4. DOD Publications

- a. DODD 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*.
- b. DODD 2100.3, CH-1, *US Policy Relative to Commitments to Foreign Governments under Foreign Assistance Programs*.
- c. DODD 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)*.
- d. DODD 3025.12, *Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)*.
- e. DODD 3025.14, *Protection & Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad*.
- f. DODD 4715.9, *Environmental Planning and Analysis*.
- g. DODD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components*.
- h. DODD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*.
- i. DODD 5100.77, *DOD Law of War Program*.
- j. DODD 5125.1, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD[RA])*.
- k. DODD 5132.3, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance*.
- l. DODD 5525.1, *Status of Forces Policies & Information*.
- m. DODD 5530.3, *International Agreements*.
- n. DODD 6050.7, *Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Department of Defense Actions*.
- o. DOD Instruction 4715.5, *Management of Environmental Compliance at Overseas Installations*.
- p. DOD Instruction 4715.5-G, *Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document*.

5. Joint Publications

- a. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.
- b. JP 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*.
- c. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

- d. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*.
- e. JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*.
- f. JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*.
- g. JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*.
- h. JP 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism*.
- i. JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*.
- j. JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.
- k. JP 3-07.7, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Support*.
- l. JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*.
- m. JP 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments*.
- n. JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*.
- o. JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*.
- p. JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*.
- q. JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*.
- r. JP 3-54, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security*.
- s. JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*.
- t. JP 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*.
- u. JP 4-04, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support*.
- v. JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*.
- w. JCS Memorandum 71-87, *Mission and Functions of the US Special Operations Command*.
- x. MJCS-0124-88, *Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program*.
- y. CJSCI 3110.12, *Annex L (Civil Affairs) to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.

z. CJCSI 3207.01, *Military Support to Humanitarian Demining Operations*.

aa. CJCSI 3214.01, *Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations*.

bb. CJCSM 3113.01A, *Theater Engagement Planning*.

cc. CJCSM 3122.03A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II Planning Formats and Guidance*.

dd. CJCSM 3500.07, *Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide*.

6. Army Publications

a. AR 190-8, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, Retained Personnel, and Other Detainees*.

b. FM 1-27.10, *Law of Land Warfare*.

c. FM 3-0, *Operations*.

d. FM 3-05, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations*.

e. FM 3-05.30 (FM 33-1), *Psychological Operations*.

f. FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*.

g. FM 3-19-40, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons*.

7. Marine Corps Publications

a. NAVMC 2890, *Small Wars Manual*.

b. FMFM 7-34, *Civil Affairs*.

c. FMFRP 7-8-1, *Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*.

d. FMFRP 14-3, *Operational Concept for Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC))*.

e. MCWP 3-33.1, *MAGTF Civil-Military Operations*.

8. Coast Guard Publication

Model Maritime Service Code

9. Other

a. Allied Joint Pub 9, *NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine*.

b. Mine Action Information Center, James Madison University, *The Role of Civil Affairs in Mine Action*.

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX B
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Special Operations Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Change Recommendations

- a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//
CDRUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SOOP-JD//
CDRUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA//JW100//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

- b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

- c. Record of Changes:

| CHANGE NUMBER | COPY NUMBER | DATE OF CHANGE | DATE ENTERED | POSTED BY | REMARKS |
|---------------|-------------|----------------|--------------|-----------|---------|
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the joint publication is not available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 15 November 1999, *Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands*.

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL
1655 Woodson Road
Attn: Joint Publications
St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point
700 Robbins Avenue
Bldg 1, Customer Service
Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)
814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321
Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant Coast Guard (G-OPD), US Coast Guard
2100 2nd Street, SW
Washington, DC 20593-0001

Commander
USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102
Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)
116 Lake View Parkway
Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, *Information Security Program*.

Intentionally Blank

GLOSSARY
PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|--------------|--|
| AC | Active Component |
| AFNSEP | Air Force National Security and Emergency Preparedness Agency |
| ANG | Air National Guard |
| ASD (SO/LIC) | Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) |
| C2 | command and control |
| CA | civil affairs |
| CACOM | Civil Affairs command |
| CAG | civil affairs group |
| CBRNE | chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive |
| CDRUSSOCOM | Commander, United States Special Operations Command |
| CIMIC | civil-military cooperation |
| CJCSI | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction |
| CJCSM | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual |
| CM | consequence management |
| CMO | civil-military operations |
| CMOC | civil-military operations center |
| COCOM | combatant command (command authority) |
| CONPLAN | operation plan in concept format |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| DODD | Department of Defense Directive |
| DODI | Department of Defense instruction |
| ESG | executive steering group |
| FEMA | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| FHA | foreign humanitarian assistance |
| FID | foreign internal defense |
| HA | humanitarian assistance |
| HACC | humanitarian assistance coordination center |
| HCA | humanitarian and civic assistance |
| HN | host nation |
| HOC | humanitarian operations center |
| HQ | headquarters |
| IO | international organization |
| J-3 | operations directorate of a joint staff |

Glossary

| | |
|--------|---|
| JCMOTF | joint civil-military operations task force |
| JFC | joint force commander |
| JOPEs | Joint Operation Planning and Execution System |
| JP | joint publication |
| JTF | joint task force |
| LOAC | law of armed conflict |
| MACA | military assistance to civil authorities |
| MAGTF | Marine air-ground task force |
| MEF | Marine expeditionary force |
| MOOTW | military operations other than war |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NBC | nuclear, biological, and chemical |
| NGO | nongovernmental organization |
| NSC | National Security Council |
| OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| OFDA | Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance |
| OPCON | operational control |
| OPLAN | operation plan |
| OPORD | operation order |
| OPSEC | operations security |
| OSD | Office of the Secretary of Defense |
| OSOCC | on-site operations coordination center |
| PSYOP | psychological operations |
| RC | Reserve Components |
| SO | special operations |
| SOC | special operations command |
| SOF | special operations forces |
| SOOP | Center for Operations, Plans, and Policy |
| TSCP | theater security cooperation plan |
| TSOC | theater special operations command |
| USAF | United States Air Force |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USC | United States Code |
| USG | United States Government |
| USMC | United States Marine Corps |
| USN | United States Navy |

| | |
|---------|--|
| USSOCOM | United States Special Operations Command |
| UW | unconventional warfare |
| WMD | weapons of mass destruction |

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. Also called CA administration. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs agreement. An agreement that governs the relationship between allied armed forces located in a friendly country and the civil authorities and people of that country. (JP 1-02)

civil defense. All those activities and measures designed or undertaken to: a. minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused or which would be caused by an enemy attack on the United States; b. deal with the immediate emergency conditions that would be created by any such attack; and c. effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such attack. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations center. An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental

organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called CMOC. (JP 1-02)

civil requirements. The necessary production and distribution of all types of services, supplies, and equipment during periods of armed conflict or occupation to ensure the productive efficiency of the civilian economy and to provide civilians the treatment and protection to which they are entitled under customary and conventional international law. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through the subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called CDR. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CBT. (JP 1-02)

consequence management. Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required. Also called CM. (JP 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

country team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

crisis management. Measure to resolve a hostile situation and investigate and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law. Crisis management will include a response to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction, special improvised explosive device, or a hostage crisis that is beyond the capability of the lead federal agency (JP 1-02)

dislocated civilian. A broad term that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an expellee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also called DC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02).

displaced person. A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country. (JP 1-02)

domestic emergencies. Emergencies affecting the public welfare and occurring within the 50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, US possessions and territories, or any political subdivision thereof, as a result of enemy attack, insurrection, civil disturbance, earthquake, fire, flood, or other public disasters or equivalent emergencies that endanger life and property or disrupt the usual process of government. The term domestic emergency includes any or all of the emergency conditions defined below: a. civil defense emergency — A domestic emergency disaster situation resulting from devastation created by an enemy attack and requiring emergency operations during and following that attack. It may be proclaimed by appropriate authority in anticipation of an attack. b. civil disturbances — Riots, acts of violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages, or other disorders prejudicial to public law and order. The term civil disturbance includes all domestic conditions requiring or likely to require the use of Federal Armed Forces pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 15 of title 10, United States Code. c. major disaster — Any flood, fire, hurricane, tornado, earthquake or other catastrophe which, in the determination of the President, is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant disaster assistance by the Federal Government under Chapter 68 of title 42, United States Code to supplement the efforts and available resources of State and local governments in alleviating the damage, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. d. natural disaster — All domestic emergencies except those created as a result of enemy attack or civil disturbance. (JP 1-02)

domestic support operations. Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies. Also called **DSOs**. (JP 1-02)

evacuee. A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (JP 1-02)

executive agent. A term used to indicate a delegation of authority by the Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on the Secretary's behalf. An agreement between equals does not create an executive agent. For example, a Service cannot become a Department of Defense executive agent for a particular matter with simply the agreement of the other Services; such authority must be delegated by the Secretary of Defense. Designation as executive agent, in and of itself, confers no authority. The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the document designating the executive agent. An executive agent may be limited to providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions, or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources for specified purposes. Also called **EA**. (JP 1-02)

expellee. A civilian outside the boundaries of the country of his or her nationality or ethnic origin who is being forcibly repatriated to that country or to a third country for political or other purposes. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (JP 1-02)

foreign humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called **FHA**. (JP 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called **FID**. (JP 1-02)

foreign nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation when operating outside its national boundaries during war, or operations other than war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations or on behalf of international organizations. Support may come from the nation in which forces are operating. Foreign nation support also may be from third party nations and include support or assistance, such as logistics, rendered outside the operational area. Also called FNS. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02).

host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also called HCA. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian assistance coordination center. A temporary center established by a geographic combatant commander to assist with interagency coordination and planning. A humanitarian assistance coordination center operates during the early planning and coordination stages of foreign humanitarian assistance operations by providing the link between the geographic combatant commander and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international and regional organizations at the strategic level. Also called a HACC. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian demining. Department of Defense and Department of State program to promote the foreign policy interests of the United States by assisting other nations in protecting their populations from landmines and clearing land of the threat posed by landmines remaining after conflict has ended. The humanitarian demining program includes training of host nation deminers, establishment of national demining organizations, provision of demining equipment, mine awareness training, and research development. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian operations center. An interagency policymaking body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation. It normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations, or a United States Government agency during a United States unilateral operation. The humanitarian operations center should consist of representatives from the affected country, the United States Embassy or Consulate, the joint force, the United Nations, nongovernmental and international organizations, and other major players in the operation. Also called HOC. (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (JP 1-02)

internal defense and development. The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. (JP 1-02)

internally displaced person. Any person who has left their residence by reason of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of their own country. (JP 1-02)

international organization. Organizations with global mandates, generally funded by contributions from national governments. Examples include the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and United Nations agencies. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

joint civil-military operations task force. A joint task force composed of civil-military operations units from more than one Service. It provides support to the joint force commander in humanitarian or nation assistance operations, theater campaigns, or a civil-military operations concurrent with or subsequent to regional conflict. It can organize military interaction among many governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies within the theater. Also called JCMOTF. (JP 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

law of war. That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also called the law of armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

migrant. A person who (1) belongs to a normally migratory culture who may cross national boundaries, or (2) has fled his or her native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02)

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

nation assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (JP 1-02)

nongovernmental organizations. Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). "Nongovernmental organizations" is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGOs. (JP 1-02)

operational area. An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, and area of operations. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned

missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

peace operations. A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Also called PO. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02)

refugee. A person who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left their home country or country of their nationality and is unwilling or unable to return. (JP 1-02)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02)

security assistance organization. All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. Also called SAO. (JP 1-02)

special operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02)

special operations command. A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within the joint

force commander's assigned operational area. Also called SOC. (JP 1-02)

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)


stateless person. Civilian who has been denationalized or whose country of origin cannot be determined or who cannot establish a right to the nationality claimed. (JP 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (JP 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-57.1** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

